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***INTELLIGENCE  
IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY***

**Proceedings of the XXI<sup>st</sup> International Conference**



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## ***Foreword***

The *Intelligence in the Knowledge Society* International Conference (IKS), organized annually in Bucharest, under the aegis of the “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy, has become the most important gathering in Central and Eastern Europe for scholars and practitioners in the field of intelligence and security studies.

The conference is the result of a long term effort to determine an enhanced level of understanding and expertise on the most important security challenges, while encouraging the development of an academic perspective on intelligence. Its main goal has always been twofold. On the one hand, through the IKS, we wish to contribute to the developing of a transnational network of scholars, practitioners and experts, coming from both the private and the governmental sector. On the other hand, the conference is designed to facilitate the transfer of knowledge and technology from academia to practitioners and, as one can observe, the heterogeneous nature of the participants that have made us the honor of putting forward their perspectives during the 2015 edition of the event, proves this mission has been achieved.

The 21<sup>st</sup> edition of the Conference approached a broad range of concepts and formats, including lectures by acknowledged experts, open debate sessions on intelligence and security topics as well as interactive workshops.

The debates focused mainly on how the security environment has changed its pace, generating new threats. The 21<sup>st</sup> century has had a profound impact on both society at large and on intelligence organizations. The technological advancement has changed the parameters within which modern warfare is being conducted in ways beyond anything known at the end of the previous century. The emergence of new actors, social movements conducted in the online environment, the subtle shifts of power and influence within a society

have reshaped the map of the international system, placing security organizations under the imperious need to adapt.

The participants debated the best ways for organizations responsible with ensuring national security to change, respond and adapt in order to ensure their survival and optimize their strategies for prevention and mitigation of security risks. As a revolution or transformation leading to a more flexible and adaptive intelligence organization requires a thorough understanding of the roots of competitiveness in intelligence, the participants also discussed the process of organizational learning, from the perspective of evolutionary tendencies, policies implemented, good practices and the degree of innovation necessary for a successful intelligence organization.

The volume reunites the perspectives of both the academia and the private sector on the uncertainty that dominates the security environment, and is dedicated to intelligence practitioners, as well as to intelligence stakeholders: scholars and researchers, decision-makers, representatives of private and non-governmental organizations, and to all citizens that might be interested in knowing more about the topics related to intelligence and security studies.

**The editors**

**INTELLIGENCE THROUGH ANALYTIC LENSES:  
DIACHRONIC VS. SYNCHRONIC PERSPECTIVES**





# REFLECTIONS ON CONTEMPORARY INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

Julian RICHARDS\*

## Abstract

*In 1991, the University of Toronto's History Department held a conference about the history of the study of espionage. The conference revealed eight key themes of analysis in the discipline. Twenty-five years later, an examination of the Intelligence Studies Section in the International Studies Association (ISA) annual convention can throw some interesting light on how and why the subject may have changed. The resulting picture shows a remarkable similarity with the main project areas identified in 1991, but with a preponderance of discussions focusing on the two areas of intelligence machinery in government; and intelligence tradecraft issues. This paper argues that the subject area can further develop by becoming more interdisciplinary, and by continuing its trend of academic diversification beyond the traditional Anglo-Saxon focus.*

**Keywords:** intelligence studies, professionalisation, training, education, interdisciplinarity.

## Introduction

In the immediate post-Cold War period, when many in the intelligence world were scratching their heads and contemplating what the future security and intelligence picture would hold, many in the academic field of Intelligence Studies were feeling similarly reflective about the subject area. Indeed, in November 1991 (just weeks before, as it transpired, the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union) the History department of the University of Toronto had decided to make a discussion about the history of intelligence the subject of a centennial event celebrating the department's founding at the end of the nineteenth century<sup>1</sup>. As Wesley Wark noted of the

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time, the event marked an interesting development in society in that, when Toronto's History department was formed, intelligence would have been "hardly a subject for polite discourse in the academy"<sup>2</sup>. With most of the twentieth century behind them, however, the attendees of the 1991 conference had plenty to talk about and were keen to do so.

Wark's subsequent analysis of the conference and its discussion, interestingly referring to the topic as the study of "espionage" rather than of "intelligence", observed that the unfolding subject had fallen into what he referred to as eight "projects"<sup>3</sup>. A quarter of a century further on from the Toronto conference, it is interesting to review how the emerging subject of Intelligence Studies has developed, both as a subject delivered in universities around the world, and in terms of how it breaks down into its constituent research areas. The key frame of reference taken in this paper for undertaking such an analysis is the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention, which, I would argue, has become the largest and most significant regular gathering of Intelligence Studies scholars on the academic circuit (with all due respect, of course, to the annual IKS conference in Bucharest, which is not far behind!)

### **The picture in 1991**

Before considering the ISA convention, it is worth recalling the project areas that Wark identified as constituting the "study of espionage" from a historical point of view in the early 1990s. The first of these was an empirically-driven research strand of activity, which had been helped over the years by the periodic declassification of papers about key political and military events. Such papers and documentation provide a rich data source for more empirical investigations of the subject. This has continued subsequently, of course, and has arguably become even more possible with the general opening-up of information and discourse about the intelligence world, including the advent of various official inquiries and investigations. Many of these, such as the Iraq Inquiry in the UK, for example, take it as a matter of course that they will declassify and make publicly available on their website a tremendous number of recent documents, all of which form a wonderful resource for the researcher.

What we might describe as good old-fashioned history was very much a key project area in the study of espionage. It goes without saying

that many of the key strategic and political events in human history, whether they concern wars and conflicts or other major events, are underpinned by a rich vein of confidential debate and discussion between government and other actors. When such debates are uncovered in later years, they provide a crucial perspective on our subsequent interpretation of historical events. It is impossible to consider the Cuban Missile Crisis and its effect on Cold War politics, for example, without considering the very central role played in the story by intelligence on all sides.

The third project area in Wark's analysis was the question of definitions of intelligence and espionage. In this respect, Intelligence Studies was no different from most other areas of academic enquiry, which sometimes seem to spend an inordinate amount of time and energy on defining concepts and terms. The next area related to what we might describe as the operational function of intelligence; that is, the way in which the relevant parts of governments, agencies and militaries discharge the business of intelligence, and how they operate, including more often than not an analysis of when things go wrong rather than right (a factor to which I return below).

Theory and methodology formed another key project-area. In part, this relates to a general academic discussion about where Intelligence Studies should fit within the wider context of International Relations or Politics, and which theoretical traditions and approaches should subsequently be used. On the methodological front, the Toronto conference was coming at the question from a primarily historiographical point of view, especially when considering such activities as archival research, but there were and are very real questions to be asked about how effectively one can research a subject like intelligence when most of the information, by definition, is secret and not available to the outside world.

By most definitions, intelligence is nothing if it does not allow policy decisions to be affected in certain ways by what it reveals. The nexus between intelligence and public policy was therefore a key project-area in Wark's analysis, including examinations of how governments and related agencies are organised to process intelligence through their systems. (This was, and is, a key element of the study of intelligence failures.) Added to this, other key vectors in society were rich areas of research in terms of their relationship with intelligence, and particularly investigative journalism and popular culture. These formed the last key project-areas identified by Wark in his analysis of the discipline in the early 1990s.

### **The picture in 2016**

Moving back to the present day, it is worth taking a look at the contemporary picture in the Intelligence Studies Section of the ISA Annual Convention (hereafter ISS-ISA). The ISA annual convention is itself a very large gathering of political scientists from across the world, and the ISS-ISA has been a growing component member of the overall programme. If submissions for paper and panel presentations are any sort of measure of progress, the ISS-ISA has been something of a success story in recent years. Since its launch in 1985, the section has grown to be allocated a record number of panel slots (28) in the 2016 meeting: an increase of approximately a third on the previous year. Submissions to present at the conference remain well above the available slots, making the composition of the programme a challenging task. Attendance at panel presentations in recent conventions has been steadily strong, and has comprised a varied and fascinating mix of practitioners and academics from a variety of fields, and in a variety of stages in their career from early PhD students to retired professionals. The section can now be classified as medium-sized within the overall list of 24 sections at the convention, and attracts a loyal base of attendees generally numbering between 20 and 50 per panel.

At the time of the presentation of this paper to the 2015 IKS conference in Bucharest, the programme for the 2016 ISS-ISA conference was in the process of being finalised. A look at the categorisation of panels for the latter and a comparison with Wark's projects in the subject from twenty-five years earlier can reveal an interesting picture, if we take the view, as I would strongly argue, that the ISS-ISA provides a fairly unique shop-window into the structure and trends in the subject area of Intelligence Studies globally. Some of the contemporary panel subjects align nicely with Wark's projects, while other new categories are starting to emerge. Across the whole set of 28 panels in the 2016 conference, an interesting hierarchy emerges, reflecting the relative popularity of different projects within the overall research discipline.

The most popular subject in the 2016 conference, forming the basis of 10 of the total 28 panels, is that which could be described as issues to do with "intelligence machinery". This concerns the study of the structure of governmental systems, and the manner in which they process intelligence, and the outcomes that result, whether these are successful and positive or otherwise. Very often, such analysis will lead to various recommendations for reorganising or merging departments, creating wholly new agencies or

working more effectively with partners. The continued popularity of this area within the subject may be because of the ongoing scrutiny of major intelligence failures, and the debates that ensue about how to avoid making such mistakes in the future. As Woodrow Kuhns noted a short while after 9/11, a study of intelligence failure has been the most academically advanced area of the field<sup>4</sup>. In the context of the ISS-ISA, it might also reflect the involvement of policy-makers in the debates, and their interest in how intelligence could and should drive effective policy.

In this area there is continuity with Wark's 1993 analysis, and the public policy project he identified as a key area in the field.

The next most common subject area for panels in the 2016 conference, constituting seven panels, is that to do with intelligence tradecraft and threat factors, such as: the ethical and policy issues arising from the use of autonomous and unmanned military technologies in intelligence; the difficult and controversial role of "covert action" within contemporary intelligence activities; or the manner in which new technologies and modalities may or may not be changing traditional intelligence-gathering activities such as Humint. Again, there is synergy here with Wark's "operational function of intelligence" project identified in the 1991 conference.

The next area in the hierarchy is a subset of the public policy project, and here there may be the largest divergence between the state of the subject area between 1991 and 2016. This area, representing five panels in the 2016 conference, concerns itself with professional issues in the intelligence analysis function, and particularly the question of analytical tradecraft. An important questions springs from this factor, which is the question of who Intelligence Studies is for, and whether it is a wholly academic practice or something that supports a professional activity. I will return to this question below. In terms of historical comparison with 1991 however, the change in interest in this area may be because the Cold War meant that we knew less about what went on inside the intelligence agencies than we do now, and also because former or current intelligence practitioners were less visible and active within the academic field than is the case now.

The next key area in the 2016 conference is that concerning ethical issues and debates surrounding the intelligence activity, forming the basis for three panels. Again, this could be said to be a subset of the public policy project, since it concerns itself mostly with a critical stance towards the activities and strategies of governments and militaries in their intelligence-

gathering. This strand of debate has been given an extra impetus in recent years with the advent of key whistleblowers such as Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden, and the revelations they have enabled about intelligence practice in the West. At the same time, it is perhaps surprising that there is not *more* debate about such issues in the contemporary context given the nature and scale of those revelations.

The final three areas in the 2016 conference, representing one panel each, are: history, cyber and issues to do with intelligence in popular culture. Cyber intelligence and cyber threat issues were obviously absent from the 1991 conference given the time, but the categories of history and popular culture accord with two of Wark's projects. In the contemporary context, it could again be said to be somewhat surprising that intelligence history, in particular, was not a bigger element of the 2016 conference, given the continual declassification of files on key episodes in strategic history.

There are, therefore, areas in the contemporary scene that are perhaps surprisingly thin in their presentation within the overall picture. At the same time, the strong dominance of issues to do with public policy and intelligence tradecraft can probably be identified as reflecting the strong policy linkage between the academic field of Intelligence Studies and issues of policy relevance. This is no bad thing, since, much as intelligence can barely be described as such if it has no bearing on a policy outcome, then the study of a core activity of the state can have little relevance if it does concern itself substantially with the business of policy-making, warts and all.

### **Wider questions for Intelligence Studies**

Moving beyond the state of the nation in terms of the research areas within Intelligence Studies and their relative prominence, another key set of questions for the field when we reflect upon it over the twenty-five years since the 1991 conference, concerns the nature of the subject itself as an academic discipline. The first key question is one extensively explored by Stephen Marrin on a number of occasions, namely the question as to whether this area of enquiry should be recognised as a fully-fledged academic discipline, displaying as it does dedicated university programmes and departments, and its own academic journals<sup>5</sup>. This connects to the question of whether Intelligence Analysis could be considered a

“profession”, akin to medicine or law<sup>6</sup>. While this is a separate question to that of being an academic discipline, the two are connected, in that in both law and medicine (and any number of other professions), academic activity aligns itself closely to the professional activities of the practitioners in its debates and analysis.

One way in which these questions can be posed differently, is to ask who Intelligence Studies is for. If, for example, the field should be a complement to professional practice within government, this raises the question as to whether the discipline is about training those within the field to be better at it, or indeed training aspiring new entrants to the field, rather than debating the issues about intelligence or acting as some sort of critical friend to government as Glees has suggested should be more the focus<sup>7</sup>. There is perhaps a significant difference between training people to conduct a practice, and educating people about the issues involved in that practice. (This, of course, does not mean that both elements cannot be present simultaneously in different parts of the field.)

The professional argument is that, in one sense, intelligence analysts can have almost as much significance for lives in the real world as can medical practitioners, solicitors or any number of other professionals. These arguments are not without their merits, but the conceptualisation of the role of Intelligence Studies in this context runs the risk of taking it more down the road of being a training and accreditation process for practitioners, rather than a critical analysis of the practice itself. It also suggests that intelligence analysis is something of a scientific process, in which there are right and wrong answers, and right and wrong ways of doing things. The author has argued elsewhere that intelligence is as much an art as a science, which means there may be ultimately limited utility in trying to find perfect ways to practise it<sup>8</sup>.

The conundrum appears to be further complicated by repeated failures and strategic shocks despite enormous expenditure on intelligence-gathering. As Wark noted in 1991, and as has been the case to a certain extent ever since, much effort has been expended in pursuit of a definition of intelligence, but arguably one of the more useful is that developed by Jennifer Sims<sup>9</sup>. She defined intelligence as “information, collected, organized or analysed on behalf of actors or decision makers”. Thus, if intelligence is a policy tool for decision or policy makers in government, should Intelligence Studies be primarily the academic discipline that helps intelligence practitioners to do their jobs more effectively?

A further question for the discipline is that of who should be included in the academic community. There is a strong case for arguing that law enforcement intelligence issues should be developing a more prominent role in the field, thus changing the dominance hitherto of the state national security arena. The developed world is in the happy position of having enjoyed a number of decades of peace, so many of the key intelligence issues there at present are largely to do with non-military, transnational threats. At the same time, processes of globalisation mean that transnational, non-military threats such as organised crime, are becoming more important than ever in all parts of the world. In the realm of counter-terrorism, for example, the role of the police and their interface with national security intelligence actors are increasingly pivotal. Similarly, in complex military environments characterised by “crowded battlespaces”, many have noted the convergence between military and policing roles. All of these transformations are happening within the context of rapidly constrained public sector budgets and cutbacks, which mean that intelligence could become more important than ever in delivering efficient policing on the streets. Here again, there is a strong strand of literature on such issues as intelligence-led policing<sup>10</sup>, which should form a staple part of contemporary Intelligence Studies.

Similarly, “competitive intelligence” relating to strategic information in the business world is a large and vibrant strand of activity, as characterised by the very active Society for Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP). In many parts of Europe, this is seen as part-and-parcel of the Intelligence Studies realm, but this is less the case in the traditional Anglo-Saxon environment. This in turn may explain the marked absence of competitive intelligence discussions on the ISS-ISA programme to date. There is a tough question to be asked as to why Intelligence Studies should be so constrained, especially in the context of a globalising, postmodern world.

Added to these thematic challenges for Intelligence Studies is the question of a widening geographical spread and participation. It is interesting to note that both the 1991 and 2016 conferences that have formed the framework of analysis for this paper were held in North America. This obliquely reflects the fact that traditional Intelligence Studies has tended to be dominated by the Anglo-Saxon world and its perspectives. With that said, recent ISS-ISA conferences have started to see an encouraging widening of participation not only through Europe (Romania,



Spain and France are notable examples) but also from the Far East (China and Japan) and Latin America (notably Brazil). There are good things happening on those fronts but there arguably should be more, in order to capitalise on the rich diversity of global perspectives on the core issues.

### **Interdisciplinarity?**

These questions for the subject-area lead into the heated and complex debates around interdisciplinarity in academic activities. In 2009, the UK's Economic and Social Research Council's National Centre for Research Methods at the University of Southampton delivered the results of a wide discussion on the "disciplinarity vs. interdisciplinarity debate"<sup>11</sup>. On one side of this debate is a suggestion that closely-defined disciplines are essentially methods of restraining discourse. Sometimes the constraint is inadvertent, and sometimes perhaps for more sinister reasons of wanting to close down controversial discussions, as Gill and Phythian<sup>12</sup> point out. But in many ways, the postmodernity argument is as compelling for Intelligence Studies as it is for any number of other disciplines. The author would argue that, as intelligence is about human society, the subject should morph and expand in ways similar to the transformations of society we are witnessing.

Practicality forms the bedrock of the counter-argument, however. Stanley Fish argued that interdisciplinarity is impossible to deliver in reality, however attractive it may seem<sup>13</sup>. Internally, universities are no different from any other large organisation, in that they have to be divided into departments and faculties, to each of which budget is devolved and has to be managed. Competition for resources usually results in the emergence of tribal fiefdoms within the organisation, who become protective of their territory and unwilling to reach out to other departments. At inter-university level, despite the vast majority of universities being state-funded, the allocation of budget is again determined by performance and competition to a large degree. Research outputs and the winning of research grants are competitive processes almost by definition. All of these institutional factors mean that, despite an intellectual push in recent years towards collaboration and interdisciplinarity and some valiant examples of these being achieved, there are a number of bureaucratic factors that can block progress.

### **The place of Intelligence Studies**

It could reasonably be argued that Intelligence Studies fits into the picture as a sub-level of International Relations, probably sitting underneath Security or Strategic Studies. Intelligence is one of the activities that states undertake to protect and further their strategic interests as defined by a notion of National Security. The way this plays out, and the myriad of issues that ensue, could all be said to be the factors that constitute the general picture of Intelligence Studies in its current shape. It is probably no accident that most of the university centres and departments that deliver Intelligence Studies do so by linking it explicitly to Security Studies.

Within this picture there are clearly a great number of interdisciplinary interfaces. Where it relates to counter-terrorism, for example, as it often does in the current context, Intelligence Studies touch heavily on the realms of Psychology and Policy Studies. Terrorism itself is also a major area of enquiry, particularly since 9/11, and Terrorism Studies is a field which could itself be described as a sub-discipline if not a whole discipline in its own right, as evidenced by factors such as dedicated academic journals and university programmes.

We have already noted how intelligence history remains a very strong strand in the field, bolstered by periodic releases of historical archives: a situation that has pertained since Wark's assessment in the early 1990s. The study of intelligence has also generally gone hand-in-hand with studies of war and conflict. The intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) strand of defence strategy and policy is probably as important an area of debate as ever in history, especially in the context of shrinking defence budgets. The significance of institutions such as the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in the UK within and around Intelligence Studies, underlines the interdisciplinary nature of the field.

But intelligence is also a tool of government during peacetime. Whatever the rights and wrongs of Snowden's actions (an interesting debate in itself), his revelations have usefully spawned an invigorated dialogue about the rightful nature of the surveillance state, and its evolution in a digital age. This is another point at which Intelligence Studies intersects with the wider considerations of International Relations.

## Conclusions

Since Wesley Wark's analysis of the University of Toronto's History Department conference about the study of espionage, held at the very cusp of the new post-Cold War world, the picture of the academic discipline has been a very encouraging one in many ways. The subject has grown in size and scope, and come to constitute what some would argue should be recognised as a distinct discipline in its own right, particularly so since 9/11. If the annual ISS-ISA conference is to be taken as a measure, the graph representing participation has been pointing steadily upwards in recent years.

But there is still work to do. Interdisciplinarity, despite a contested notion for any academic discipline, should arguably be the watch-word of Intelligence Studies, since the subject touches on so many aspects of Psychology, Sociology and International Relations, and rightly so. The subject should also think about broadening in two further ways: one, to incorporate a greater element of both law enforcement, and competitive intelligence issues. The second way is to continue the good work being done in making sure the subject is not completely dominated by Anglo-Saxon perspectives and writings, since diversifying in this way can only make the discipline richer for all involved.

## References

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<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that the two events were not connected!

<sup>2</sup> Wesley Wark (1993) Introduction: The study of espionage: Past, present, future?, *Intelligence and National Security*, 8:3, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> W.J. Kuhns (2003), in R.K. Betts and T.G. Mahnken (eds.2003), *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel*. London: Frank Cass.

<sup>5</sup> S. Marrin (2016) Improving Intelligence Studies as an Academic Discipline, *Intelligence and National Security*, 31:2, 266–279.

<sup>6</sup> See for example S. Marrin & J.D. Clemente (2006) Modeling an Intelligence Analysis Profession on Medicine, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence*, 19:4, 642–665.

<sup>7</sup> A. Glees (2015) Intelligence Studies, Universities and Security, *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 63:3, 281–310.

<sup>8</sup> J. Richards (2010) *The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>9</sup> J. Sims (1995) *What is Intelligence? Information for Decision Making*. In R. Godson, E.R. May and G. Schmitt (eds.), *US Intelligence at the Crossroads*. London: Brassey's.

<sup>10</sup> See for example J. Ratcliffe (2008) *Intelligence-Led Policing*. Collumpton: Willan.

<sup>11</sup> A. Krishnan (2009) "What are Academic Disciplines? Some observations on the Disciplinarity vs. Intedisciplinarity debate". *Southampton, University of Southampton National Centre for Research Methods, NCRM Working Paper Series*, 03/09.

<sup>12</sup> P. Gill and M. Phythian (2016) What is Intelligence Studies? *International Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs*, 18/1: 5–19.

<sup>13</sup> Krishnan, *ibid*, p. 19.

# **WHY FIGHT? AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF WARS: WHEN TO START THEM, HOW TO FIGHT THEM, AND WHEN NOT TO**

**Michael ANDREGG\***

## **Introduction**

Intelligence is an instrument of war as well as peace, so professionals must study basic issues. The United Nations and the body of international law that preceded and empowers it concluded that starting aggressive war is the ultimate crime, because embedded in that act are derivative crimes like murder, torture, abuse of captured combatants or civilians, and in the worst cases slavery and genocide.<sup>1</sup> The history of humankind has seen many worst cases, so thousands of groups of peoples that once existed do not anymore.<sup>2</sup> Just War Theory (JWT) is the most recognized and discussed root of such thinking, though it varies in versions and interpretation.<sup>3</sup>

The only universally recognized legitimate reason for war is defense of the people or of the state against attack by others. Since nation-states have written most of the modern rules, many are slanted toward the state and against rebellion. But war has been with us far longer than nation-states<sup>4</sup> and corruption of governance is among the most important causes of the civil wars that predominate today, in the Third Millennium of the Common Era.<sup>5</sup> So we will pay some attention to the neglected area of when to rebel or at least when to disobey orders, because blind obedience can facilitate fascism and the universal crimes of genocide, etc.

I remind American audiences that our country was born in rebellion against unjust rule. Our “founding fathers” were all considered traitors by corrupt elites in Britain. Britain gave up being “great” when it decided to

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sacrifice freedom in pursuit of wealth, power and enslavement of non-British people. I remind others that this problem is universal. The sins of imperialism go back thousands of years before nation-states, and still exist today in Russia, China, and the USA.

A short essay cannot be comprehensive. The moral dilemmas encountered by professionals in the military and intelligence sectors are profound and complex. “Ethics for spies” is especially difficult and “situation dependent.” If you think hard about that, I think you will agree that even spies are better (and better off) if they have some moral foundation, lest they become agents of evil like employees of police-state institutions exemplified by the Stasi of East Germany, the Nazis before them, the KGB of Stalin, the Securităţii of Romania, or the Mukhabarat of many Islamic states who think that their mission in life is repressing dissent instead of protecting their peoples. When this condition prevails, such agents of evil crush their best and brightest citizens, parasitize the economy and eventually cause the state to collapse as the men and women who were born to protect their peoples (a.k.a. warriors) pivot to help the rebellion instead of the corrupt government that often formerly employed them. Professionals are not mere employees.

So ethics for soldiers, even for spies, is essential. Wise ones agree; what you think is up to you.

Governments sometimes worry when people like me write like this. But people like me are a dime a dozen. They worry more when people like you start to whisper taboo thoughts, which is why they spend so much effort controlling what military and intelligence professionals learn and telling them what to think. So expect a little subversion here, because I have sworn to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States and I am not happy with what I see in the USA today. Our Constitution is being ignored and abused by police-state enthusiasts obsessed with ‘terrorists’ and power. Of course real terrorists exist, and must be stopped, but we face bigger problems. Survival of civilization itself is at risk to the confluence of WMDs and authoritarian leadership rising in countries where hundreds of millions of unemployed and poorly educated teenaged males face desperate circumstances. That is a formula for many more disasters.

Civilization today is besieged by barbarians who do not care about nuances of governance or law. And all the bombs on earth cannot destroy them if the bombs create more enemies than they kill. So the circumstances for military success are transforming as we discuss the threat environment.

A hyper-complex “developing global crisis” is building on our horizon, like a line of high, dark clouds about to spawn tornadoes. We must spend a few paragraphs on that now, because it will dominate our future

whatever you conclude about ethics of war. A page on “community policing” will come later, because that body of thought and doctrine provides a model for both the military and for intelligence professionals who together face larger, darker problems with much heavier weapons than your average gang in the neighborhood.

### **The Developing Global Crisis: Main Dimensions and Causes**

The “developing global crisis” (DGC henceforth) begins with population growth and resulting pressures on both the living system and on global economies that lead to derivative phenomena like failed states and violence. Failed states become breeding grounds for terrorism, warlords and crime. But the crisis has many other dimensions, like perfection of propaganda combined with modern computer technologies, corruption of governance worldwide, ever more clever financial crimes, and that confluence of WMDs with millions of teenaged men maturing in desperate circumstances. Against these forces of decay, good people work hard every day to protect the innocent, feed the hungry, and heal the earth. One ideal role of military and intelligence personnel with global vision is to protect those good people from the forces of death and decay, so that the NGOs can do their work.

The DGC has been developing for a very long time and been studied by thousands of scientists over generations because it threatens human civilization, perhaps even survival of our species.<sup>6</sup> It is also very complicated and interdisciplinary. This makes it difficult to talk about even among professionals. Some of its causes are taboo, especially problematic for people in bureaucracies. So this summary must be superficial, and it will be blunt about a few sensitive subjects.

#### **1. Population Growth, Population Pressure and the “Population Bomb” (all different)**

Population growth is absolute numbers and rates, such as that the world currently has about 7.3 billion people increasing at about 1.1% per year to add about 80 million per year. This would imply doubling in about 64 years if that rate were sustained. It will not be because the living system of the earth cannot support so many people long term without vast changes. Death rates will likely rise instead. Nations will fall, for sure. The living

system that supports us will rebel, is rebelling. These all have military consequences, but many differ from classic, interstate war.

Population pressure is more complicated because it depends on cultural, economic, technical and military factors that influence how much pressure there is on stressed populations to move along opportunity gradients, often generating conflicts in destination nations. The “Population Bomb” is exploding all around you now, disguised by political and religious languages. The descent of Syria into bloody chaos is an excellent example if one has time to follow the causal links.<sup>7</sup>

Simply put, four years of drought caused millions of unemployed youth from rural areas to move into Syrian cities where opportunity was rare and monopolized by friends of the Bashar al-Assad regime. Mostly peaceful demonstrations against corruption were repressed ever more violently until civil war erupted. A country that had a population growth rate of 2.4% before these events saw that turn negative as over 250,000 people were killed and millions fled to neighboring countries like Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Those countries were also severely stressed, and emergent evils like the death cult called ISIS, ISIL, Daesh or the “Islamic State” were born.

## **2. Global Warming (+desertification, extinctions, resource wars, mass migrations, etc.)**

Global Warming is just one result of all that growth and consumption of fossil fuels combined with wholesale destruction of forests and dead zones in oceans detailed in thousands of climate science reports.<sup>8</sup> Propaganda from old energy industries caused the term “climate change” to replace the more accurate term “global warming” as part of a campaign to frustrate practical responses to this problem. The ability of organized money to prevent solutions to lethal problems cannot be overestimated. Its ability to corrupt politicians is also legendary.

## **3. Jobs, Income, and Opportunity Inequality**

The need for jobs is obvious and everywhere, especially since about 80 million more people will join us each year with all the normal needs and wants. Less obvious, but at least as important for social stability, is the quality of jobs available and the general distribution of wealth within and between nations. That has been getting less equal as technology and other



factors known as “globalization” hits economies. Some inequality is natural and even essential. Too much kills.

#### **4. Failed and Failing States Combined with Proliferation of WMDs and New Technologies**

When the balance between natural resources and consuming populations is lost, societies fail. When 90% of the wealth of a nation is controlled by 10% or less of the people, societies often fail. When states fail, people become poorer and more desperate as governments no longer provide even basic safety. So people spend scarce resources on weapons, and violence increases. When arms to rebel against unjust and often immoral elites include WMDs, everything under heaven is at risk. The internet is transforming such dynamics profoundly today. In the past, the dispossessed could be ignored or exterminated. That is neither moral nor practical now.

#### **5. Corruption of Governance (more important than “terrorism”, which is a symptom, tactic and a label for opponents, not a primary cause of the developing global crisis)**

Some degree of corruption of governance has always been with us and probably always will be, because it arises spontaneously in groups. A certain amount may even be necessary for efficient economies, according to theorists. Governments often label their enemies, often mere critics, as “terrorists” or “criminals”. Real terrorists are genuine pests and require attention, but do not be fooled who the more powerful and dangerous are. Corrupt politicians do much more damage.

The DGC matters because most of its causes are not military, and many of its symptoms cannot be solved by military methods alone, yet it has many military and intelligence consequences. Our people and our nations must be protected against vast numbers of dispossessed angry young men who emerge, because there will be demagogues eager to recruit them to genuine terrorist groups if no one else offers better options. Some demagogues will be non-state actors, others psychopathic leaders of pathocracies.<sup>9</sup> Both acquire power by coopting anger and focusing that on neighbors. The confluence of all those angry, hopeless young men with WMDs, computers and demagogues is transforming the strategic threat picture as we read, write and analyze.

### **The Essence of Just War Theory (JWT)**

Libraries of commentary have been written about Just War Theory and its main principles, which are deeply reflected in both national and especially international laws of war. So there is no need for a detailed review here. But our main thesis today is that the bewildering threat picture described as a developing global crisis (DGC) presents novel implications when seen through the lens of Just War Theory. So a very brief review of that is called for now.

First, JWT is classically divided into two parts that can be expressed as questions: 1) When is it just to initiate war? (*jus ad bellum*), and 2) How can wars be justly fought? (*jus in bello*).

These are important questions for those who support military and intelligence professions, because they distinguish principled and disciplined people from mercenaries and terrorists who kill anyone for mere employers, or even deliberately kill innocents to support ideological goals.

Second, despite those libraries of commentary, evidence is thin that political leaders actually contemplate fine points of philosophy before starting wars or authorizing tactics in wars. Immediate consequences for their nations seem to predominate over theory, and crass calculations about the effect of the war on the politicians' political future are so common there is a term for it (Simmel effect).<sup>10</sup> Bureaucracies also seldom consult philosophy, but often discuss rules and financial implications for their institutions. Money should be irrelevant in strict JWT, but only innocents think that politics and greed never matter to those who start and wage wars.

Third, there are at least seven basic principles of JWT, but some scholars cite up to 11. So there is no firm consensus even on the theory, much less on how to apply it to real-world cases. Even more revealing, some scholars conclude that almost no wars can be just, especially in the modern world with WMDs and non-state actors. Others conclude that every war their country is engaged in must be just, by definition. The personality of scholars can influence conclusions about JWT.

Those reservations noted, here are the most important principles of JWT to me. Rank is arbitrary because, in theory, every one of the at least seven conditions of JWT must apply for a war to be justly declared and fought.

1) There must be a JUST CAUSE, or reason for starting a war. The most obvious, and only universally recognized just cause is to defend against external armed threats. Internal armed threats should be dealt with only by police forces except in severe circumstances.

2) War must be declared by a LEGTIMATE authority. Lengthy pieces have been written by attorneys, philosophers and political scientists about the meaning of political legitimacy.

3) Response to external attack must be PROPORTIONAL to the evil caused by the attack. For example, it is very questionable whether North Korea was “justified” when they used cyber methods to injure SONY Corporation in 2014 when SONY created a movie that insulted leader Kim Jong-Un. If the US had responded to that attack by destroying Kim’s capitol Pyongyang with nuclear weapons, this would clearly violate the “proportionality” principle of JWT. So instead, we crippled their internet for several days.

4) Because nuclear weapons are extremely indiscriminate, that response would also be disallowed because nuclear weapons would kill every kid, cat and rat over many square kilometers. All to stop the evil behavior of one bad leader and his team of cyber warriors. Thus conduct in war is subject to a test of DISCRIMINATION between the innocent and real threats to a nation’s security. Finer distinctions were very explicitly and carefully considered when creating the Geneva Conventions and the US Military Laws of War.<sup>11</sup>

5) LAST RESORT – Finally, resort to war is only allowed in JWT if all other avenues of conflict resolution have been tried and failed.

That is enough for here on principles of JWT. Others can explain esoterica like the principles of double effect, and right intention. Now for what these mean in the context of the current crises.

### **When to Start Wars**

Since the only universally recognized legitimate reason to wage war is defense against attack by others, an idealistic answer to this question is “never”. In an ideal world, the US Army for example should only end wars, with victory over forces of evil that started them. In the very imperfect world we observe, many say our Army should be available to protect or even promote “national interests”, a perniciously plastic concept. Some idealists (like Canadian diplomat Lloyd Axworthy) even say that there is a larger “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) innocents elsewhere from genocide or other major disasters caused by incompetent or immoral governments.<sup>12</sup>

R2P is a very slippery slope. On one hand it was awful to watch the Rwandan genocide unfold when so many western nations could have stopped it. On the other hand, experience of the last generation has shown

that even the greatest Army ever built is much better at breaking enemy governments than at rebuilding functional governance from the ashes and rubble of the broken. This result has been seen despite the best efforts of millions of service men and women to create effective institutions in Iraq and Afghanistan and to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of populations to support them. It is also likely that Paul Kigame has done better at rebuilding Rwanda than any occupying army could. So extreme caution should accompany ‘responsibility to protect’ calls.

America lost in Vietnam because our high command did not recognize that the Vietnamese were actually the ones fighting for freedom (from foreign domination). Our high command thought that America had to be ‘fighting for freedom’ because Communism was so bad and repressive that no one would prefer that to domination by us. But they were wrong, and so we lost.

British ethicist, chaplain and Col. Phillip McCormack observed at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Ethics Symposium of 2015 that there are really only two universal values that should orient military and intelligence professionals in democracies. These are Survival and Liberty (or freedom). Never get on the wrong side of liberty, no matter what some politicians say, or you will likely lose. In worst cases even your national survival may be put at risk.

According to U.S. General Daniel Bolger<sup>13</sup> we lost in Iraq and Afghanistan for similar reasons, although he also stresses the lack of significant planning for post-war rebuilding, and the lack of 100% commitment at home for the very long and extremely expensive task of rebuilding states once destroyed. Those situations are still fluid, but Iraq looks like it will never reintegrate and Afghanistan started out about a millennium behind Iraq in social and infrastructure development.

Finally, there are always some who argue for the morality of preemptive wars. They ask “Why wait” if a declared enemy is building strength to attack. Such logic can be compelling, as when the Israelis launched their 1967 war against a host of gathering enemies. But if everyone launches wars against prospective enemies, what you will get is endless wars of each against all. In a world of WMDs, that means a very short half-life for human civilization itself.

Such reservations noted, one still must ask how America (or any state) should deal with old and emerging death cults like the Lord’s Resistance Army of central Africa, Boko Haram of Nigeria, or “ISIS” (ISIL, Islamic State, or Daesh ... the name hardly matters)? Others ask whether any response to global problems without a strong military component is

realistic. Many NGOs have found they cannot do their good works without serious security and intelligence support, lest they all be killed or captured for ransom and propaganda. The broad sweep of history also shows that inaction when faced with growing, clear and present dangers presents great risks of its own.

Integrating these nuances of the history of war during and before my lifetime leads me to these practical conclusions.

1. Defense against unambiguous attacks is always allowed, as is counterattack.
2. Preemption should not be allowed except under the most extreme, compelling, and unambiguous circumstances, which almost never occur.
3. If a death cult or terrorist state becomes so powerful that it threatens everything under heaven, then the Security Council of the United Nations should be able to recognize that and authorize an appropriate and international military response. Thus responsibility is shared, costs are shared, and the world is protected from the fevered minds of people who see enemies everywhere. As George Kennan once noted, some people “need enemies.” Nations should not go to war just to meet those people’s psychological needs.
4. Aggressive war is the supreme international crime, just as it says in the UN Charter, which the US largely wrote and certainly ratified. So wars for wealth or mere “national interests” are not moral unless they are actually sanctioned by the UN Security Council as well as by the US Congress if America is involved.

### **How to Fight Wars**

One thing the United States military does not need from me is advice on how to fight once engaged. It defeated the greatest evil in human history in World War II, while simultaneously defeating Japan in the Pacific theater. Later, it defeated a superpower armed with over 35,000 nuclear weapons during the long and frustrating Cold War which included many hot encounters, using radically different methods and strategy. In 1991 America defeated the fourth largest army on earth (Iraq) in just 100 hours of actual combat. The U.S. military knows how to fight.

Today our Air Force can deliver lethal ordinance to any spot on earth if so ordered, and our Army and Navy Special Forces can send more discriminating and flexible teams almost anywhere as they did when they

killed Osama bin Laden who was holed up near an army headquarters in Pakistan 40 miles from their capitol under protection of Pakistan's ISI.<sup>14</sup>

The big problem is achieving meaningful, long-term victories in the context of the Developing Global Crisis. Despite such awesome power, this is much harder than killing a particular enemy person or breaking Third World governments when dictators become unbearable. So political context is critical, and we are back to the vexing question of when to fight.

General Colin Powell, once our Chief of the military Staff and then a Secretary of State, thought hard about these issues and offered this advice which is a good place to start. It is largely based on thinking by his former boss and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, but all of our work is built on foundations created by many others. The "Powell Doctrine" suggests that 8 questions must ALL be answered before military action should be taken by the United States, so it is much like the 7 main principles of Just War Theory. The questions are:

1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
2. Do we have a clear, attainable objective?
3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
4. Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted? (Note that this is parallel and quite consistent with the JWT principle of "last resort").
5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
7. Is the action supported by the American people?
8. Do we have genuine, broad international support?

Let us assume that danger threatens, that all these questions have positive answers, and all the other constraints of JWT and international law have been satisfied. How then should we fight?

My answer is **ferociously**, with overwhelming force if possible, but "all in" regardless because the nation must be in genuine danger and it is our duty to respond whether victory is likely or not. When the children are in danger it is everyone's responsibility to do what they can to help. The uniformed military are just the people who have chosen to prepare for this full-time. And of course, the ones who suffer first and most therefore. More on this soon in community policing. To fight without ferocity is to invite defeat, perhaps disaster. So clarity of purpose is essential.

Most of the caveats I have cited in this essay reflect the tragic truth that sometimes intelligence about danger is not correct, "all consequences"

and “exit strategies” have not been thoroughly considered, and sadly that forces of evil really exist on this earth that like to start wars for profit, and for other very crass reasons that have nothing to do with the honorable virtues that should motivate intelligence **professionals**. The 2<sup>nd</sup> invasion of Iraq in March, 2003, is an example.<sup>15</sup> The cost of that disaster was over \$1 trillion wasted killing or wounding about 1 million people. Iraq has not recovered, and ISIS (Islamic State, Daesh, ISIL) is another horrific death cult result.

Even when all the conditions of JWT and laws and Powell Doctrines have been obtained and we fight the forces of evil ferociously, we still need to consider the reservations that those principles identify. We need to discriminate between truly evil dangers and the many innocents around them. We need to be proportional in response, and we need to consider political context so that a better solution can eventually be found or created long-term. All wars have causes, some eternal, some triggers for each specific conflict. When the fighting is done, many of those causes will continue unless corrected. So unless you want perpetual war, considerable thought should be devoted not just to exit strategy but to dealing with fundamental causes. Otherwise, in the long term, use of WMDs somewhere is almost inevitable. Once that Pandora’s Box has been opened again, all of civilization is at risk, even human survival. Therefore it is mandatory that military and intelligence **professionals** consider such issues. Along with a few other hard questions!

### **When to Rebel**

Officers are taught from the day they walk in the door to obey orders from a hierarchy that peaks with a Commander in Chief, who is also the Chief of State in the USA and many other countries. So the idea of rebelling **as a duty** is virtually unheard of. But it is my duty to report on the very rare circumstances when that applies. Let us consider some obvious cases first.

Germany’s Wehrmacht had a great reputation in 1939, for operational efficiency and for honor among the officer’s corps. As the psychopathic madman Adolf Hitler changed laws, created the SS, suppressed dissent, invaded neighbors, then non-neighbors like France and Russia, then started to murder millions even of his own country’s men, women and children, the truly honorable among Germany’s officers faced a profound moral dilemma. Did their loyalty to the state and its madman leader, sworn by oath, overwhelm a duty to protect the people of Germany?

As students of history know, some very senior officers began formulating plans to depose or even assassinate Mr. Hitler as early as 1939, with the most famous attempt occurring on July 20, 1944. All failed for various reasons, and that last attempt resulted in the arrest of over 7,000 Germans and execution of almost 5,000.<sup>16</sup> The point is that military professionals are not mere employees. Even though such circumstances are extremely rare, they do occur. So men or women who seek the honor of a military profession must contemplate and even study them.

Intelligence professionals cannot escape such dilemmas, because they are inevitably involved.

On the other side of the world, the Japanese Admiral who is credited with creating the successful plan to attack Pearl Harbor, Isoroku Yamamoto, is alleged to have said shortly after that, "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant, and filled him with a terrible resolve".<sup>17</sup> The Admiral obeyed his Emperor and General Staff to create an attack plan that mostly succeeded, short term. But if his reservations had been adopted, his country could have avoided being hit by two nuclear weapons that alone killed ~ 200,000 mostly innocent people, ending a war that killed over 2 million military and perhaps 3 million Japanese when civilians are included. Of course, many innocent Americans were also killed at Pearl Harbor and in the resulting war against Japan.

One could continue to list many other cases, like the dictator Pol Pot of Cambodia who murdered something like 2 million of his own 7 million people (a contender for world's highest percentage of slaughtered innocents) or Mao Tse Tung of China who managed a long killing process called the "Cultural Revolution" that resulted in deaths of 18-30 million depending on who is counting. Estimates of such mass killings are always very approximate guesses. What matters here is that the dictators ALWAYS depend on their uniformed military and intelligence services to assist, and often to play leading roles in a total violation of the rules of the Commander of us **ALL**.<sup>18</sup>

A group of social science scholars including many psychiatrists and clinical psychologists in Poland survived first the Nazi occupation, then the Soviets. So they were very highly motivated to understand, a) how such evils could occur, and b) how otherwise decent men in uniform could be transformed into agents of evil willing to kill their own citizens, neighbors, even family. Their result is called "Political Ponerology"<sup>19</sup> This is a difficult read, but worth it for scholars.

What should matter to intelligence professionals is whether their duty stops with simply obeying commands by the state, or whether loyalty



to their peoples should prevail under very severe circumstances. I say that protecting the people is a mission from God (however you discern that) and that this is a duty that cannot be erased by any law or any oath if you want to preserve the dignity of a noble profession. Men who will do anything for an employer are sadly common and disgraceful to put that bluntly, especially when they slaughter innocents for profit as some do. The strategic challenge of our time is between civilization and barbarism.<sup>20</sup> So how you decide this fundamental question has very large consequences for both civilization and for your soul.

### **Community Policing**

The differences between military combat and police who keep the peace and preserve order at home are profound. So do not be misled that I am ignoring those differences. But both soldiers and ideal police have a common moral mission which is protecting the innocent against violence by others. Every profession has better (wiser) and worse practitioners. The best among police have been working on a concept called “Community Policing” since at least 1829. It expresses some very basic principles that everyone in the guardian professions should know.

Sir Robert Peel set out to reform the Metropolitan Police of London in 1829. A key part of that was creating a code called Peel’s Principles that became a cornerstone of what is now called Scotland Yard.<sup>21</sup> All nine are useful, but I will focus on just two here, lightly paraphrased.

#7. The police at all times should maintain a relationship with the public that recognizes the historic tradition that *the police are the public and the public are the police*; uniformed police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties *which are incumbent on every citizen in the intent of community welfare*.

#9. The test of police efficiency is the *absence of crime and disorder*, not the *visible evidence* of police action in dealing with them. (A parallel for Generals would be the absence of war.)

Some modern management systems make a mess of this by insisting on “metrics” for success that ignore these deeper principles. For example, simply rewarding high arrest or incarceration rates can obscure the deeper reality that something else is fundamentally wrong if a society is plagued by chronic crime. A parallel example from the military side would be when

General William Westmoreland kept declaring imminent victory in Vietnam, because we were killing such huge numbers of Vietnamese and winning every major battle ... on the way to losing the war. A better metric for him would have been decreasing recruitment for his enemies because they were assured that America would leave and let them determine their own destiny.

So here are some operational lessons I take away from community policing.

1. Never conclude that “the public” is your enemy. We need the public. Violent individuals may become enemies of peace and innocence anywhere, but if the general public or simple critics of the regime of the day become your enemy, then you, and it, are doomed.
2. Never assume you are actually fighting for “freedom” if substantial parts of your public disagree. That is like Powell’s item #7. Remember that politicians can be the masters of calling black “white.” It is a professional officer’s **duty** to point out when they are wrong. If that means losing your commission or your pension, so what? To a real **professional** money is never an excuse for betraying the mission of protecting innocence. This item is equally vital to intelligence analysts, who must always be ready to ‘speak truth to power’ even if power is greatly displeased. So some real courage is called for.
3. Even if engaged overseas in life and death combat with armed barbarians, never forget that every one of them has a mother, father, other kin and often wives and children too. In their minds, THEY are fighting for god and freedom, not you. You are an agent of evil to them. Occupying armies are never loved in the long term. So do not forget that the hearts and minds of populations, even adversaries, are always relevant strategically.
4. Finally, never forget that the strategic challenge of our time is between civilization and barbarism. Professionals should remind politicians when they forget that as some will.

Thus while overwhelming force for a quick victory is almost always the ideal strategy, and an early exit to return to family and protecting actual home lands is the noble goal, one must always take the greatest care to protect the innocent in your area of operations. Of course perfection is not

possible; it is not possible in police work also. But enemy media will always focus on deaths to innocents as they see them, not as you do, so even the most heartless calculator must learn how to minimize these to avoid recruiting for your enemies and to sustain assistance from other countries. That is increasingly imperative for long term victory in our complex, modern world.

### **The Autoimmunity Metaphor**

The challenge of Community Policing can be expressed by a metaphor centered on autoimmune diseases. When a body is healthy it is protected from external diseases and internal cancers by an immune system that circulates by every cell checking for foreign invaders (bacteria, viruses) and internal mutations called cancers that may grow beyond their proper bounds to kill healthy cells and eventually the whole body if not suppressed by that healthy immune system.

If the immune system fails to recognize the essential differences between its many healthy cells and true disease organisms, it begins to attack healthy cells resulting in diseases like Multiple Sclerosis (MS), Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), and Huntington's Chorea. In such cases the nervous system is slowly destroyed and the body eventually dies.

If the internal security services of a state begin to confuse dissent or free thinking with treason, those services begin to attack the sources of progress and reform, who are the dissenters and free thinkers. These are the people who first see what is wrong or weak in a society, and agitate for change. Even within security services free thinking can be repressed, which dumbs them down.

Likewise if a person is attacked by an external enemy, he or she must respond with maximum speed, strength, precision, technique and fighting spirit. That is not possible if the body or mind are weakened by disease or internal conflicts. Martial artists master relevant skills by discipline and constant practice, which also maximizes speed and strength. Intelligence professionals in any branch of service should be the philosophical martial artists of their communities. And some in the counterterrorism and counterintelligence areas should be able to fight as well as soldiers.

Thus if a master is attacked by a foolish or evil other, his or her body springs into action and the fool is disabled, dismantled or killed with extraordinary speed and technique, depending mainly on how dangerous he is. There is no hesitation; no muscle pulls the wrong way because it is

confused or weakened by autoimmune disease. The bones are strong, the eyes clear, the mind is calm and focused, and one man (or woman!) can defeat five ordinary fighters or twenty thugs.<sup>22</sup>

The key is not technique; it is remembering mission, and that the mission begins with protecting innocence always.

### **Virtue, Duty and Essential Differences between a “Professional” and an “Employee.”**

Some people think that the word “professional” just means they are being paid to do things. That is a very primitive definition. Others observe that any true profession must have a code of ethics specific to their trade and responsibilities. Some “intelligence professionals” have been trying to develop such a code for about a generation, but they have failed for many reasons including the extremely difficult dilemmas that spies encounter in their work, and resistance by bureaucracies that frankly fear ethics.<sup>23</sup> But why America’s military has failed to develop a true professional ethic deeper than “obey orders and the law” or “do your job” is a real mystery to me.<sup>24</sup>

So I will simply declare here what I believe distinguishes military and intelligence **professionals** from terrorists, thugs, mercenaries, political police and other dark employees of police-states.

1. In my world, the **professional** man or woman of arms is distinguished by an intense commitment to protection of the innocent and the weak against the ruthless and strong (imagine babies being threatened by terrorists here). Whether these guardians are paid to act or not is quite irrelevant, because protecting the innocent is a duty of all citizens. But some people make this their full time avocation, and those are often called professionals.

2. Protecting a nation against external attack is a large case of that first principle, and good intelligence is at the heart of both early warning and effective action. Many good men and women have agreed to make full time careers of this duty; Kudos to you. But do not confuse the two. Protecting innocent people and ideals of freedom and liberty come first, not second. People and liberty are more important than states that can go bad. Remember the Securităţii. If governments become too corrupt, or leaders become insane, they can injure innocents. This puts a strain on true professionals because those are not mere employees of some bureaucracy.

They are people with autonomous missions, avocations, callings that transcend the daily task list.

3. Military professionals must be courageous, because they have committed to run towards danger, not away from it. This has nothing to do with money, and everything to do with commitment to protecting the innocent and our communities. Intelligence professionals must be brave too, because they are often closest to both power and corruptions thereof. Never forget that moral courage is considerably more rare than physical courage, but both are essential for true professionals of the guardian variety.

Finally I stress that all this resonates with something buried deeply in our souls that some call conscience. And conscience resonates with the Commander of us All. This is why mercenary forces almost always lose to defenders of innocence and liberty, in the long run.

These are my opinions on the topic of morality of war in the modern age of Developing Global Crises and Weapons of Mass Destruction. Best wishes with your own struggle with the difficult dilemmas that every professional officer must face in his or her time of service to higher goals.

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<sup>7</sup> “The Developing Global Crisis,” Section 3 on Conflicts, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RLyMB3KGWck>, Bome Productions, 2015.

<sup>8</sup> The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth Assessment Report, 2014 is an introduction to hundreds of other reports, because it is an 1140 page magnum opus compiled by the UN agencies WHO and UNEP.

<sup>9</sup> Political Ponerology: A Science on the Nature of Evil Adjusted for Political Purposes by Andrew M. Lobaczewski, Red Pill Press, Edmonton Canada, 2008, based on a Polish original titled Ponerologia Polityczna published in 1984, translated into English in 1985 by Alexandra Cheiuk-Celt and corrected by the original author in 1998. “Pathocracy” is a term they use to describe nation-states coopted by and often ultimately destroyed by psychopathic leaders.

<sup>10</sup> “Simmel effect” is named after Austrian Georg Simmel who wrote about “scapegoating” and other demagogic tactics in “The Sociology of Conflict” in the American Journal of Sociology, IX, pgs. 490–525, 672–689, and 798–811, 1903–1904. Translated by Albion W. Small.

<sup>11</sup> A good reference for US Military Laws of War is the “Law of War Deskbook,” (243 pages) available at: [http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military\\_Law/pdf/LOW-Deskbook-2010.pdf](http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOW-Deskbook-2010.pdf), 2010.

<sup>12</sup> Axworthy, Lloyd. “The Crisis in Burma” in the Journal of the International. Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 13 May, 2008, accessible at: <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/128-the-crisis-in-burma/1706-lloyd-axworthy-international-community-has-a-responsibility-to-protect-myanmar>

<sup>13</sup> Bolger, General Dan. Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, New York, NY: Eamon Dolan/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014.

<sup>14</sup> It should be noted that many parts of the intelligence world remain sceptics on many aspects of this story (see Hersh, Seymour, “The Killing of Osama bin Laden” in the London Review of Books, Vol. 37, No. 10, May 21, 2015, at <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n10/seymour-m-hersh/the-killing-of-osama-bin-laden>) since zero actual evidence was publicly produced regarding the identity of the people killed in Abbottabad that night, even though decisive evidence would have been extremely easy to obtain and reveal. Hersh believes it was indeed Bin Laden, but that many other elements of the official story are quite false. This fact, combined with the very persuasive but largely fraudulent data presented to the world about Iraqi WMDs prior to the second Gulf War in 2003, means that no one with a brain believes what America says anymore just because we say it. Sceptics demand evidence for very legitimate reasons. This lack of trust presents a huge long-term cost to American security and has damaged our relationships with many nations, not least among their intelligence communities. Allies matter for military affairs.

The whole story of that episode of cooking the books on pre-war intelligence is far too complicated for a short essay like this. So it will be summarized by the head of Britain’s MI6 report to his Prime Minister on July 23, 2002. Sir Richard Dearlove reported then that U.S. intelligence was “being fixed

around the policy” which means it was being distorted and politicized to justify a war that U.S. leaders had already decided to start regardless of evidence or Iraqi actions. It is especially ironic that the messenger chosen to deliver this fraudulent information to the United Nations on Feb. 5, 2003 was the same General Colin Powell whose wisdom I cite in this paper.

Powell calls that speech his darkest hour now. When a U.S. Secretary of State and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with an exceptional reputation can be fooled by dark forces in the intelligence community and the White House on such a fundamental matter with such grave consequences for our troops whom he loves and for millions of people overseas, well, it should increase prudent caution among all the Generals on this earth.

<sup>15</sup> A paper on this was presented in Germany at the Fifth “Need to Know” Conference sponsored by the Polish Institute for National Remembrance, on 6 November, 2015. Its title is: “The US Decision to Invade Iraq in March, 2003, Chasing Phantom WMDs: How Human Intelligence was Used, Abused and Politicized to ‘fix the facts around the policy’”. That paper is very detailed on how a pretext for this war was created by people who desired to profit from it. The paper will be published by the sponsors, but is available today from the author if asked.

<sup>16</sup> Kurtz, Harold, *July Plot* in Taylor 1974, p. 226. *The Course of German History*, by A.J.P. Taylor, Cambridge University Press, 1974.

<sup>17</sup> Record, Jeffrey. *Japan’s Decision for War in 1941: Some Enduring Lessons*, Feb. 2009, findable at: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=905>

<sup>18</sup> Whether you have any religion or not is entirely up to you of course. But you deserve to know that I do because that matters for moral conclusions. In particular, the God I serve 1) does not want us to destroy the earth as some people claim, and 2) is not happy with how casually adults on earth kill each other’s children today over political arguments as we observe in so many ways.

<sup>19</sup> Lobaczewski, Andrew M, *Political Ponerology: A Science on the Nature of Evil Adjusted for Political Purposes*, *ibid*.

<sup>20</sup> “Intelligence Ethics: A Key to Much Bigger Issues,” by Michael Andregg, presented at the US Army Command and General Staff College Ethics Symposium, April 22, 2015, and published in their Proceedings.

<sup>21</sup> Sir Robert Peel’s *Principles of Law Enforcement*, 1829, itemized at: [https://www.durham.police.uk/About-Us/Documents/Peels\\_Principles\\_Of\\_Law\\_Enforcement.pdf](https://www.durham.police.uk/About-Us/Documents/Peels_Principles_Of_Law_Enforcement.pdf) There are many other summaries and lesson plans available on the Community Policing concept like “Policing by Consent,” provided by the Home Office of the UK Government which have been applied for generations by enlightened police forces. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-consent>.

<sup>22</sup> Well, so the sensei’s say. Experience with reality teaches every Special Forces soldier in the world that any eight year old with a gun can kill the greatest martial artists. So some balance is called for here, but it still is true that masters of martial art can do amazing things in combat. An unpublished essay presented at a

Comparative Civilizations conference of June 6-9, 2012 goes a bit deeper on this, titled: “Clashes of Civilizations Gave Rise to Martial Arts, but Enlightened Martial Philosophies Reveal the Better Way,” by M. Andregg.

<sup>23</sup> “Ethics Phobia and the U.S. Intelligence Community: Just Say No” by Jan Goldman, pages 16-17 in *Intelligence Ethics: The Definitive Work of 2007\**, by the Ground Zero Minnesota Center for the Study of Intelligence and Wisdom, 2007. Also relevant: the entire Fall/Winter edition, Vol. 3, No. 2, of the *International Journal of Intelligence Ethics* which was devoted to the question of whether Dr. Goldman’s thesis was in fact displayed by official intelligence agencies and bureaucracies, both in the USA and abroad.

<sup>24</sup> Thomas Gibbons of the US Naval War College, another presenter at the CGSC Ethics Symposium of 2015, was also amazed that the US military still lacks a formal code of ethics for military professionals.



# THE INTELLIGENT NEXUS. SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT AND INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

Florian COLDEA\*

## Black Sea Dynamics

After the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea region has **no longer been a natural border** between the West and the East. The dismantling of the Soviet Union quickly increased the number of “players” around the basin and brought new forces to the region. But the Western institutions focused mainly on the transition of central and Eastern Europe and did not see the Black Sea as a distinct area of interest.

Today, the Black Sea region **reemerges from the “periphery”** and establishes itself as an important part of/for the Euro-Atlantic project<sup>1</sup>. The EU and NATO border it on the West, Turkey, an EU candidate and NATO member borders it to the South. Members of the Council of Europe and two NATO partners border it on the North and East. And we do not ignore the Russian *de facto* and growing military presence after the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula.

A region that a decade ago was on the far edge of Europe’s attention has now become the **next theme of European strategic thinking** in terms of energy security, frozen conflicts, trade links, migration, and other key policy areas. It is – **again** – **a strategic crossroad** for Europe, Russia and the United States.

For the Black Sea, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, prospects will be shaped by: the interaction of big external actors, the interests of states / peoples in the region, and the status-role as a crossroads of civilizations. As a result, **its development requires special consideration**, not only from policy makers, but also from the intelligence and security community.

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### **The common projects in the Black Sea Area**

There is an **increasing influence of states and powerful economic actors**<sup>2</sup> in the context of economic crisis and a clear influence of the economic on the political foreign conduct. This brings up another relevant link, namely between economy and security, with the obvious connection in the field of economic security.

The **economic regional security is a necessary step** towards stability and development. There are various formats of regional cooperation, some of them established by international organizations (NATO and EU) and other at the initiative of concerned states.

First, **the energy / economic projects**<sup>3</sup> included divergent hopes and plans for the Nabucco West pipeline (the natural gas pipeline from Turkey-Bulgaria border to Austria), the AGRI (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector for natural gas), the South Stream (pipeline proposed to transport Russian gas through the Black Sea to Bulgaria and further to Greece, Italy and Austria), the submarine power cable between Romania and Turkey (important, as there is already a surplus of electricity in Dobrogea while the industrial consumption in the region has decreased), the Black Sea Ring Highway (7.000 km route linking Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine) etc.. Some of them are already nothing more but history, but all of them offer a relatively clear picture of the real potential of the regional economic projects.

Second, we see a series of **more institutional and political cooperation initiatives**, which tried to bring some coherence between history and geography. Those projects sustain a regional building approach with emphasis on stability and exchanges: the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation (the German Marshal Fund's initiative that promotes regional cooperation and good governance), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)/OCEMN (development of maritime initiatives), RCC (Regional Cooperation Council agenda includes economic and social development, infrastructure and energy, security cooperation, justice and home affairs, parliamentary cooperation), the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership (established in 2006 at Romania's initiative: political format, building confidence to foster regional projects).

The **EU** has various initiatives<sup>4</sup> dedicated to the issues at stake as the Eastern neighborhood represents a strategic position with important connections to Central Asia, the Middle East, but also to the Western Balkans, with a great potential to develop energy, transport and commercial routes, and a high relevance of issues like environment or democracy: the Black Sea Synergy, the EU Strategy for the Black Sea, the EU Maritime Security Strategy etc. But the events in Ukraine have had a significant impact (in terms of suspended projects), adding to the already numerous

challenges to the development in the region. The illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol is not recognized by the EU and the international community, and the EU adopted different types of sanctionatory measures (mainly economic). Last, but not least, EU adopted a *Joint Framework to counter hybrid threats* in order to foster the resilience of the EU, its Member States and partner countries.

**NATO**, as a military alliance, is aware of regional security dangers and took some steps to respond accordingly, especially after the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia and in the context of Russian aggressive actions in the Eastern Ukraine<sup>5</sup>: the Readiness Action Plan adopted at the Wales Summit, an enhanced forward presence in the East, the basing of the AEGIS Ashore missile defense system in Romania, the support offered to his partners in the region, and other assurance measures. The Allied approach to deterrence and defense must be coherent and based on solidarity. Other areas of interests for the Alliance are the security of energy infrastructure in this region, stability, building a democratic security sector, maritime and naval cooperation.

There are **dedicated formats of cooperation among intelligence and law enforcement** agencies: SEEIC (South-East Europe Intelligence Cooperation): created in 2002, at the initiative of intelligence agencies from Romania, Greece and Turkey, with the objective to enhance cooperation in order to prevent and combat the extremist-terrorist activities, weapons and drugs traffic, illegal migration, economic and financial criminality ; SELEC (Southeastern European Law Enforcement Center) is the former SECI Center, with the headquarters in Bucharest. It touches a large array of domains of interest and promotes close cooperation on matters from transnational crime to terrorism.

### **Security and development – what nexus do we need?**

The interactions of security and development are frequently synthesized in the maxim “**No security - no development! No development - no security!**”<sup>6</sup>. From the security point of view, cooperation for development is an important contribution towards conflict prevention. A stronger link between these two fields is indispensable.

There is an **overlapping area between security and development**: the economic security – not only regarding specific individual states, but referring to the Black Sea region as a whole. This domain gained importance in the context of the persistent effects of the economic and financial crisis. It worth mentioning that the economic security is also affected by nationally oriented initiatives emerging from countries with centralized economies.

**The concepts.** Both intelligence and academic debates face a common problem: how to define development and security, which are generous and elusive concepts. *Security* has gradually enlarged from state security to human security and now includes a series of threats that recognize no borders. Similarly, *development* has multiple dimensions from human rights to environmental sustainability, from economic growth to good governance. It classically refers to societies seeking to achieve higher or more equitable standards of living. This leads to a *dilemma: what to mix with what?* And there is entire series of theories, policies and practices on the mix between security and development.

**The challenges.** The increasing convergence in the strategies of security and development actors is based on a **clear assumption**: to achieve sustainable security and long-term development, the challenges faced by an unstable country or region need to be addressed in a holistic and integrated manner. And the Black Sea area is well known for the difficulties encountered on the way toward democracy and security: chronic political instability, weak democratic institutions, corruption, fragile market economies, persistency of frozen conflicts and, recently, the crisis in Eastern Ukraine etc. Frozen conflicts are the legacy of post-Soviet disintegration and remain one of the most important threats to the stability and security. The lack of substantial progress affects us all. Also, the persistency and episodic warming of these conflicts threatening the Euro-Atlantic path of this region and affects the development of strategic projects (like energy corridors or the programs against organized crime). At an actionable level, becoming aware that security and development are linked in *causing* as well as *addressing* crisis is an essential step for effective strategies in the Black Sea area.

**The tensions not to ignore.** The goals of security and development agendas intersect, at least partially, which has good effects for both domains. However, this close interlocking produces some tensions and worries. Part of the academic community is concerned that there is a danger of **1.** development policy being manipulated by security or **2.** competition for resources between development and security. The core of the matter is the question of whether the focus of such efforts should be determined primarily by considerations of security policy or of development policy.

### **Intelligent cooperation and collaboration**

**The need for regional approach.** Different countries and agencies approach the wider Black Sea issues from a narrow national perspective. There are authors that point “*irreconcilable differences*”

among riverain states (see Scott Taylor<sup>7</sup>). We do not agree with the severity of such a verdict. However, the riverains miss a strategic vision of the region as a whole. The area needs a simple but common agenda that transcends the narrow interests of local agencies. That's because the main challenges are correlated: democratization and reform, economic development, security and Euro-Atlantic values and path.

**What we understand by cooperation.** Cooperation is more than simple interaction: is working together; joining effort and ownership. Of course, there may be more or less reluctance in sharing intelligence, but it is possible to protect sources and technologies and still share intelligence. SRI cooperates with more or less 120 services from roughly 64 countries. With some, we have extensive cooperation, with others - decently good, and in some cases we try to enhance it. Given the increasing illegal migration or the smuggling of goods/weapons, there is a pressing need for collaboration between services, especially between neighbors in the Black Sea Area. The hottest topics are cross-border criminal activities at a regional level or with extensions within the EU.

**What actions must be taken** to facilitate this kind of collaboration? There is a remarkable consensus about the general principles of collaboration. Still, there is little consensus about the effective need to collaborate. We need mutual trust building measures<sup>8</sup>. Information sharing is a good first step. In the process, we also share a part of national culture and spirit. We spread our values, trying to open doors to each other. The next step: joint operations in the fields of undisputed common interest. There are EU and NATO state member services that are willing to provide assistance to the neighboring services for adapting their normative frames to the Euro-Atlantic values and standards, for implementing good practices in areas where they have consistent expertise.

## Conclusions

There is **no Grand Strategy** to foster collaboration in the regional security arena. We just need the **common sense** to find right incentives and reshape some outdated mindsets.

**The substance of the Black Sea region** will be built around the common projects which our countries and agencies will propose and really implement for this area.

**Intelligence** is just a piece of the complicated regional puzzle. We need a better and closer integration of diplomatic, law enforcement and intelligence efforts.

Fostering collaboration in the regional security arena is difficult: a **real social dilemma** with multiple agencies, time frames, structures, organizational cultures, barriers etc. But, ignoring the importance of collaboration because of his complexity is not an option.

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- <sup>3</sup> Panagiotis Gavras, *The Current State of Economic Development in the Black Sea Region – Policy Report*, Bertelsmann Stiftung 2010.
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- <sup>5</sup> Cross, S., *NATO–Russia security challenges in the aftermath of Ukraine conflict: managing Black Sea security and beyond*, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2015, 15.2: 151–177.
- <sup>6</sup> Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General pointed that « we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights » in his Report *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all* (A/59/2005).
- <sup>7</sup> Taylor, S. *Unreconciled Differences: Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan*. Esprit de Corps Books, 2010.
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**NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND IMMUTABLE  
GEOPOLITICAL CONSTRAINTS.  
CHALLENGES FOR THE COMPETITIVE  
INTELLIGENCE MODEL  
– AN ESSAY –**

**Antonia COLIBĂȘANU\***

It is generally believed that the digital environment is borderless. Just as innovation is not bound to a location or culture, but it is developed by the universal human mind, the digital world, evolving through innovation, has no centered source. It is global, decentralized, supporting and fueling globalization. However, as we observe the downsides of globalization and, while technological progress is rapidly advancing the digitized sector into the main feature of the XXIst century, it is neither homogenous nor systematically sustained worldwide. The internet – the platform that supports global digital development, may be “the realization of the classical theory in anarchic leaderless world”<sup>1</sup>. But it is also characterized by a more and more visible geography, ultimately dependent on the nation states’ policies toward supporting not only innovation but also their foreign policy, very much embedded into the classical concepts of national interest and geopolitics. The current essay challenges the assumption that the digital environment and particularly the cyberspace are not characterized by geographical or historical patterns, therefore challenging its borderless character.

**The Logical Geography of Innovation**

The development of the cyberspace is essentially driven by human innovation. Therefore its evolution is limitless indeed. It is through an analysis of its components that borders are defined. Simply put, the

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cyberspace is shaped by three elements: the physical one, the virtual one and the human one.

The physical component of the cyberspace is referring to all machines for data storage, but also to the network systems that make possible for data to be shared. In this sense, it is the fiber optic cables, the space communication systems, the electronic circuits – and the energy that all these consume, which account for borders on the physical side.

The virtual component that all these support is defined by the information environment shaped by all digitized data shared and stored. The software programs transformed into applications for the end-users but also all the statistics contained in databases, unseen but necessary for the people's daily workflow, are all part of the virtual element of the cyberspace. While this component is non-geographic, being linked to both human innovation and need, it is arguably affected historically, its development being affected by the way both culture and time perception dictates.


The most important component of the cyberspace is human. The individuals are both contributing to the development of the cyberspace – through their evolving cyber-needs but also through their active innovative work in the technological field – and, in the same time, are most affected by its evolution. Technology defines the age we live in – one that we both embrace and fear of, as the ease of adaptation is also dependent on biological factors or age. Information shared via the cyberspace is useful to individuals, but also to corporations or nation states. Spheres of influence are created with the help of technology, using the internet both for a platform of information and for conflict. The individuals' dynamism is giving speed for developments in cyberspace, of the technological progress in the digital world. Of all the three components, the human element is showing, in the same time, both the geographic and historical borders of the cyberspace.

The way the three components – the physical, the virtual and the human – link to one another is defining the cyberspace characteristics in a certain location in the world. Depending on the population's internet access, there are different levels and features for the human needs when using the cyberspace. Considering the way doing business worldwide has changed since the mid '90s, the economic development of the nation states is today directly influenced by internet access. Politics are slowly becoming the major player in the mix, giving directions on how the three components should link up, depending on the national interest. For instance, certain countries limit or even prohibit the population to have access to the internet while others implement policies for supporting the digitization of the



economy in order to increase their competitive advantage internationally. Some nation states support the development of alternative Domain Name System roots working in parallel with the internet and not attached to it (like the Iranian 'halal internet') or support the usage of their own programming languages, an evolution very much in sync with the current globalization exhaustion and return of international competition. All this considered, a mapping of the cyberspace is needed in order to understand the various features and tools that countries may use in order to support their national interest.

Figure 1. Cyberspace components




Source: author

While connectivity gives power to individuals, it also relies on the power that the nation states have on the mechanics of the internet. From the state's perspective, increasing security is linked to achieving more control over the environment where potential threats develop – and the

cyberspace makes no exception. As physical control is limited – because of the way the internet has developed, being served by the existing communication infrastructure, nation states have to rely on policies, shaping up what is currently considered to be a “lawless space”. Taking into account the applications of the technological progress registered in the cyberspace, such as robotic advances, the state will need to administer soon their implementation, coping with the revolutionary – but yet natural – development of the society. Normally, implementation will be gradual at the global level – as countries will find competitive advantages in the technological adaptation race. The usage but also the regulation of technological progress will be dealt differently from one place to another. Geopolitics is both able to explain the direction of such trends and be, at its turn, shaped by the way countries choose to work with one another in the cyberspace. Dependencies established between countries are key to understanding such trends – especially since in the digitized world it *seems* that physical geography is secondary.

Figure 2. Geopolitics and Cyberspace – Components



Source: author

Translating the three components of the cyberspace into the geopolitical framework, we find each corresponding to a larger feature that needs to be studied when looking at the nation state behavior. Geography, as first determinant of the national interest is getting a new characteristic in the digital age: the data entry points (internet exchange points<sup>2</sup>), the submarine cables and satellites caring such data are defining the physical dependencies between countries. The socio-economics is getting a new layer as the individuals add to their behavior those activities associated with the cyberspace: from messaging to online purchasing. The “revolution in computing” is part of the contemporary history and the information stored and shared digitally is adding nuances to the way history is perceived in different places on the Globe. The dynamics of digitization is in fact adding to the geopolitical constraints of states today, considering these dynamics are both defined and are defining the traditional concept of *power*.

### **Digital Political Influence**

The essence of leadership (as that of the power) remains the same as it was centuries ago. The computing revolution has however added both challenges and means to leaders world-wide as they seek to understand the world and secure their states while using contemporary technology. First, the cyberspace is a constantly new environment. Countries – and the other global actors: corporations or civil society – have discovered a newfound independence in the cyberspace, interpreting it as an area where they can build and use tools that are either no longer functional in the physical space or not suitable for it. Secondly, the cyberspace at large is almost a completely free (in part lawless) environment.

Therefore, nation states’ first reaction (and generally that of all actors: businesses and civil society too) towards a new environment is the *control concern*. As control is not fully achievable, *understanding* the new environment – the next logical step is even more complex. States can ‘control’ the cyberspace through actions like filtering information available to the citizens, through policy and legislation referring mainly to the telecommunication and trade sectors. Control is also relating to copyright enforcement regulation. In the same time, supporting innovation is the nation states’ strategic reaction to cyberspace development, meant to partly control and partly gain leverage in understanding the way digitization is affecting society. Communication and coordination with the innovators give governments more knowledge on the potential technological advances.

In essence, the state needs to develop its capabilities of understanding the industrial digital (r)evolution, so that it is able to govern accordingly. The cyberspace accessibility, which is giving more power to the individual in democracies, is also having the potential to empower more centralized administrations. The binary language that is universally used for programming is making sense for the users through the different operating systems developed. It is therefore the system developers that are giving meaning to the IT language – and therefore it is them who are setting the cyberspace culture. It is often that the nation state's culture is embedded in the operation system. For example, Russia is seeking to increase its independence from American technology by 2025, hoping for a drop of non-Russian mobile operating systems at just 50% by then<sup>3</sup> - the Russian minister of communications has announced support for local mobile operating system developers since 2015. Such a move is not unique, nor is it casual – national interest and culture go together, and as the digital age shifts culture bringing new additions, states need to adapt, understanding and building on digital governance to serve national interest.

At a time when influence comes through the binary language of the digital world, perception becomes more important, as it is the most important filter for what we call to be “big data”. In managing networks and, more, webs of influence, states deal with two major questions: first that relating to the laws of innovation and secondly that relating to censorship (and everything referring to cyberspace administration). It is hard for states to define what the legal boundaries or even the directions to limit or support innovation are. It is likely that the legal void continues. Which, in turn, brings in new risks to be managed by the state as it doesn't and, to a certain extent cannot have a proactive attitude in what regards the regulatory environment. Censorship is also taking new forms in the cyberspace (social media, email monitoring, etc.) – a useful tactic for hybrid war operations, supporting power projection both within and outside the country.

The organic growth of digitization makes the human resource more important for the nation state than any other resource. Even if robotization is very much a phenomenon attached to the technological progress, meant to solve the demographic problems countries face, it is the human resource that makes the difference when it comes to analyzing processes and developing perceptions. Internet builds on and enlarges networks, sometimes transforming them into webs of knowledge. This ultimately brings power to the civil society, which gains power in the political decision

making process, and at times this even translates into how governments decide to shape up their international alliances. This is how national foreign affairs are becoming more accessible to the individual, through the cyberspace developments. Such a fact poses however both opportunities and vulnerabilities from the national governance perspective. In the case of the new economic development models, based on more informational flows and interconnections, the cyberspace is not only supporting innovation but it is also a source for new risks – some of which are not well understood by states, companies or civil society, taking into their rapidly evolving nature.

In terms of defense, digital technology brings forth the question of satellites' utility, in the context of a new technological layer attached to geography. Using the cyberspace for both conventional and unconventional warfare is another issue that refers to the military domain. A topic that is likely to appear in the future defense programs is that of army robotization – the more robotization evolves, the more we will need to take into account the ethical<sup>4</sup> aspect of robots fighting in the army and if ethics can be programmed or not (and if so, who takes responsibility for defining the ethical code(s) for robots). The technological progress poses therefore new challenges for the military domain. As Kissinger has put it in his latest book<sup>5</sup>, “the history of warfare shows that every technological offensive capability will eventually be matched and offset by defensive measures, although not every country will be equally able to afford them”. Therefore, understanding the differences between developed/active and emergent actors – the US, Israel, China, Russia, Iran vs. the rest, is key for understanding military technological advancement trends. The political and economic relations between countries are setting up the background for both influence and military developments, which at their turn are set up by the political forces within the nation states.

### **Challenges for the Competitive Intelligence Analysis Framework**


The connection between politics, economics and military has always served for defining the cycle of power within society. Searching the sources for those links in today society translates into considering the three main components of the cyberspace: the physical, the virtual and the human, in the way they shape each of power sources in society at the national and international level. The competitive intelligence analysis framework is thus

re-composed, taking into account digitization as key driving factor for societal evolution.

The relationship between humans and nature is managed today through technology – perceptions are therefore changed because of the invisible networks in the cyberspace, building a distinct layer of analysis for each of the data analysis sequence<sup>6</sup>. But overall, intelligence processes remain the same. Computing technology translates into an increase in capabilities in what regards data transformation into usable information, while the analytical framework stays conceptually constant. Protective intelligence processes will still start with identifying risks, but will likely base assessments on ‘big data’ flows of information. Reporting will lead to surveillance and influence intelligence processes that take into account similar information flows.

The pervasiveness of networked communication into the social, financial, industrial, political and military sectors is creating new vulnerabilities. The information revolution supported by technological advances has emphasized the actual and factual elements more than the contingent or conceptual ones and thus it has accelerated the decision making process. The interconnection between all supporting sectors for a functioning society has become the critical ingredient – but, in the same time, higher connectivity has translated into higher levels of risk and uncertainty.

Figure 3. Competitive Intelligence Analysis Framework – Organizational Intelligence Process



Source: author<sup>7</sup>

Due to the characteristics of the cyberspace, the competitive intelligence analysis framework needs to take into account the intrinsic change at the societal level: “values are shaped by consensus more than they are by introspection”<sup>8</sup>. While deep and strategic thinking is still a must for leadership (as it is for all of us), the every-day life speed induced by digitization makes humans behave more in a reactive manner more than proactively. We no longer write letters – we write emails. We no longer make phone-calls – we’re more likely to use text messages. In such a society, dependencies between nation states are to be determined by the level of intensity in communication between individuals, communities, government on one side and the limits of interconnections on the other. Therefore, the analytical framework needs to identify and attach political meaning and risk assessment to both aspects.

Reporting on the relationships’ intensity within a society or, internationally – at a regional level, needs to take into account the flow of information available in the cyberspace (‘big data’ component). Economic links are also forging those relationships – trade policies as well as the financial sector are both integrating, or on the contrary, limiting relations between countries or communities. Vulnerabilities relating to online purchasing for instance or those coming from the international capital markets are also forging dependencies between countries. All these components are drawing up a map that intelligence analysts need to work with and have as a foundational ‘document’ when applying the competitive analysis framework described above.

The linkages between the political, economic and the defense sector that regard or involve technological progress in the cyberspace are in fact building on the existing critical infrastructure that nation states need to protect. This is the primary concern – and main change in what regards the intelligence analysis framework: the focus is no longer the elements of key concern for society, but the way they coordinate with one another in enabling efficiency and ultimately contributing in defining the national competitive advantage. Identifying the key integrative components for systemic and structural communication, cooperation between the nation socio-economic sectors, at each and every of the three levels comprised in the intelligence analysis framework, is of critical importance for an accurate analytical report. Knowing the infrastructure’s vulnerabilities is key for the decision maker dealing with the new risks and uncertainties coming from cyberspace.

### **Concluding Remarks**

Nation states remain at the core of international system. Governments eventually decide on how to support technological progress. While innovation is borderless, the logical ideas building up in programming algorithms that we find in the cyberspace have a specific location and sometimes specific influence goals. While borders are hard to be drawn, there are physical elements in the cyberspace geography: the internet exchange points – the physical infrastructure through which internet service providers and content delivery networks exchange traffic between their networks. Submarine cables go into supporting those nodes, and nation states have autonomy and executive power on them. From an economic perspective, the evolution of the financial and trade flows carried and supported by the cyberspace are ultimately driving governmental policies. The interdependencies between businesses, government and civil society, taking into account digitized communication and technological progress are also mapping the cyberspace.

Besides the cyberspace map of influence, supported by the physical veins of submarine data cables, nation states are also challenged in establishing their geographical role in the relative new and expanding environment. Countries need to choose their stance on censorship and decide between the different filtering policies it can adopt. In the same time, states have the option to decide between developing alliances or increasing self-isolation in the cyberspace, choosing between opening up for partnering on technological innovation and developing competing operation systems or establishing alternative domain name systems.

The question of authority and regulation for the cyberspace becomes urgent considering it is currently being used as unconventional warfare environment. However, taking into account the evolution, the nature and the stakeholders in the cyberspace, this is unlikely to happen soon. The virtual world of the internet is to remain the place where both civil society and terrorist groups interact with nation states in a direct manner. This makes protection of the critical infrastructure difficult for nation states to manage without coordinating with one another and with the private stakeholders – the civil society and businesses. This is where alliances' value added is proven, as acting in a coordinated manner against the vulnerabilities technological progress brings is building systemic resilience against threats coming from the cyberspace.



The challenges posed by the cyberspace to intelligence analysts are related to understanding the new paradigm for traditional concepts of 'influence' and 'vulnerability'. While nation states remain key players, the other actors: businesses and civil society have increased interaction among themselves and with states' administrations. The classical interconnection between sectors has also grown in intensity. Therefore, it is important to understand where and how critical infrastructure is affected by technological progress and perceive potential threats coming from the cyberspace in due time. That can be achieved through a well-rounded analytical framework that, while keeping the traditional pillars for intelligence analysis, looks deeper into understanding the linkages supporting systemic functionality. Cooperation and coordination between the IT sector and the other socio-economic sectors, as well as the government will likely facilitate understanding both challenges and opportunities that technological progress in the cyberspace brings.

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<sup>6</sup> Competitive intelligence analysis refers to the 3 main analysis sequences, considering scope: organizational intelligence analysis, external forces intelligence analysis and environment intelligence analysis. The model is developed around Michael Porter's Diamond Model and the Thinking Model presented in "Building

the framework for useful intelligence – the contemporary needs and risks” by A. Colibasanu, pp. 57–71, Proceedings of the XX International Conference Intelligence in the Knowledge Society.

<sup>7</sup> Colibasanu A., Building the framework for useful intelligence – the contemporary needs and risks, Proceedings of the XX International Conference Intelligence in the Knowledge Society, Ed. ANIMV, Bucharest, 2015, Fig. 2, p. 62.

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# **THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA AND INTELLIGENCE NEEDS. AN IMPOSSIBLE EQUILIBRIUM?**

**Giorgi LILUASHVILI\***

## **I. Introduction**

The notion of right to privacy, home and correspondence have to great extent guaranteed under various human rights instruments, inter alia, Universal Declaration on Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Life, European Convention on Human Rights. The concept of private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person, gender identification, names, sexual orientation and etc.

In accordance with the approach followed by civilized nations, in this paper following aspects will be discussed:

### **A. The scope of private life**

The determination of a private life necessarily involves a two-stage test. The first stage concerns the applicability of this concept. This will often involve discussion of, for example, what constitutes private life or home. If, however, Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights is found to be applicable, we shall go on to the second stage of the assessment. In that situation, we shall consider whether the interference with the right to privacy can be justified. To be more precise, first question is whether the situation fall within the scope of one of the rights protected by right to privacy and on the second stage it shall be determined whether there been an interference with private life? If so, is it justified? In other words is it in accordance with law? Does it pursue a legitimate aim? Is it necessary in a democratic society?

The meaning of private life is a broad concept which is incapable of exhaustive definition. The concept is clearly wider than the right to privacy,

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however, and it concerns a sphere within which everyone can freely pursue the development and fulfilment of his personality. In 1992, the European Court of Human Rights said that.... it would be too restrictive to limit the notion [of private life] to an “inner circle” in which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings.<sup>1</sup> Thus, private life necessarily includes the right to develop relationships with other persons and the outside world.

*i. Will the use of covert technological devices to intercept private communications concern private life?*

The use of covert technological devices to intercept private communications has been found to fall within the scope of private life. Moreover, the provision applies regardless of the content of the telephone conversation. In *A v. France*<sup>2</sup> the Government argued that conversations taped relating to the commission of murder did not relate to private life. The Strasbourg Court held that the mere fact that a conversation concerned the public interest did not deprive it of its private character.

*ii. Will the collection of personal data by the State concern private life?*

The collection of information by officials of the State about an individual without his consent will always concern his/her private life and will thus fall within the scope of private life. Examples include: An official census, which includes compulsory questions relating to the sex, marital status, place of birth and other personal details; the recording of fingerprinting, photography and other personal information by the police<sup>3</sup> even if the police register is secret<sup>4</sup>; the collection of medical data and the maintenance of medical records.

**B. HAS THERE BEEN AN INTERFERENCE WITH THE ARTICLE 8 RIGHT?**

Once it is established that the dispute concerns private or family life, home or correspondence then it goes on to examine whether such interference is justified. Interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right must be **in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.**

i. *Is the interference in accordance with law?*

What is the meaning of “in accordance with law”? In order to be “in accordance with law” the interference complained of must have a legal basis and the law in question must be sufficiently precise and contain a measure of protection against arbitrariness by public authorities. In *Malone v. the United Kingdom*<sup>5</sup> the Court considered whether the power to intercept telephone conversations had a legal basis. At the time, telephone-tapping was regulated by administrative practice, the details of which were not published, and without specific statutory authorization. The Court said that there was not sufficient clarity about the scope or the manner in which the discretion of the authorities to listen secretly to telephone conversations was exercised: because this was an administrative practice, it could be changed at any time and this constituted a violation of privacy. More recently, in *Khan v. the United Kingdom*<sup>6</sup> the Court held that the use of a covert listening device by the United Kingdom authorities was not in accordance with law within the meaning of Privacy because there was no statutory system to regulate the use of such devices, which was governed by Home Office Guidelines which were neither legally binding nor directly publicly accessible.

ii. *Does the interference pursue a legitimate aim?*

Once an interference is found to be in accordance with law, the Court will proceed to question whether it pursues a legitimate aim/ For example, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights contains a list of the aims upon which the state can seek to rely in this regard. For example, the State may argue that:

- Collection and storage of information about individuals is “in the interests of national security”;
- Intercepting prisoners’ correspondence seeks to prevent “disorder and crime”;
- Removing children from an abusive home or denying one party custody or contact aims to protect “health or morals” or the “rights and freedoms of others”;
- Ordering an expulsion or deportation serves the interests of the “economic well-being of the country”.

It falls on the respondent State to identify the objective or objectives of the interference, and the fact that the grounds for permissible interference are so wide – in the interests of national security for example – means that the State can usually make a plausible case in support of the interference. The civilians claim frequently that the reason given by the State is not the “real” reason motivating the interference, although the

Strasbourg Court has not willingly accepted such a claim. In fact, the Court could be said to pay little attention to the aims invoked by the State as a basis for its actions and often condenses the aims invoked – such as the protection of health and morals and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others – into one. Thus, in most cases, the Court will accept that States were acting for a proper purpose and it has rarely if ever rejected the legitimate aim or aims identified, even where this may be disputed by the applicant.

*iii. Is the interference necessary in a democratic society?*

The final stage is the determination of whether the interference is “necessary in a democratic society”.

It is clearly not sufficient that the State had “some” reason for taking the measures that created the interference as the interference must be “necessary”. In terms of the meaning of “necessary” it is not synonymous with “indispensable” ... neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as “admissible”, “ordinary”, “useful”, “reasonable” or “desirable”. In *Olsson v. Sweden*<sup>7</sup>, it was held that ... the notion of necessity implies that an interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Excessively strict or generous interpretations of the term “necessary” have thus been rejected by the Court, which instead pursues a policy of proportionality.

In carrying out its review of whether domestic decisions are compatible with right to privacy, the Court must apply the proportionality test, which, at its simplest, involves balancing the rights of the individual and the interests of the State. Deciding whether the interference is proportionate to the aim which it pursues is frequently a complex process, that involves consideration of a number of factors. These include the interest to be protected from interference, the severity of the interference and the pressing social need which the State is aiming to fulfil.

## **II. SECRET SURVEILLANCE**

Secret surveillance has, for obvious reasons, been seen to be problematic with regard to the foreseeability requirement. The question arises, therefore, as to how the requirement applies in such an area.

In *Malone v. the United Kingdom* the Court acknowledged that the requirements of the Convention, with regard to foreseeability, cannot be exactly the same in the special context of interception of communications for the purposes of police investigations as they are where the object of the relevant law is to place restrictions on the conduct of individuals. In particular, the requirement of foreseeability cannot mean that an individual

should be enabled to foresee when the authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he can adapt his conduct accordingly. Similarly, in *Leander v. Sweden*<sup>8</sup> the Court held that an individual could not claim to be able to foresee precisely what checks would be made by the special police service. Nevertheless, the Court said that in a system applicable to citizens generally, the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give ... an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to this secret and potentially dangerous interference with the right to respect for private life and correspondence.

Telephone tapping in two cases against France – the *Kruslin* case<sup>9</sup> and the *Huvig* case<sup>10</sup> – it fell to the Strasbourg Court to consider whether French law regulating telephone-tapping by the police was in conformity with the foreseeability requirement.

Tapping and other forms of interception of telephone conversations represent a serious interference with private life and correspondence and must accordingly be based on a “law” that is particularly precise. It is essential to have clear, detailed rules on the subject, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated. In that respect the Strasbourg Court was of the opinion that French law (written and unwritten) did not indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on the public authorities. This was truer still at the material time, so that Mr *Kruslin* did not enjoy the minimum degree of protection to which citizens are entitled under the rule of law in a democratic society.

In *Rotaru v. Romania*<sup>11</sup> the applicant complained that the Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS) held and used a file containing personal information on him, some of which he claimed was false and defamatory. The core issue was whether the law which permitted this interference was accessible to the applicant and foreseeable as to its results. The Court first noted that the risks of arbitrariness are particularly great where a power of the executive is exercised in secret. It then went on to say that since the implementation in practice of measures of secret surveillance of communications is not open to scrutiny by the individuals concerned or the public at large, it would be contrary to the rule of law for the legal discretion granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power. Consequently, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference.

The question was, therefore, whether domestic law laid down with sufficient precision the circumstances in which the RIS could store and

make use of information relating to the applicant's private life. Noting that the relevant law provides that information affecting national security may be gathered, recorded and archived in secret files, the Court observed that no provision of domestic law lays down any limits on the exercise of those powers. For instance, it observed that the relevant domestic law did not set out any of the following:

- the kind of information that may be recorded;
- the categories of people against whom surveillance measures such as gathering and keeping information may be taken;
- the circumstances in which such measures may be taken, or
- the procedure to be followed.

### **III. WHAT INFORMATION CAN BE COLLECTED AND STORED BY THE POLICE?**

Whether the taking of photographs by the police amounts to an intrusion into an individual's private life will depend on whether it related to private matters or public incidents, and whether the material thus obtained was envisaged for a limited use or was likely to be made available to the general public. The case of *Friedl v. Austria*<sup>12</sup> concerned the fact that the Vienna police authorities took photographs in the course and during the conclusion of a demonstration in which the applicant participated. Afterwards, the police established the identity of the applicant, recorded these personal data and stored them in an administrative file relating to these events. However, the Commission failed to find that this constituted an interference with his right to respect for private life and put forward three reasons for its decision:

- there was no intrusion into the "inner circle" of the applicant's private life in the sense that the authorities had not entered his home and taken the photographs there;
- the photographs related to a public incident, namely a manifestation of several persons in a public place, in which the applicant was voluntarily taking part;
- they were solely taken for the purposes of recording the character of the manifestation and the conduct of the participants in it in view of ensuing investigation proceedings for related offences. However, in reaching its final conclusion, the Commission also attached weight to the fact that the Government had given assurances that the individual persons on the photographs taken remained anonymous in that no names were noted down, the personal data recorded and photographs taken were not



entered into a data processing system, and no action was taken to identify the persons photographed on that occasion by means of data processing.

#### **IV. COLLECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION IN ORDER TO PROTECT NATIONAL SECURITY**

The Court has accepted that in order to protect national security, States need to have laws granting the authorities the power to collect and store information in registers that are not accessible to the public<sup>13</sup>. Moreover, it is also acceptable that the authorities should be able to use this information when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in posts that are important for national security. It is the State's responsibility to identify those exceptional conditions and special jobs. However, in such cases, the Court has said that it must be satisfied that there exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse. These are necessary, it said, in view of the risk that "a system of secret surveillance for the protection of national security poses of undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of defending it"<sup>14</sup>. States must, thus, have in place an adequate framework of safeguards offering minimum standards of protection in order to prevent the abuse of power by the State and the violation of privacy.

#### **V. SECRET SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS**

Although it is recognized that intelligence services may legitimately exist in a democratic society it has made it clear that powers of secret surveillance of citizens are tolerable in so far as they are strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions. In this regard, the States are influenced by the fact that democratic societies find themselves threatened by highly sophisticated forms of espionage and by terrorism, with the result that the State must be able, in order effectively to counter such threats, to undertake the secret surveillance of subversive elements operating within its jurisdiction. Therefore, the existence of some legislation granting powers of secret surveillance over the mail, post and telecommunications is, under exceptional conditions, necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security and/or for the prevention of disorder or crime.

#### **VI. WHAT SAFEGUARDS ARE REQUIRED?**

While it is within the discretion of the State how such a system of surveillance should operate, this discretion is not unfettered. Similar to the State's covert activities in other areas, therefore, it must be satisfied that

there are adequate and effective guarantees against abuse whatever system is adopted. However, this assessment has a relative character it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for ordering such measures, the authorities competent to permit, carry out and supervise such measures, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law. In *Klass v. Germany*<sup>15</sup> the Strasbourg Court had to address whether German legislation, which authorized letter opening and wire-tapping in order to safeguard national security and prevent disorder and crime, violated the applicant's rights insofar as it lacked adequate safeguards against possible abuse. In relation to what protection is necessary, the Court emphasized that, in principle, judicial control of surveillance is desirable. However, it went on to approve the German system even though the supervisory control was vested not in the courts but in a Parliamentary Board and a body called the G10 Commission, which the Board appointed. This was because it was satisfied that both bodies were independent of the authorities carrying out the surveillance and have been given sufficient powers to exercise an effective and continuous control. The Court concluded, therefore, that taking notice of technical advances in the means of espionage and surveillance and of the development of terrorism in Europe, the German system for controlling covert surveillance met the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention.

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# WRITING ISRAEL'S INTELLIGENCE HISTORY: FORMAL INITIATIVES, SUBJECTIVE MEMOIRS AND NARRATIVES IN DISPUTE

Eyal PASCOVICH\*

## Abstract

*Although writing the Intelligence history of Israel - as of that of any other state - is indeed a challenging task, researchers in this field can be assisted by a variety of both Israeli and foreign sources. However, understanding the advantages and disadvantages of each type of these sources is extremely important. Thus, memoirs of former directors of Israeli Intelligence agencies may be of great assistance for researchers, despite the subjective and even biased narrative they may portray. For instance, the examination of the memoirs that have been written about the 1973 Yom Kippur War's Intelligence fiasco, with special emphasis on those written by then-directors of AMAN and the MOSSAD, Eli Zeira and Zvi Zamir respectively, reveals two opposing narratives. The controversy between the two former directors, which turned into a passionate public dispute that has even reached legal proceedings, was concerning three major questions: Who should be blamed for the Intelligence fiasco that preceded the war?; Did Ashraf Marwan - a senior Egyptian official who spied for the MOSSAD and delivered a war alert on the eve of the war - actually serve as a double agent, and was part of an Egyptian deception plan?; And was Eli Zeira responsible for the exposure of Marwan's identity, which allegedly brought about Marwan's mysterious death in 2007? The following article will introduce the differences of opinion with regard to these questions, demonstrating the challenge with which researchers are faced when trying to decide which narrative to adopt in their attempt to reveal the truth.*

**Keywords:** Intelligence History, Israel, Yom Kippur War, Eli Zeira, Ashraf Marwan, AMAN - Israeli Directorate of Military Intelligence

## Introduction

Academic researchers in the field of Security Studies, and even more so in the subfield of Intelligence studies, are quite familiar with the unique

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difficulties which characterize these disciplines. Discovering the unknown, based on unclassified or declassified materials, is, at all times, a highly challenging task, especially when formal authorities do all that they can to minimize any leak of information, or - alternatively - to portray their own subjective and biased narrative.

Contrary to popular writers who can publish rumors as absolute truths, academic researchers, as well as accomplished journalists, are expected to carefully examine their findings before publishing them. This mechanism of crosschecking may appear to be very confusing and challenging when different and sometimes even conflicting narratives claim to be true.

Academic researchers of the Israeli Intelligence cope with these challenges on a daily basis, and with more intensity. As one of the most reputable, yet confidential Intelligence communities worldwide, the Israeli Intelligence community has always been a popular object of interest, and at the same time also a 'tough nut to crack'. The most clandestine agency is the Israeli foreign Intelligence agency, the MOSSAD, nevertheless, both AMAN (military Intelligence) and Shin Bet (internal Intelligence) do not lag behind.

Yet, one who seeks to explore chapters in the history of these three main agencies - and a few other secondary ones - which together form the Israeli Intelligence community, can be assisted by various sources, either foreign or Israeli. Understanding the characteristics, advantages and disadvantages of each type of these sources can assist in the process of carefully and reliably writing Israel's Intelligence history.

### **Different Types of Sources**

In light of Israel's strict censorial regulations surrounding national security, the State's Security and Intelligence agencies have never been obligated to declassify and publish most of their past internal documents and records, including those whose exposure will not result in any damage to security in the present. Indeed, the Israeli Freedom of Information Law, which was legislated by the Knesset (Israeli parliament) in 1998, instructs that „every Israeli citizen or resident has the right to obtain information from a public authority”<sup>1</sup>. However, Paragraph 9 of the law instructs that „a public authority shall not deliver information, whose disclosure may raise fear of harm to national security', as well as, 'information on subjects which have been determined by order of the Minister of Defense[...]for reasons of national security’<sup>2</sup>.

According to another law - the 1955 Archives Law - all official Israeli authorities and ministries must deposit all their records in the Israel State Archives, where they are said to be open to the public. However, the law imposed a confidentiality period of fifty years on every file that belongs to some security authorities, including Shin Bet, the MOSSAD and some units of Israel Defense Forces (IDF), including AMAN<sup>3</sup>. Then again, in 1998, when Israel celebrated its 50th anniversary, only a small portion of the security files from 1948 has been released to the public. As a result of the persistence of this situation, leading Israeli journalists Ronen Bergman and Yossi Melman have filed an appeal, in 2007, to the Israeli High Court of Justice in order to coerce the security establishment to comply with the law. In response, the Israeli PM (Prime Minister) has signed on a new regulation, which expanded the fifty years confidentiality period in additional twenty years (which will begin to expire only in 2018)<sup>4</sup>.

Nonetheless, in recent years, more and more historical security-related documents have been declassified and published online in the websites of either the Israel State Archives<sup>5</sup> or the IDF and Defense Establishment Archives<sup>6</sup>. Although these revelations still constitute a mere drop in the bucket, they may, however, indicate on some change in Israeli policy on this matter. Among the files that have been released were the orders for the military Intelligence's establishment and its transformation into a directorate in the IDF's General Staff; the protocols of a special committee - the Yadin-Sherf Committee - which was commissioned in 1963 for examining Israeli Intelligence community's structure and distribution of responsibilities; IDF's operations log - including its Intelligence part - in the 1976 Operation Entebbe for rescuing Israeli hostages that were held in Uganda; and the protocols of the Agranat National Commission of Inquiry into the failures of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, led by a colossal Intelligence fiasco (as will be elaborated later on). Careful reading of these interesting historical records may indeed produce some new revelations, although part of their contents has already been leaked, little by little, throughout the years (while other parts are still redacted).

Other formal initiatives for introducing and commemorating Israel's Intelligence history are held by the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (IICC). The latter congregates high-ranking veterans of Israel's Intelligence community, runs seminars and publishes a quarterly magazine, as well as researches and books. Among the latter, a most interesting book is a special anthology that was published on the occasion of Israel's 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary and contains a few dozens of short essays written by both past and present senior Israeli Intelligence officers on different historical chapters and current challenges with which Israeli

Intelligence is faced<sup>7</sup>. IICC also runs the "Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center"<sup>8</sup> which constitutes an unofficial public diplomacy arm of AMAN for disseminating unclassified and declassified information on matters such as Palestinian, Lebanese and global terrorism, worldwide anti-Semitism and the Iranian nuclear threat. The Center's numerous publications can be of great assistance for those who wish to learn about the security threats and challenges with which Israel is faced and the Israeli Intelligence's view of the State's enemies, although one must bear in mind the biased and partial picture - though true - these publications may portray as part of what the Center (and AMAN) label "The Battle for Hearts and Minds"<sup>9</sup>.

Alongside Israeli sources, academic researchers of Israeli Intelligence can also be assisted by foreign sources. Relatively reliable sources are reports made by foreign Intelligence services on the Israeli Intelligence that have been openly published, intentionally or otherwise. Such was the case of the secret CIA report on Israel's Intelligence and security services that has been found by the Iranians at the American embassy in Tehran following the 1979 Islamic revolution<sup>10</sup>.

Pieces of information on the Israeli Intelligence are often published also by foreign journalists and writers, who are not obligated to follow the Israeli censorship's orders and therefore can expose any secrets they wish. However, some of these secrets may turn up to be either rumors or simply untrue, while Israel maintains its no-comment policy and avoids either denying or approving them. This policy is a lesson learned from the 1990 Ostrovsky affair, in which Victor Ostrovsky, a former MOSSAD agent, has published a Canadian book on this clandestine Israeli agency, in which he allegedly exposed its structure and methods of operation, as well as names of its agents<sup>11</sup>. Yitzhak Shamir, then-Israeli PM, instructed to file lawsuits in both Canada and the United States in an attempt to achieve injunctions on the book's publication. However, Israel's appeals were rejected, creating - like in the Streisand effect - an undesirable outcome of turning Ostrovsky's book into a best-seller (and perhaps even inadvertently validating its contents, although Israel insisted that it was no more than a collection of lies).

While Ostrovsky was only a 'small cog' in the MOSSAD and his revelations are often referred to with misgivings, memoirs written by former directors and other seniors in the Israeli Intelligence community are much more reliable. Although they may portray a somewhat subjective and biased picture, these memoirs constitute an invaluable treasure for academic researchers in the fields of Intelligence and Israel Studies and therefore deserve special attention.

## **Memoirs**

A rich literature of memoirs written by former officers in the Israeli security establishment has been published throughout the years. Most of it has been written by veterans of IDF and deals with Israeli wars and other military issues. A small portion of these memoirs has been written by former AMAN Directors. Due to the unique characteristics of the military service in Israel, all of these directors have held different positions, Intelligence and particularly non-Intelligence ones, throughout their military careers. As a result, their memoirs cover both Intelligence and non-Intelligence military affairs (in addition to references to their post-military careers, since many senior veterans of the Israeli security establishment hold senior public positions following their retirement from service).

Thus, of the 17 AMAN Directors that served from its establishment in 1948 (not including the current director), six have written memoirs or books that deal with historical Intelligence affairs<sup>12</sup> (in addition to two other AMAN Directors whose biographies were written by others<sup>13</sup>, as well as some general Intelligence and security-related books that have been written by a few directors<sup>14</sup>). A most interesting book is the memoir of former AMAN Director Eli Zeira (1972-74), which, unsurprisingly, focuses on the 1973 Yom Kippur fiasco and will be given a special attention below.

The memoir of Meir Amit, the only one to head both AMAN (1962-63) and the MOSSAD (1963-68), details Amit's experience in these two agencies. Four other MOSSAD Directors - from the ten that served from its establishment, excluding its current director - have written memoirs<sup>15</sup> (in addition to one semi-biographical book that has been written on Reuven Shiloah, the first MOSSAD director). The most relevant memoir to our discussion below on the Yom Kippur War was written by Zvi Zamir, who headed the Mossad during the war and whose account contradicts the narrative portrayed by then-AMAN Director Eli Zeira.

The most productive writer was Isser Harel, one of the founding fathers of the Israeli Intelligence community who served as both Shin Bet's first director (1948-52) and the MOSSAD's second director (1952-63, while simultaneously serving also as the Supervisor of Security Services - the only one in Israel who ever served in this position - thus continuing de facto to oversee Shin Bet's activity). Harel has written no less than eight memoirs (in addition to one biography that has been written about him by others), dealing with almost every affair or field of activity he was involved in during his lengthy security service. Three of Harel's memoirs refer to his Shin Bet career and deal with the tension between security and democracy, Soviet espionage against Israel during the Cold War, and Jewish terrorism in

Israel's early days. The additional five cover important operations and affairs Harel was involved in during his term in office as the MOSSAD Director, including Operation Susannah (see endnote no. 12) and Egypt's alleged attempts, with West German scientists' assistance, to develop nuclear capabilities during the 1960s. Harel's most famous book, which has been translated to at least eight different languages, deals with the MOSSAD's operation for the capture of the Nazi criminal Adolf Eichmann and bringing him to justice in Israel<sup>16</sup>.

In addition to Harel, two other Shin Bet Directors - of the eleven that served in this position so far (not including the current director) - have written memoirs<sup>17</sup>. The most emotional one is Carmi Gillon's memoir, which focuses on the agency's 1995 fiasco - that happened "on Gillon's shift" - in failing to prevent the assassination of then-Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin<sup>18</sup>. Gillon's memoir, similarly to all other memoirs written by former directors of AMAN, Shin Bet or the MOSSAD, have been written in Hebrew (most of them have not been translated into foreign languages) and published as popular yet non-fiction books which are specifically directed to the general Israeli audience.

This is precisely where the most significant disadvantage of this kind of literature lies. These memoirs do not include references and are primarily based on the memories of their authors, which may be incorrect or biased, either intentionally - to glamorize the past, rewrite history and glorify the authors' legacy - or unintentionally, given the number of years that have passed since the occurrence of the events.

On the other hand, these memoirs have been written by those who had access to all operational and Intelligence secrets. Although it is reasonable to assume that many of these secrets are still kept hidden - for reasons of either formal or self-imposed censorship - one can rely on these memoirs' credibility, more than that of many other books - whether academic or especially popular ones - that have been written about the Israeli Intelligence and are a mixture of known facts, estimations and rumors.

Therefore, the above-mentioned memoirs can be considered as an invaluable treasure for those interested in the history of the Israeli Intelligence. However, in the light of their previously described disadvantages, it is advisable - as in any academic research - to crosscheck each fact, interpretation or argument hidden in the pages of these memoirs. That said, this task may, sometimes, be very challenging, particularly when traumatic or controversial national events are under exploration, due to the fact that the reader may be faced with different and even contradicting narratives of the same event. Such is the case of the Intelligence fiasco that preceded the 1973 Yom Kippur War.



### **The Yom Kippur War - Narratives in Dispute**

No one denies the heavy responsibility that lies on AMAN, and especially on its research department, for the Intelligence fiasco that preceded the traumatic war that broke out in 1973 on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the year for the Jewish people. AMAN, and as a result also the entire IDF and Israeli leadership, were caught by surprise by a coordinated attack of the Egyptian and the Syrian armies, which resulted in a bitter war that lasted 19 days. Although the war ended after all with an Israeli military victory, the price Israel had paid, particularly in the beginning of the war but also until its end, was unbearable - IDF casualties exceeded 2,200, in addition to almost 5,600 wounded soldiers and 300 who were captured by the enemy<sup>19</sup>.

The national investigation committee that was appointed following the war, the Agranat Commission, has determined that AMAN and its research department had failed in their top-priority mission of issuing an alert at least 48 hours before an impending enemy attack, although its collection units had succeeded in collecting - during the days and weeks that preceded the war - plenty of pieces of information that could have easily suggested on the upcoming attack. However, then-AMAN Director, Eli Zeira, and his research department, headed by Aryeh Shalev, held the opinion that all these pieces of information pointed to an Arab military exercise rather than to a war. Since the two have been holding a conception, according to which the Egyptians are still not ready for a war, no evidence could have convinced them that their assessment was wrong. It was only after a leading MOSSAD human source, code named Babel, had reported on the imminent attack, that AMAN changed its assessment - from low probability of war to high. But, this alert of AMAN has been issued only a few hours prior to the zero hour, not leaving enough time for IDF's reserve troops to be called up and prepare for a war.

The Agranat Commission has found Zeira and Shalev, as well as the IDF's Chief of Staff, David "Dado" Elazar, as those mainly responsible for the fiasco and recommended on their dismissal. In a controversial decision, the commission chose to clear the political echelon - PM Golda Meir and Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan - from any responsibility for the War's failures, whether the Intelligence, the military or the political ones. However, the two were eventually forced to resign due to heavy public pressure that blamed them for the alleged delay in calling up the reserve troops.

This allegation has been fully accepted by AMAN Director Zeira, and even more so: Zeira claimed that Meir and Dayan should have reached the

conclusion - based on the materials that AMAN had been collecting and despite its erroneous reassuring assessment - that a war was pending. These allegations were rejected by the Agranat Commission, and Zeira was forced to leave his position. In addition, he also chose to shun away from any public career and to disappear from the public eye, until 1993, exactly twenty years after the war, when he first published his narrative on the war in his memoir, which was symbolically titled "Myth versus Reality". Eleven years later, Zeira published an updated edition, based on new records that have been released during these years<sup>20</sup>.

Zeira's book, and specifically its new edition, is a scathing indictment of the Agranat Commission and its conclusions. While Zeira does not deny his responsibility for the Intelligence failure, he insists that the political echelon should have also been found responsible by the commission for the war's failures. Zeira claims that PM Meir has deliberately hidden from the commission the meeting she held with King Hussein of Jordan ten days before the war, during which he had warned her of Egypt and Syria's plan to attack Israel. And as for Dayan, Zeira argues that the Minister of Defense disagreed with AMAN and estimated, as early as a day before Yom Kippur, that a war is about to break out the following day, but for some reasons - political and others - Golda and Dayan tarried in calling up the reserve forces. Zeira accuses the Agranat Commission of favoritism towards the politicians, while at the same time adopting a hardline towards the military commanders and strongly recommending them not to be assisted by attorneys.

In addition, Zeira also claims that Babel, the leading MOSSAD human source who - during an urgent meeting with then-MOSSAD Director Zvi Zamir in London the night before Yom Kippur - warned Zamir of the impending war, was actually a double agent, who worked for the Egyptians. In order to prove this allegation, Zeira points out to false war alerts that have been deliberately issued by Babel throughout the year prior to the war in order to confuse and put the Israeli Intelligence to sleep. In addition, Zeira blames Babel for deliberately delivering a particularly short notice before the war, as well as intentionally misleading the Israelis about the exact time the war was to begin (Babel had said that it would begin before sunset, while the war actually began at 2pm)<sup>21</sup>.

Zeira's allegations were entirely rejected by Zvi Zamir, who served as MOSSAD Director during the Yom Kippur War. In Zamir's memoir which has been published in 2011, he argues that PM Meir indeed told the Agranat Commission about her meeting with King Hussein prior to the war, but demanded that it will not be published in order to keep the promise she had made to Hussein<sup>22</sup>. As of Babel, Zamir decisively states - based on the

close contacts he personally maintained with this leading human source - that Babel was completely loyal to Israel; as he wrote in his memoir:

"Zeira's unfounded theory, according to which Babel was a double agent who misled Israel, was aimed at throwing the responsibility for the Intelligence failure on the shoulders of the MOSSAD, which operated Babel, thus clearing the conscience of AMAN and its director, who kept arguing - until the eve of Oct. 5 [less than 24 hours before the zero hour] - that a war is not impending"<sup>23</sup>.

Zamir's narrative is further supported by Prof. Uri Bar Joseph from the University of Haifa, Israel, who is considered the most important researcher of the Yom Kippur Intelligence fiasco. Both of them raise the same accusations against Zeira, including a relatively new one, according to which Zeira is indirectly responsible for Babel's tragic end, who mysteriously fell to his death from his London apartment's balcony in 2007.

Babel - or "the angle" - was the code name of Ashraf Marwan, the son-in-law of the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. In 1969 Marwan offered his services to the Israelis, and the MOSSAD began operating him. Following the death of Nasser in 1970, Marwan became the advisor and a close companion of Anwar Sadat, Egypt's new president. Apparently, his connections with the MOSSAD continued even after the Yom Kippur war, at least until the late 1970s (and according to some sources, up until the late 1990s, though on a low key).

Early in the 1990s, hints on the existence and identity of Babel began to be published, either in the first edition of Zeira's memoir or in other sources, including Egyptian ones. Babel's full identity as Ashraf Marwan was finally exposed in 2002 by Ahron Bregman, a researcher and journalist of an Israeli origin who lives in London (and therefore unobligated to the Israeli censorship's rules), in an interview to the Egyptian daily newspaper, al-Ahram, in which Bregman claimed that Marwan was a double agent<sup>24</sup>. The exposure of Babel's identity was cited throughout the world, including Israel. Therefore, Zeira chose to specifically refer to Ashraf Marwan in the second edition of his memoir (2004), and continued to claim that Marwan was indeed a double agent. Although Marwan denied he had any contacts with the Israelis, surely he began to feel threatened.

Following the publication of the second edition of his memoir, Zeira gave a rare interview to the Israeli television, in which he, once more, specifically named Marwan and repeated his allegation that Marwan was a double agent. A week later, Zvi Zamir arrived to the same television studio and accused Zeira of exposing the identity of the most senior agent Israel has ever operated and - by doing so - causing a severe damage to Israel's

ability to further recruit human sources. Zamir, along with two AMAN officers who served under Zeira, filed a formal complaint against him to the Attorney General, claiming that Zeira was the one who exposed Babel's identity to unauthorized Israeli and foreign sources. This allegation was supported also by Prof. Uri Bar Joseph<sup>25</sup>.

Zamir also publicly blamed Zeira for allegedly misleading his superiors prior to the war. This was in reference to the allegations, that Zeira had let Minister of Defense Dayan and IDF Chief of Staff Elazar believe, during the days prior to the war, that AMAN's special signal Intelligence means, which were supposed to provide a clear warning in the event that Egypt was about to launch a war, have been activated. However, Zeira apparently was delayed in activating them until very close to the start of the war, since he was certain that it was merely a military exercise and was aware of the fact that the activation of the "special means" might uncover them. In addition, Zeira's hubris allegedly brought him to postpone the distribution of further information that could have pointed out on the upcoming war<sup>26</sup>.

As a response to Zamir's public allegations against him, Zeira filed a libel suit against Zamir. Due to the sensitivity of the matters at hand, a former Supreme Court Judge was nominated as a special arbitrator between the two former directors. The arbitration process between them resulted in a compromise on the allegation of misleading the superiors. However, in the matter of Zamir's first allegation, the arbitrator decided in 2007 to reject Zeira's libel suit, and stated that Zeira had exposed Marwan's identity to a few Israeli and foreign researchers and journalists for the purpose of strengthening his theory according to which Marwan, who has been operated by the MOSSAD, was a double agent who deliberately misled Israeli Intelligence. By doing so, Zeira had hoped to divert at least part of the responsibility for the Intelligence failure onto the MOSSAD's shoulders<sup>27</sup>.

Following the arbitrator's decision, a criminal investigation on the suspicion of exposing state secrets was opened against Zeira, led by a special team of Shin Bet and police investigators. The team's findings were submitted to the Attorney General, who has decided, in 2012, to close the investigation without putting Zeira on trial, taking into account the long time that had passed since the alleged offences have been committed, as well as Zeira's advanced age and his past contribution to Israel's security. The Attorney General added that historians rather than judges should rule on this matter, as follows:

"The Yom Kippur War is still very much a national trauma... Issues pertaining to the war, including Intelligence collection and research, should

first and foremost be at the heart of a historical research, learning lessons and public debate. The possibility that these issues, including the exposure of the source, will be the focus of a lengthy criminal trial, which will undoubtedly delve into the heart of historical arguments, is problematic"<sup>28</sup>.

The Attorney General's decision greatly frustrated Zamir, also because of the tragic end of Ashraf Marwan's life a few years earlier. On June 27, 2007 - only two weeks after the arbitrator's verdict was made public (although originally it was defined as confidential) - Marwan fell to his death from his London apartment's balcony. Despite the account of a few eye witnesses who allegedly saw some mysterious figures walking around in Marwan's apartment the same morning, an investigation of the Scotland Yard has failed to determine whether Marwan committed suicide or was forced to jump. Marwan's wife accused Israel of murdering her husband as revenge for allegedly being a double agent. Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak commented on Marwan's death, saying that he was a "patriot who loyally served his country", and denied "the rumors according to which he spied for Israel". Others believe that he was killed by the Egyptians after they have been convinced by the arbitrator's verdict that he indeed worked for the MOSSAD (and in order to prevent him from publishing his own memoirs of the 1973 war), or simply committed suicide following the exposure of his identity<sup>29</sup>.

In any event, Zamir holds the opinion that former AMAN Director Zeira bears responsibility for Marwan's tragic end:

"I was filled with sorrow for this man whose life ended in such a tragic way, anger on the circumstances that led to his death, and helplessness for failing to protect him... I am also tormented by the thought that perhaps the exposure of his name and his identity as an Israeli spy among the Egyptian leadership has indirectly - if not directly - brought about his fall from his London apartment's balcony".<sup>30</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The academic discipline of Intelligence studies is characterized by special challenges with which the researcher is faced, led by the confidentiality and inaccessibility of many of the original documents. This challenge may be multiplied in dictatorships, which, naturally, prefer to keep their secrets hidden and do not attribute much significance for the public's right to know, but also in some democratic states, like Israel, which follow a strict policy regarding the publication of past security-related records.

However, even in these countries one can find several types of unclassified or declassified sources which may be very helpful in shedding light on historical Intelligence chapters. At the same time, recognizing the advantages and disadvantages of each type of source, as well as crosschecking facts and narratives, are extremely important for revealing the truth.

This paper focused on the Israeli case and a unique type of source: memoirs written by former directors of Intelligence agencies. This kind of literature is indeed an invaluable source for researchers, though the latter must be aware of the subjective and biased picture these memoirs may sometimes portray, deliberately or otherwise. As a result, and especially with regard to traumatic or controversial events, different and even contradicting narratives may be found.

Such is the case of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which stood at the heart of this paper. Eli Zeira and Zvi Zamir, respectively AMAN and MOSSAD Directors during this war, keep on arguing even today on the war's narrative, and are especially disputed over the question of who should be blamed for the Intelligence fiasco that preceded the war. This battle of historical narratives even reached legal proceedings following Zamir's accusation that Zeira had revealed State secrets. Moreover, Zamir suspects that Zeira's actions have brought about the death of Ashraf Marwan, the most valuable human source Israel has ever operated.

The emotions that characterize almost every reference to the 1973 Intelligence fiasco - either by the involved directors or by journalists and academic experts investigating the case - are completely understandable, considering the deep rift this war has generated in Israeli politics and society. Indeed, many authors have chosen to decisively take a side in this controversy of narratives, while others preferred to take a more cautious approach.

In the Yom Kippur case, as in other clashes of narratives, the two approaches are acceptable, as long as the authors attempt - as much as possible, considering the circumstances - to keep their objectivity. Alternatively, they can simply introduce the difference of opinions without any judgment. If they choose to do so, they should not be accused of hesitation or of "sitting on the fence". Sometimes, the truth is an elusive concept, or simply too difficult to explore. Revealing two alternative truths may also be of good service for the "book of Intelligence chronicles". And perhaps, the combination of these two alternative truths may reveal a third one, which may portray a more accurate and full picture that better reflects the complex and multifaceted reality.

## References

- <sup>1</sup> *Freedom of Information Law, 1998*, paragraph 1.
- <sup>2</sup> Ibid, paragraph 9-a-1+2.
- <sup>3</sup> IDF records are kept in a special archive - the IDF and Defense Establishment Archives (IDFA) - which legally belongs to the Israel State Archives but in practice enjoys much independence. Many of IDFA's records are inaccessible, whereas others are open to authorized researchers only, who often complain about restrictions and difficulties with which they are faced when searching for files and documents.
- <sup>4</sup> *The Archives Law, 1955*, 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>th</sup> amendments, regulation no. 8 (2010).
- <sup>5</sup> [http://www.archives.gov.il/ArchiveGov\\_eng](http://www.archives.gov.il/ArchiveGov_eng)
- <sup>6</sup> [http://www.archives.mod.gov.il/pages/ENG/default\\_eng.asp](http://www.archives.mod.gov.il/pages/ENG/default_eng.asp)
- <sup>7</sup> Amos Gilboa and Ephraim Lapid, eds., *Silent defender: an inside look at sixty years of Israeli intelligence*, translated from Hebrew by Elizabeth Yuval (Springfield, NJ, Jerusalem and Ramat Hasharon, Israel: Gefen and Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, 2012).
- <sup>8</sup> <http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/index.aspx>
- <sup>9</sup> See in this matter the following center's publication: Reuven Erlich, "The role of intelligence in the battle for hearts and minds", Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center - IICC (22 July, 2007), accessed 26 July, 2015 at [http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/data/pdf/PDF\\_07\\_096\\_2.pdf](http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/data/pdf/PDF_07_096_2.pdf)
- <sup>10</sup> United States, Central Intelligence Agency, *Israel: foreign Intelligence and security services* (March 1979).
- <sup>11</sup> Victor Ostrovsky and Claire Hoy, *By way of deception* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).
- <sup>12</sup> Memoirs have been written by former AMAN Directors Chaim Herzog (1949-50, 1959-62), Meir Amit (1962-63), Eli Zeira (1972-74), Uri Sagi (1991-95) and Moshe Ya'alon (1995-98). The sixth one is former director Yehoshafat Harkabi (1955-59) who wrote a book on the failed AMAN's covert operation, code named Operation Susannah, which was conducted in Egypt in 1954 and on the major implications this operation had on Israeli politics.
- <sup>13</sup> Aharon Yariv (1964-72) and Ehud Barak (1983-85).
- <sup>14</sup> Especially productive was Yehoshafat Harkabi, who - after retiring from military service - has built a very impressive second career as a professor of International Relations and Middle East Studies in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
- <sup>15</sup> Issar Harel (1952-63), Zvi Zamir (1968-74), Danny Yatom (1996-98) and Ephraim Halevi (1998-2002).
- <sup>16</sup> See the book's English edition: Isser Harel, *The house on Garibaldi Street: the first full account of the capture of Adolf Eichmann* (New York: Viking Press, 1975).
- <sup>17</sup> Yaakov Perry (1988-95) and Carmi Gillon (1995-6).
- <sup>18</sup> Carmi Gillon, *Shin Bet between the schisms* (in Hebrew; Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books, 2000).
- <sup>19</sup> Some sources indicate even bigger numbers of casualties and wounded soldiers, referring also to the post-war era until the final withdrawal of all IDF forces in both the northern and southern battlefronts.
- <sup>20</sup> Eli Zeira, *Myth versus reality: The October 1973 war: failures and lessons* (in Hebrew; Tel Aviv: Miskal - Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books, 2004).

<sup>21</sup> Aryeh Shalev, who in 1973 served under Zeira as the head of AMAN's research department and was found responsible as well for the Intelligence fiasco by the Agranat Commission, also wrote a memoir, in which he did not accept Zeira's claim that Babel was a double agent; see: Aryeh Shalev, *Israel's Intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling deception and distraction* (Eastbourne, UK: Sussex academic press, 2010), p. 102.

<sup>22</sup> Zvi Zamir and Efrat Mass, *With open eyes* (in Hebrew; Or Yehuda: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, Dvir, 2011), p. 126–128.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, p. 152.

<sup>24</sup> Bregman was interviewed by the al-Ahram daily newspaper following the publication of his book "A History of Israel", in which he elaborated on Ashraf Marwan without specifically mentioning his name: Ahron Bregman, *A history of Israel* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 139–159.

<sup>25</sup> Prof. Bar Joseph wrote a book on Ashraf Marwan with reference to his exposure: Uri Bar Joseph, *The angel: Ashraf Marwan, the MOSSAD and the Yom Kippur War* (in Hebrew; Or Yehuda: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, Dvir, 2011. See also his article on Zeira and Marwan's exposure: Uri Bar Joseph, "The Intelligence chief who went fishing in the cold: How Maj. (res.) Eli Zeira exposed the identity of Israel's best source ever", *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2008.

<sup>26</sup> In his memoir, Zamir not only accuses Zeira but also the entire AMAN agency in hubris which caused them not to share with IDF's operational commands the detailed information they had since the beginning of 1973 on Egypt's and Syria's war plans - based on MOSSAD's sources, including Babel - because AMAN was very much convinced that a war is not about to erupt. This failure impaired IDF's performance during the first days of the war. These accusations of Zamir were supported by the Agranat Commission's findings. See: Zamir and Mass, op. cit., pp. 210–215.

<sup>27</sup> It should be noted, that Zamir was involved in another libel suit concerning the narrative of the war. In the late 1980s, Zamir has filed a libel suit against Yoel Ben-Porat, who in 1973 headed AMAN's central collection unit, following an accusation Ben-Porat has made in the media, according to which Zamir had tarried in distributing Babel's war alert. In light of the fact that Agranat Commission's protocols have not been declassified at the time, no legal procedures have been initiated. And in another libel suit, Ben-Porat has reached a settlement agreement with one of his past subordinate officers who sued him for some allegations that he had made in his memoir about the war: Yoel Ben-Porat, *Neila: Locked-on* (in Hebrew; Tel Aviv: Edanim publishers, Yediot Aharonot, 1991). Ben-Porat argues in his memoir, that he had tried to draw Eli Zeira's attention to the upcoming war, but his attempts were in vain.

<sup>28</sup> Aviel Magnezi, "Attorney General: Zeira case very complex", *Ynet news* (9 July 2012), accessed 29 July 2015 at <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4253141,00.html>

<sup>29</sup> Another hypothesis suggests that Marwan was killed either by business opponents or by the Libyans, as revenge for his part in the Israeli and Italian success in foiling a joint Libyan-Egyptian-Palestinian attempt to shoot down an Israeli passenger aircraft in Rome in September 1973.

<sup>30</sup> Zamir and Mass, op. cit., pp. 151–152.



# NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS THROUGH ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE

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## **Abstract**

*The global market evolutions in recent decades have highlighted the significant increase in economic operators' international competition and, in order to meet the information asymmetry challenges, each of the involved actors are resorting to specific intelligence tools. Large and powerful firms are the first to understand the information potential to increase the production factors' value, to allow the use of available resources in the best economic conditions. Later, by retrieving the mechanisms and enclose them into public policies, states with advanced economies achieve and maintain competitive advantages.*

*In the current global competitive configuration the need for the public authorities to design and implement national economic intelligence systems is revealed. Developed as a public-private partnership and designed to harmonize economic agents' particular interests with the national interests of optimal resource use, the economic intelligence system has the sole purpose of augmenting economic competitiveness through information.*

*Economic intelligence approach involves four areas: the systematic monitoring of the emerging economic areas of interest, in order to obtain relevant data about them and, correlated with their own strategies, to adapt on-going actions; the promotion of own vision, through appropriate behaviours and launched ideas, as well as through their interpretations for the benefit of their strategy; the protection of own information in order to make it harder for the competition to obtain them; the provision of decision support, based on analyses and evaluations resulting from the processing of available information.*

**Keywords:** economic intelligence, economic competitiveness, economic information, national interest.

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### **Conceptual marks**

Developments and challenges posed by globalization lead economic agents to act in order to permanently develop their adapting capacities to the economic market's new realities. The stakes of this effort are important: their survival on the economic segments they are operating into, providing contributions to society development and creating jobs that require higher qualifications, by placing them in a constant innovative position. Leveraging this effort could mean vulnerabilities identification. In this respect, market vulnerabilities have to be identified and research, industry and services have to be placed in an active circuit, in order to generate the most appropriate innovation<sup>1</sup>.

In recent decades, this globalisation changes adaptation process moved from the microeconomic level to the macroeconomic one, amid the concerns of different countries to increase economic competitiveness and, subsequently, conational economic actors competitiveness. A new concept developed regarding this task - economic intelligence and state level competitive intelligence – around which some countries – such as France, Germany, Japan, USA etc. – shaped genuine state policies.

Economic intelligence is a relatively new field in international intelligence concerns, aiming to augment economic competitiveness and create synergy between private and state interests, for maximum efficiency and effectiveness in the global competition for resources and markets. Information, as a neo-factor of production, if properly processed and harnessed, has the potential to significantly contribute to the growth and strengthening of the national economy<sup>2</sup>.

Economic intelligence is a set of steps undertaken in a public-private partnership for searching, collecting, processing and distributing information useful for economic operators in order to implement their business strategies. Information useful for economic operators are the ones they need in order to establish and implement, coherently, the strategies and actions enabling them to achieve their competitive environment position adaptation strategies<sup>3</sup>.

In the acceptance of Alain Juillet (appointed in 2003 as economic intelligence Senior at the General Secretariat of National Defence in France), economic intelligence is a form of governance that aims at strategic information processing, in order to ensure economic agents' competitiveness and economic security<sup>4</sup>.

Earlier, in 1967, Harold Wilensky (American sociologist, organisational intelligence pioneer) defined<sup>5</sup> economic intelligence as the work of producing knowledge/information as a support for a company's economic and strategic objectives, information that has been obtained and produced in a legal context and from open sources.

Basically, economic intelligence can ensure competitive advantages for an economic sector or a national economy which, by understanding to adopt a proactive attitude, reduce uncertainty and time cycles needed for decision making.

The competitive advantages of a country or a region are the performance of the state and private enterprises' activities, from a country or region, which tend to the performance peak at an international level. The concept of "national competitive advantage" reveals both the competitive advantage microeconomic aspects and the macroeconomic ones, starting from the premise that most of the competition and international trade happen between companies and not countries and that, however, there are certain country specific features, functions and characteristics that affect the likelihood of a company's international success and that they have specific relevance for various industries and sectors<sup>6</sup>.

Economic intelligence can ensure a systemic vision of the competitive environment and of the determinants on which the national competitive advantage depends, vision that must contain the influences political power, economic policies and legal regulations perform on the four determinants. Therefore, many authors tend to consider the state as the fifth determinant of national competitive advantages in the international economic competition<sup>7</sup>.

### **Economic intelligence dimensions**

Developments in the economic intelligence concept development/refinement process generated multiple approaches on the characteristics of this action, some of the most advanced theories being outlined in France.

In most approaches, economic intelligence involves a trilateral formula: areas of interest systematic monitoring (in order to obtain relevant data about them); available information protection (in order to counter any attempts of competition to reveal it); own vision promotion (by launching appropriate ideas/behaviour and interpreting them for the benefit of its own strategy)<sup>8</sup>. A particular form of this theory is the resultant of an

extensive research conducted by a team led by Christian Coutenceau, president of “Advanced Technologies” Group from HEC Diplomas Association and permanent member of the Economic Intelligence Academy in France. According to him, an economic intelligence approach is articulated around three axes: environmental monitoring, protection of strategic information, heritage, informational systems; decision making to act and to implement an economic intelligence system/project<sup>9</sup>.

Other views on economic intelligence, especially from the French space, added to the three dimensions a fourth component: ensuring the decision support (based on some analytical conclusions/assessments resulting from processing the available information)<sup>10</sup>.

At the same time, there are approaches considering that any economic intelligence process has six major dimensions<sup>11</sup>:

- *Integration and targeting* of an economic intelligence process: requires the ascertainment of the corresponding request site in the enterprise scheme (capacities – actives – offer – profession), the staff awareness regarding this action, the strategy development, the device verification, the informational need determination and intervention targeting within the intelligence cycle, everything with respect to a certain ethic;

- *Monitoring* proper context: involves the construction of an information and monitoring plan, knowledge regarding the information sources typology, the skill of human resources and web research tool management;

- *Strategic information processing and analysing*: consists of the analysis process understanding in order to transform data into strategic information, mastering the rapid processing of such information given the cognitive dissonance, information sources classification, the use of advances instruments for competitor’s strategies analysis and the graphical representation of the best change;

- *Information management*: requires knowledge of the information management in order to capitalize it, to make it flow and to turn it into knowledge, to promote practice communities formation and network management, but also to develop the prospective and implement a *war-room*;

- *Material heritage protection*: consists in knowing how to secure information, how to perform a self-diagnosis of the weaknesses, how to

identify social engineering practices, how to protect key individuals and how to develop a prognostic tendency of places and skills;

- Environment *influencing*: involves knowing how to communicate within the entity in order to mobilize employees and to provide the strategic vision of the company.

### **Economic intelligence cycle stages, functions and levels**

• In the acceptance of the French Association for Developing Economic Intelligence, inspired by the approach made by the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals – SCIP from USA, economic intelligence involves a series of stages<sup>12</sup>, namely:

- *The search and collection of key knowledge*, in which three courses of actions are considered: systematic monitoring; documentation; specific investigations conduction (using human sources);

- *Processing and interpretation of collected data* is done based on specific methods and techniques, but also on a developed information and database management mechanisms. It involves running analysis and data synthesis processes (by constructing mental models and interpretative schemes);

- *Formulating strategic judgments* is achieved by setting innovative vision, determining the projects, anticipate and control the risks, evaluate the induced effects, and setting the confrontation plans;

- *Establishing and implementing the action lines*, stage that consists of: activating the promoting infrastructure; determining the plans of preventing and counter the offensive or defensive approaches; establishing crisis cells; awareness of the values and values systems. In the alternative, increased attention should be paid to the creation and development of specific cultures of some domains, such as the economic intelligence one, this requiring considerable effort in order to promote the specific values and values systems and in order to clot training centers in that area;

- *Feedback*, is the final task which consists of assessing the results, auditing the entire economic intelligence process and retro-feeding the intelligence cycle (especially in terms of adapting to new developments, by changing the way action/practice is done)

• Performing the economic intelligence process has several functions, the specialized approach promoted by Bernard Besson and Jean-Claude Possin<sup>13</sup>, which involves four functions, being emphasized:

- *Creating infrastructure – internal and external*, which consists of creating the internal network, composed of the involved structure's exponents, ensuring specialized expertise and providing information regarding a known case, and the external one, including partners, clients, suppliers, but also representatives of other entities from the same field;

Infrastructures involved in the economic intelligence operationalization – also named experts and decision makers' networks – can be created in inter-institutional and inter-entrepreneurial formats, but also in formats including the state, the business environment, the academic environment and the civil society.

- *Establishing data management procedures – institutional memory*. Storing information and knowledge specific to the economic agent, obtained through economic intelligence or other instruments, represents a key stage in the economic intelligence process because it gives continuity and coherence to the specific approaches;

It can be ensured through an engineering project, consisting in making a structured deposit where, ideally, the main data (metadata) are in accordance with the information system structure and in compliance with the internal and external consistency standards.

- *Administrative coordination/organization*, an essential function, since any economic intelligence process is designed and oriented towards the organization/company. As a result, it is coordinated by the manager, which has to define the main objectives and questions economic intelligence should respond to. Question's quality is crucial in order to obtain relevant information. The approach of formulating the questions is always open, so that no key information that might arise from the context is excluded;

This economic intelligence function assumes the existence of ethical and professional conduct.

- *Analytical tools application*, important stage, given that obtaining useful information depends on choosing and applying those techniques and analytical methods which give value/relevance. It depends on how the economic intelligence infrastructure exponents will function, formulate pertinent questions and provide/validate appropriate responses to the company, providing multiple ways for its development.

The analysis is organized transversal, similar to the way institutional memory and infrastructures are organized.

Also, Jean-Louis Levet and Robert Paturel identify the following four functions: scientific heritage and know-how control, opportunities and

threats identification, strategy coordination and, namely, promotion/influence practices implementation<sup>14</sup>.

- There are two major **levels**<sup>15</sup> of economic intelligence implementation:

- *Territorial economic intelligence*. Given the specificity of the various local areas, economic intelligence must be adapted to those characteristics, so that each economic intelligence territorial strategy is based on the economic/competitiveness growth poles principle. Basically, under the coordination of the state, businesses/investments promoting projects are launched aiming at economic and technological development of a region, endeavour involving local authorities and also local business and academic environment;

- *Strategic economic area*. This is specific to strategic interest or national/European interest domains, as well as to special industry, energy security etc. While most of the economic intelligence projects can be implemented at a regional level, there are some areas in which the approach is and must remain at a strategic level (given the many implications that are generated by the development of business/investment profile)

### **The central role of monitoring/supervision in economic intelligence**

In the process of economic intelligence, all stages are important, but its results are essentially influenced by the way monitoring is designed and carried out: permanently seeking environment/profile markets information relevant to the agent/economic sector or state economy (since the signal phase – seemingly insignificant – of opportunity or threat, but that may influence its developing strategy).

The conclusions obtained, in this regard, by the research team coordinated by Christian Coutenceau<sup>16</sup> represent a very important theoretical-scientific landmark for economic intelligence scientific literature. According to this research, monitoring involves three stakes: to own permanently detailed knowledge regarding the context; to own relevant and pertinent information about the current problem or strategic guidelines; to have the needed useful respite for anticipating developments or establishing a sufficient advance in the agent's/economic sector's/state economy's activity (offensive or defensive).

Monitoring is preceded by the clear established of two intelligence process essential coordinates:

- *Center of gravity*, defined as the focal, strong point of the agent/economic sector/state economy, which should be protected by any element of vulnerability or risk factor (it can be modern logistics, distribution network, an exceptional decision maker or any official placed in a key position etc.). Accurate and timely identification of the center of gravity allows knowing strength elements, defining the main supervision/monitoring directions and the essential parts to be protected;

In strong connection with determining the center of gravity is the approach of defining the critical vulnerability, which is the problematic element through which competitors can touch the center of gravity.

- *Final state targeted*, which consists of the strategic position (in observable and measurable terms) expected to be reached by the agent/economic sector/state economy following the intelligence process.

The monitoring demarche implies the existence of three major elements:

- *The agent's/economic sector's/state economy's strategic plan*: established on a specific area, it defines and prioritises long-term objectives for value creation, adding, however, the allocated resources to this process (human, financial, technological, etc.);

- *Monitoring plan*: it is developed depending on the agent's/economic sector's/state economy's stakes and it defines the domain (activities, technologies, regulations etc.) that will be subject of the active surveillance for anticipating developments. In preparing this plan, the agent's/economic sector's/state economy's strategic plan is considered, as well as its center of gravity and concerned final state. The plan contains goals (permanent and occasional) expected to be achieved in order to obtain decisive information, with the optimization of the corresponding time.

- *Relevant/pertinent information*: information that may have impact on the agent/economic sector/state economy and, implicitly, on its development.

Monitoring establishment and achievement depend on three factors: the originator's ability to develop and implement an effective strategy; innovation and distinction search in relation to competitors; ability to respond to a crisis by rapidly obtaining items that allow taking the most appropriate decisions at a certain time.

There is a varied supervision typology, according to the objective/area targeted to be monitored:



- *Competitive*: involves monitoring the moves made by competitors in connection with critical or potentially critical topics;

Searched information consist of strategies, pricing policies, new products or services, financial results, recruitments, won or lost customers, partnerships etc. This type of monitoring provides comparison of the agent/economic sector/state economy with one or more competitors.

- *Sectorial*: monitoring the sectorial activity composed by all actors: competitors, partners, suppliers, customers, the environment and sustainable development;

Information to be obtained contains current aspects regarding the suppliers and customers, draft laws, innovations, societal and behaviour trends. Sectorial supervision provides market development anticipation.

- *Technological*: monitoring patents, regulations evolution and regulation drafts;

Aspects are searched in specialized publications, but also in the results of research regarding a specific topic, and the type of supervision anticipates the gaps and the technological developments.

- *Regulatory*: monitoring the regulation activity of various areas of interest, in order to anticipate future regulations;

Information targeted consists of legislative initiatives, proposals to amend the current legislation, pros and cons of these approaches etc.

- *Imaging*: monitoring the agent's/economic sector's/stat economy's visibility/awareness, in terms of quantity and quality;

It related to rumours, information conveyed in various media, but also to perceptions of various circles of interest on different forums, blogs etc.

- *Financial*: monitoring the strategic developments and competitive game (defined as all actors that interact with the agent/economic sector/state economy) in order to obtain the information needed to anticipate a fundamental change and a major economic environment change evaluation.

All information inherent to the center of gravity and final state concerned are taken into account.

- *Territorial*: monitoring a region's socio-economic, political, socio-cultural aspects.

Information to be searched includes key stakeholders' activities, civil, economic and cultural initiatives, successful projects in other regions, major societal, economic and technological trends with territorial impact.

This type of monitoring provides proactive knowledge, result and outcome evaluation of project initiators in order to support the agent's/economic sector's/state economy's development policy.

### **Surveillance cycle stages**

The monitoring/surveillance process involves four main activities<sup>17</sup> - needs study/evaluation; information collection; information processing/analysis; useful information dissemination – which takes place under the supervision of experts.

- *Needs study/evaluation* incumbents several steps: defining the challenges and translating them into strands of supervision; establishing information search plans; determining resources; establishing process conducting rules, establishing information prioritization and ranking criteria.

Needs assessment is performed by engaging experts and managers in strategic analysis and it consists of: determining the universe to be explored in terms of stakes, by taking into account their center of gravity and their competitors; translating stakes in monitoring process action lines, representing viewpoints for evaluating the chosen universe. A first search action will aim to highlight components and the result is to determine certain words, phrases or key individuals.

In its turn, the information search plan establishment is performed by surveillance experts, under the manager's coordination, in order to ensure the activities' proper conduction, and it requires taking into account one or more scenarios relative to the defined/targeted universe.

- *Information collection* involves identifying the sources and, subsequently, effectively implement information obtaining process.

*Internal sources* (employees, trainees, documentations, heritage, databases regarding the agent/economic sector/state economy) may be considered; *Internet* (external source characterised by richness and complexity: institutional websites, blogs, forums, social networks, dark web etc.); *external sources* (saloons, exhibitions, media, networks, institutional organisms, symposia, seminars, publications or patent regulations etc.); *specialised sources* such as specialized booths that ensure a very technical information collection and analysis).

Prior to information gathering, there should be carried out an information prioritization plan, this being an essential step for the following

obtained data evaluation because it conditions the analysis process coordination. For example, the distinction between relevant, objective, professional information and the ones circulating on blogs, forums and social networks has to be made.

The actual information collection can be done in several ways: by *human source* (focused or diffused search, carried out throughout the work done by the economic entity); *semi-automated* (using aggregator portals, but with the risk of picking their limited/erroneous perception. The gathered information analysis will be entirely manual and will not allow the establishment of documentation bases); *automated* (conducted with the help of Internet search instruments). In the information search process the fact that it is dispersed has to be considered, being located either on the notorious websites, on news agencies or online commerce ones, blogs etc.. It is therefore essential that the results list of this search is made, according to the chosen criteria, but also to proceed with deleting the redundant or insignificant information/words. Also, obtained information evaluation sheets can be made, relative to: source validity, information veracity and its level (strategic, internal and public). In addition, on this evaluation sheet, additions/updates may be required, but also mentioning the impact that information could/would have on the final state targeted by the agent/economic sector/state economy.

• *Information processing* involves, initially, making a selection on the obtained information, keeping only the relevant and pertinent ones, followed by ranking, indexing and storing them in databases. Subsequently, the extracted information are subject to analysis – determining step that conditions surveillance's success and what is done based on a methodology. The applied analytical instrument will lead to the following results:

- Volumetric information assessment on a certain topic and following trends over time;
- Detection of a new concept or subject, as well as evolutionary trends;
- Identification of sources that might contain useful information (type, origin, etc.);
- Highlighting, through mapping instruments, the links between monitored individuals and/or subjects;
- Outlining the vulnerability elements.

The analysis is based on statistical instruments for extracting statistical information and themes from various documents. Therefore, the

surveillance results allow trends identification, as well as their importance and evolution over time evaluation.

Analysed information synthesized and included in a summary document which validates useful information for decision makers.

- *Useful information dissemination* is preceded by an analysis regarding the source (in terms of validating it) and, respectively, the resulted document relevance (on three levels: is correspondent to the stakes, but has no particular consequences; can have impact on the strategy and has to be disseminated to involved actors; is essential and has to be part of the reflection elements of taking an action or not).

Depending on the confidentiality degree, information is disseminated or not by the management levels that received it to other involved/responsible tiers, and the pace of diffusion depends on the information's relevance and nature and also on the concerned purpose.

- *Final analysis (feedback)* is the activity that aims to assess the supervisory process in its entirety and to establishing the extent to which the objectives were achieved, but also to determine the acting way (efficient or not).

## Conclusions

In the early 90s, the economic context was characterized by several major developments that underpinned the economic intelligence developing process: trade globalization, which put businesses in a position facing fierce competition, exhibited even as an economic war; special development of new information and communication technologies, as well as the informational era, in which information became increasingly numerous and a lot more accessible, and economic agents had to face the new international competition challenges; the markets generalized opening, leading to significant inflow of economic actors in developing countries, which quickly understood the importance of communication and information technology. Basically, information proved to be a competitiveness element for economic agents, so that the manager will need to know the issues related to: agent's market place, as well as its strengths and weaknesses (from the market competition's perspective); agent's development opportunities, as well as its development strategy elaboration manner<sup>18</sup>.

In conclusion, in the context of globalization and worldwide competition exacerbation, economic intelligence – as a way of obtaining

useful strategic information for the economic agents – is obviously an absolute necessity. Economic operators, regions and states must impose and exploit this essential feature in order to strengthen markets, guarantee quality and, more recently, to ensure sustainable development<sup>19</sup>.

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# **SPOTTING TROUBLE IN MIGRATION FLOWS: AN INDICATOR-BASED EARLY WARNING MODEL**

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## **Abstract**

*Along with terrorism, organized crime, climate change or pandemics, mass migration is one of the biggest security challenges that state actors must address nowadays. Migration occurs in a mixture of flows and for a variety of motivations - persecution, conflict or hope for a better life - and could have major consequences on everyday life and on the functioning of society as a whole.*

*Tackling root causes and proximate conditions of this phenomenon represents a difficult task for every government. Identifying patterns and motivations in migration movements are just two of the indicators that could help establish viable strategies and preparation in order to avoid inconsistent responses.*

**Keywords:** migration, flows, early warning, strategy, indicators.

## **Strong signals of an impending crisis**

Even before April 2015, the so-called death ships had been for many years a serious challenge for European countries such as Italy, Malta or Greece. In the words of the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the Mediterranean Sea has become one of “despair”, as tens of thousands of refugees arrive each year on the shores of Europe.

In the aftermath of the April 2015 tragedy, when almost one thousand people died after a ship had capsized off the Libyan coast, European leaders agreed, during a special meeting of the European Council, to mobilize all efforts at their disposal to prevent further loss of life at sea and to tackle the root causes of the human emergency they faced, in

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\* Romanian Intelligence Service

cooperation with the countries of origin and transit. Yet the crisis has deepened, despite the fact that many initiatives and decisions applied since then, but none was a success in curbing the flows of illegal immigrants or diminishing the risks this phenomenon poses to European security.

According to the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR<sup>1</sup>, more than one million people migrated in Europe in the entire year 2015, 84% of them from the top 10 refugee producing countries. In the first half of 2016, total arrivals of migrants in Europe by sea were 233,665 people, most of them in Greece (159,875) and Italy (65,478)<sup>2</sup>. Another 10.000 of those who tried to reach European shore died, according to IOM statistics<sup>3</sup>, in the last 3 years, only on Mediterranean Sea.

Moreover, the EU states are not the only ones facing this escalating crisis. According to IOM<sup>4</sup>, in the last year, there has been an exponential increase in the number of migrants and refugees passing through the Western Balkans region: almost 3,000 persons per day are crossing into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and almost 2,000 - into Serbia.

And the future doesn't look bright: according to the German Finance Minister, Gerd Muller, in the next years, Europa will have to face an influx of 8-10 million refugees, and a "Marshall Plan" dedicated to manage this crisis within the origin states would worth more than 10 billion euro for Syria and Iraq only<sup>5</sup>. Also, according to Frontex Director, Fabrice Leggeri, more than one million of those will arrive in Europe across Turkish territory.

That is why the immediate priority for policymakers was to prevent more people from dying at sea. It was not an easy task, considering that more and more migrants and refugees are waiting in African camps to get a place in the boats.

### **Signs of trouble on the sea**

The refugee crisis that has gripped Europe in the second half of 2015 seemed to take many by surprise, but the signals had been there for several years, in fact, but they were covered, at least for Europe, by other important subjects on the agenda, such as the Ukrainian conflict or Grexit.

In the last five years, there have been tens of reports warning about worsening life conditions in Sudan, Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, Myanmar, and many other countries from where the refugees and migrants come from. The war in Syria was just another conflict that added to those from Sudan, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

There have been law enforcement reports<sup>6</sup> about the arrest of organized migrant traffickers and hundreds of news reports warning about



the risks collapsed regimes may pose in regard to flows of displaced persons or refugees. According to UNHCR, some 60,000 people crossed the Mediterranean in 2013, and their number doubled the following year.

In September 2014, Ambassador William Lacy Swing, IOM Director General stated that “the paradox is that [at] a time when one in seven people around the world are migrants, we are seeing an extraordinarily harsh response to migration in the developed world”<sup>7</sup>.

Many European and international institutions<sup>8</sup> have issued official data about illegal migration and refugee phenomenon and made substantial efforts to foresee future trends. Exchange of information took place, formally and informally among those institutions, but also among countries, via Internet or based on memoranda, resolutions, and agreements. Statistics of law enforcement institutions showed the growing number of organized migrant traffickers' arrests.

More recently, on May 17, 2016, Europol and Interpol published a common report about the traffickers' networks across Europe, pointing out that the illegal benefits from carrying refugees and migrants on European territory were, in 2015, approximately 6 billion USD<sup>9</sup>.

Despite the fact that there are many regional or international databases on migration, estimating migration flows is difficult, as there are gaps regarding the collection of current data, the reports each country provides or the methodologies used<sup>10</sup>. Also, in some cases, “distinguishing migrants from asylum seekers and refugees is a clear-cut process”<sup>11</sup>.

### **Migration - security challenge or opportunity**

The securitization of migrants and migration is not new. Migration is often seen as a challenge, as a so-called vehicle for importing terrorists, criminals, or even for spreading infectious diseases. Khalid Koser, Nonresident Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, raises a very important question: “*Given such consequences, it is worth asking whether, and if so when, migration really does represent a threat to national security*”.

From one perspective, we must focus on these issues, otherwise we risk diverting attention from circumstances where migration can actually pose a threat to national security.

Irregular migration, for example, can legitimately be viewed as undermining the exercise of state sovereignty, as any state has the right to control who crosses its borders and who is a resident on its territory. Even if the majority of irregular migrants worldwide have not crossed a border without authorization, but rather remain or work without authorization, failing to control and manage migration undermines public confidence in

the integrity of government actions and policy. That's why states such as Hungary, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Croatia, Italy, Greece started to build fences and closed their borders, rejected the mandatory quotas of refugees.

The migrant smuggling and human trafficking industries can pose a genuine threat to law and order, especially where they are related to terrorism, organized crime and intersect with the movement of illicit goods, including weapons and drugs. And the first to be targeted are the children: according to Brian Donald, from Europol, „at least 10.000 unaccompanied immigrant children disappeared in Europe, in 2015, risking to be exploited by organized crime groups"<sup>12</sup>.

The arrival of large numbers of migrants, especially from very different social or cultural backgrounds than the receiving communities can also pose serious challenges to social cohesion. This can have practical implications for states, for example, regarding the allocation of resources as well as more conceptual implications regarding models of integration and national identity. Migrants can compete with locals in the labor market, especially during periods of recession, and thus become magnets for resentment.

For example, the New Year's Eve 2016 incidents in Cologne, when more than 1,000 complaints were filed against immigrants for violence, rape or aggression against women, the public discontent grew exponentially in Germany against governmental decisions regarding asylum policies. The fact that more similar incidents were reported, separately, in Hamburg, Frankfurt, Stuttgart or Düsseldorf didn't help German authorities, nor those from Finland, Switzerland or Austria, when confronted with the same situation. In order to avoid the attacks against women, in Belgium sexual education courses for male refugees were initiated.

At another level, the Czech authorities announced that, for a better integration of refugees, they are offered free courses on language learning, democracy principles and human rights.

But migration should also be seen as an opportunity.

Not so long ago, (1949) well known French historian Fernand Braudel wrote his first book, *La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l'Epoque de Philippe II* (*The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*) that was also his most influential<sup>13</sup>.

For Braudel, life is conducted on the Mediterranean: people travel, fish, fight wars, and drown in it in these various contexts. Life is diverse and complex; the poorer South is affected by religious diversity (Catholicism and Islam), as well as by intrusions - both cultural and economic - from the wealthier North. Braudel's Mediterranean is centered on the sea, but just as

important are the desert and the mountains. The desert creates a nomadic form of social organization where the whole community moves; mountain life is sedentary. Transhumance - movement from the mountain to the plain, or vice versa in a given season — is also a persistent part of Mediterranean existence.

From his point of view, the traveler seeks to avoid the obstacles, moving horizontally from plain to plain, from valley to valley. Sometimes, he has to pass some awful gorges and canyons, but he uses them as least as possible. But after that, the traveler remains the prisoner of the plains, gardens, sparkling meadows and rich life of the sea... Reading Braudel's work might help European authorities to better understand current situation in migration-refugee so called crisis.

Back in our times, as EU Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström stressed in a conference held in January 2014, migration inside the European Union - as long as it's legal - could benefit the European countries both economically and culturally, so it should be seen as an added value for an aging continent.

### **Romania's Case**

Talking about Romania, it has not been directly affected by the refugee or illegal migration crises yet.

In 2014, 1,547 people legally applied for asylum, 691 of them being granted with a form of social protection in our country.

According to Romanian Border Police, in 2014, 1,918 foreign citizens were involved in illegal migration, double than 2013.

Subsequently, 339 groups were spotted at the Romanian borders, 208 transporters were arrested (103 of them Romanians). Also, 307 foreign citizens tried to illegally cross the border hidden in vehicles. Statistics say that most of them were Afghan, Iraqi, Syrian, Iranian, but also Pakistani, Albanese, Somali, Armenian, Russian, Ukrainian, etc.

The illegal transporters were mostly from Turkey, Syria, and Romania, the price per family: between 5,000 and 10,000 euro. According to the National Police, though, there were more than 3,200 cases of illegal migration, involving 339 groups and 208 transporters<sup>14</sup>.

In 2015, there were 1,266 requests for asylum, 472 of them being taken into consideration for a form of social protection in our country. Only 1,481 foreign citizens were involved in illegal migration, 392 groups were spotted on the border area, 211 smugglers were identified, 175 transporters were involved in supporting illegal migrants that mostly originated from Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran<sup>15</sup>.

The numbers are much lower than Southern or Western countries, because Romania is not a member of the Schengen Area, it does not have an active workforce recruitment and retention policy from third countries. In fact, if there is a domain Romania is very well prepared for, that would be migration control, from legal, strategic, tactic, and operational point of view.

In the meantime, Romanian institutions are actively involved in countering human trafficking and common missions on Mediterranean Sea to control the migratory flows, including in Interpol's "Operation Hydra". It was launched in October 2015 and is aimed at spotting the fugitive people smugglers on national territories and ensuring operative support in dissolving criminal networks behind people smuggling.

But, more important, Romanian authorities should take a better look to the new trends of the migration phenomenon and transform them into an opportunity, especially at present, when Romania has to tackle the migration of important segments of work force. Transforming our country in an attractive destination involves: integration policies; abolish restrictions on their work and social life; avoid down-skilling and brain waste; equal pay and social security coverage for migrants, as well as portable rights.

### **Spotting troubles in migration flows - indicator-based early warning system as a solution**

Migration crises are not only a matter of phenomenon, but of crisis management. Many call for new strategies or legislation and although sometimes in some countries they already exist, the crisis management system should be revised, as flows of immigrants will continue to emerge, and new types of crises will take shape.

For the European Union, for example, the challenge of managing the external border has become critical to ensuring domestic security within the continent since 1995, when the Schengen border-free zone was created.

The challenge for Europe is the mixed-migration phenomenon, in which economic migrants and asylum seekers travel together these groups can and do overlap, and this gray area is frequently exacerbated by the inconsistent methods with which asylum applications are often processed across the EU's twenty-eight member states.

In a report published in 2013, three researchers from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs were arguing that, by mid-2015, a "Common European Asylum System" (CEAS) was to be implemented across the European Union, in order to ensure better access to

asylum procedures, faster and fairer decisions, and dignified and decent conditions for refugees.

More recently, EU authorities have adopted a common perspective and steady commitments in managing this crisis, that include: constant support for the European states seated on the migration route, such as Western Balkan states; counter migrants smugglers and traffickers; diminish the risks of diversifying the migratory routes; accelerate the transfer and relocation actions; work closely with origin and transit states, establishing sound agreements; allocate the necessary funds; strengthen border control and security; establishing an European "Border and Coastal Joint Force"<sup>16</sup>.

In order to cope with this type of crises, UE also has developed alert and warning mechanisms such as CIREFI<sup>17</sup> or EUROSUR<sup>18</sup>. They are valid and managed to offer good warnings, answering to questions such as where from, where to, who, why, what for, etc. They failed to answer however to the questions such as how many and when.

It is not easy to deal with migration in terms of warning indicators because migration is an indicator itself when it comes to evaluating security levels. For example, in World Bank indicators database, net migration is used to measure both aid effectiveness and financial sector performance.

But if we consider illegal migration a security risk itself, it is possible to compile a list of variables that can be used to foresee future migration patterns, for the state of origin:

- demographic (rapid demographic aging, youth bulge, growing populations, life expectancy) and economic disparities (unemployment, GDP per capita, remittances);
- risk of conflict;
- authoritarian regimes;
- health systems;
- education systems;
- environmental issues;
- border apprehensions.

We can find them in databases of OECD, World Bank or national statistics institutes, as composite indicators, check lists, event data, and key-problems. Using indicators to spot troubles in migration flows is feasible because they build a coherent framework, easily understood by decision makers.

In order to give a clear picture about what will happen warning indicators must be accurate, comparable, measurable, credible, specific, scientifically valid, robust, transparent, representative, and accessible.

They are efficient if the security matter is well defined, including its particular aspects, if the goal of their creation is correctly established, if the sources they are spotted in are reliable and if the informatics support they rely on is adequate.

For example, in 2015, University of Georgetown launched the “Forecasting the Break: Building Community and Capacity for Large-Scale Data-Intensive Research in Forced Migration Studies” project, in which “a multidisciplinary community of scholars and practitioners was assembled in order to create a pilot of a large-scale, data-intensive early warning system for detecting forced population displacement”.

The primary source for long-term data was the Georgetown University unstructured archive of over 600 million publicly available open-source media articles. One of the main purposes was “to provide insight for the development of state-of-the art data mining of open sources databases for event detection, sequential mining and change detection”<sup>19</sup>.

### **Conclusions**

Coping with this dynamic phenomenon is one of the most challenging tasks for national and European authorities, because of the enormous structural complexity - it has social, political, economic, diplomatic and informational causes, effects and implications. This risk is real, has always been present and kept under a sort of control, making the best of it to fulfill national systemic vulnerabilities, such as demographic pressures. Now is the time to manage it better, otherwise it will become a top threat for European construct and individual security.

Therefore, public policies should not rest on emotional drivers, but on evidence-based narratives and scientifically-based papers. Moreover, national and European strategies and public policies would be better if they reckon on early warning.

For a state and its citizen to be prepared for the worst, they must build resilience, or, as a newer concept, to be smart. And the most important thing in being smart is anticipation, in order to be able to shape the future. Coping with risks and opportunities involves, at the very basics, early warning capabilities.

Migration flows will always emerge, and they will always be a challenge – we better get used to them and get the best of it, merging the national interest with responsibility to protect.

Migration flows are inherently difficult to predict, but none of the push factors driving refugees and migrants to Europe’s shores appear likely to be resolved soon. The current so-called crisis has not reached its peak yet

and given that few truly innovative or large-scale solutions to the migrants protection challenge have so far presented themselves, what is seen at Europe's borders may not be a "crisis" but rather the new normal.

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# REDESIGNING RISK ANALYSIS. PRINCIPLES FOR A SYSTEMIC APPROACH

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## **Abstract**

*The traditional risk analysis methodologies are focused on assessing risks' impact and likelihood based on threat agents' characteristics (e.g. intents or capabilities) and targets' vulnerabilities (e.g. sensitivity or exposure). However, given the rise of non-linear, systemic risks, the researchers tried to identify a new risk analysis framework to address three new challenges – complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity. The current paper is trying to identify a number of principles to cope with these challenges, by exploring the issues faced in trying, for instance, to model society as a whole, or significant segments of it, in order to assess risks' impact and likelihood from a systemic perspective.*

**Keywords** :risk, security, probability, complexity, volatility, ambiguity

## **Introduction**

The current paper is an attempt to identify a number of useful landmarks in analyzing security risks from a systemic perspective, taking into account the expansion of risk and security concepts, as well as the components of the current methodologies for analyzing systemic risks (mainly from the economic domain).

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In order to better define the security risks and to establish/identify a set of principles and rules for their analysis from a systemic perspective, a review of the current literature regarding the theories on risks/systemic risks/security risks, as well as the development/implementation of methodologies for analyzing this type of risks was undertaken. The principles/rules identified in the current paper could lay the basis for designing a methodology for the systemic analysis of security risks.

## **1. The risk, from economy and sociology to national security**

### ***1.1. The risk in economy and sociology***

One of the first scientific approaches of the concept of risk is pertaining to Frank Knight and it was meant to operate a distinction between risk and uncertainty based on the applications in the economic field, Knight being amongst the founders of the Chicago Economic School, together with Milton Friedman and George Stiegler.

In order to operate the above-mentioned distinction, Knight analyzed the risk taking into account its relation with all the probability types associated to an event – *a priori* probability, statistical probability and estimation. While the first two categories facilitate risk analysis, by using either identical existing situations (*a priori* probability) or the frequency of similar past situations (statistical probability), the estimation doesn't provide any valid basis for analysis. Knight's conclusion is that the „measurable“ uncertainty can be qualified as risk, while the „unmeasurable“ uncertainty as real uncertainty (Knight, 1964).

Meanwhile, Knight (1964) emphasizes that only the unmeasurable uncertainty influences the profit or the losses in the economic domain, since the measurable uncertainty can be managed by applying contingency measures. However, Knight's approach doesn't clarify the unknowns regarding the possibilities to "measure" uncertainty and the limits of such a process.

The subsequent developments led to three questions useful in analyzing/defining the risk (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981):

1. What can happen? (What can go wrong?)
2. How probable is for an event to take place?
3. In the case the event happens, what would be the consequences?

Based on those questions, there were developed three landmarks extensively used in the quantitative risk analysis – event type (if it represents a threat, taking into consideration the protected objectives/

values), as well as its probability (the threat level) and impact (including with a view to the possible vulnerabilities of the threatened system).

At the same time, Kaplan and Garrick (1981) tried to extend the possibilities to „measure“ the uncertainty by developing a complex definition of the risk, to include the use of the above-mentioned landmarks in relation to a set of scenarios, each of them with a distinct probability to happen.

Unlike the economic domain, governed by a quantitative approach of the risk and its relation to profit / loss, the sociology of risk is focused on the way the new technological and environmental risks impact on the society's transformation or on other relevant issues for risk analysis – cultural and governmental perspectives, etc (Zinn, 2009).

As part of the most consistent and used sociological perspective on the risks, Ulrich Beck (1992) connects the concept of risk to that of reflexive modernity, defining the first as a „systematic way of approaching the dangers and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization“. In the meantime, Beck (1992) promotes the idea of „risk society“, analyzing the relation between welfare and risk: in the industrial society the logic of producing wealth dominates the logic of generating risks, while in a risk society the reverse is valid.

Beck (1992) starts from a distinction which is similar to Knight's approach, calculable and uncalculable threats/risks, emphasizing the emergence of some industrialized incalculabilities and threats, conditioned by the decision-making process. In fact, the incalculability of the consequences generated by the risks analyzed by Beck is dependent on the capacity on the rise of the technical options (*Zweckrationalität*). In this way, the risks are dependent on the threatening force of modernization, as well as on the globalization of the uncertainty.

### ***1.2. Security risks – the traditional approach***

There are three key concepts widely used in the analysis of the security risks – the protected value/asset, the vulnerability (of the protected system) and the threat (threat agent). For clarity, we will use the state as the main referent of security and we will distinguish between the three concepts, considering the risk a mathematical function of them. However, threat and risk are occasionally interchangeable or the threat is perceived as implying the manifestation of a risk.

The definition of the protected value/asset could be based on the sociological view on this concept. Therefore, the asset/protected value could represent “the appreciation a subject expresses toward an object (thing, idea, attribute, relation), based on the socially shared criterion of

meeting a need of accomplishing an ideal” (Zamfir and Vlasceanu, 1983). Moreover, the protected values/assets are not “individual subjective preferences, but socialized supraindividual preferences, transmitted and promoted through social mechanisms” (Zamfir and Vlasceanu, 1983). In the case of security, given the fact we have the state as referent, most of the authors consider that the protected values/assets are represented by the national interests, exemplified through survival, economic development, etc. (Nuechterlein, 2001).

Taking into account all the above-mentioned issues, the protected value/asset exists and produces security effects, pending on the existence of a subject/actor which validates it (the protected value/asset representing subject/actor’s appreciation toward an object, etc.), as well as of a subject / actor which challenges it (the threat agent). Therefore, the risk can be defined as a relation between two subjects/actors, taking into account the protected value/asset to be challenged. Security risks analysis can be undertaken through the perspectives of both the subject/actor which protects the value/assets, taking into account its vulnerabilities, as well as the threat agent, based on its features.

The concept of vulnerability was largely used in the research on disaster management or global warming and it has two dimensions (Brauch, 2011) – the degree of exposure for the protected value/asset (how important is the value for the actor which protects it) and the sensitivity of the protecting actor (its capacity/capabilities to protect a certain value, with an emphasis on the weak points). For instance, in the case of the survival-related values, the exposure being significant, the actors take measures in order to reduce their own sensitivity.

In the case of the threat agent, the risk analysis is related to three of its features – the intent, the instrument at its disposal and its actions (which could confirm or deny the intent). If with a view to the instruments and actions the analysis is based on facts/tangible developments, the intent analysis is a challenge. The complexity of this challenge increases as there a lot of individuals involved in the threat agent decision-making process.

Some authors consider that the risk could be defined through an extended formula, including, alongside the three above-mentioned features, some other attributes, such as sets of scenarios, risk probability reduction measures or risk impact measures (El Fray et al, 2012).

At the same time, according to Buzan and Little (2009) we can use five analytical units – three of them being main units (individual, state and global system of states) – and five analytical levels (political, military,

economic, social and environment) when operating with the three above-mentioned features (see Figure 1).

	PROTECTED VALUE/ ASSET	THREATS
<b>III. SYSTEM OF STATES</b>	✓ Sovereignty	➤ Political, military, economic, social and environment
<b>Risk Sources</b> ✓ Lack of a balance of power ✓ The tensions within the complexes	<b>SECURITY MACRO-COMPLEXES</b> (GROUPS OF STATES with interdependent security concerns)	
<b>II. STATE</b>	✓ Territory, the idea of state and its institutions	➤ Political, military, economic, social and environment
<b>Risk Sources</b> ✓ Political actions against the individuals ✓ Struggles to control the state	<b>SECURITY MICRO-COMPLEXES</b> (GROUPS OF INDIVIDUALS with interdependent security concerns)	
<b>I. INDIVIDUAL</b>	✓ Life, health, status, wellbeing and liberty	➤ Social: physical, economic, against the rights, position or status

**Figure 1.** The units and levels of analysis, according to Buzan and Little (2009)

## 2. PRINCIPLES FOR A SYSTEMIC APPROACH IN SECURITY RISKS ANALYSIS

### *2.1. Systemic risks. The need for a systemic analysis of security risks*

In a simplified formula (presented in the previous chapter), the risk analysis implied a sequential approach (the separate analysis of each risk), focused on a few major elements (protected value/asset – vulnerability – threat). Given the increase of the interdependence between individuals, groups and nations, as effect of globalization, the need for a systemic approach of the risks was acknowledged. Such an approach would have to take into account mainly two issues (Klinke and Renn, 2006):

- the increase in the interdependence of risks, leading to risk clusters analysis, such as the cluster energy-food-water as source of instability;

- the increase in the probability that a risk with an apparently low impact to impede on an entire system/sub-system of the global system, as showed by the recent global economic crisis.

Additionally, the research done by Andreas Klinke and Ortwin Renn, under the aegis of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), emphasized the following main elements:

- the challenges associated to the analysis of systemic risks, such as the complexity (the relations between the actors and the effects of the risk), the uncertainty (the lack of information) and the ambiguity (the different interpretations for the same data / assessments);

- the need for extending the number of criteria for risk assessment beyond probability and impact, to include risk ubicuity (the geographical dispersion of the possible effects), persistence (effects length), and so on;

- the delineation of six risk classes, based on the above-mentioned criteria. (Klinke and Renn, 2006)

In the case of security risks, the complexity of systemic analysis could be amplified by supplementary significant developments, such as the extension of the domains of reference for the security concept (the inclusion of some non-military dimensions, such as the economic, social or political ones) and implicitly the diversification of the types of actors (moving toward the levels of individuals/groups of individuals) and of the relations between them/the diffusion of power (Buzan and Little, 2009).

Therefore, the systemic analysis of the security risks would operate with a wide range of actors, as well as with classes of interdependent protected values/assets, vulnerabilities, threats and risks. Nonetheless, the security risks analysis from a systemic perspective needs to take into account both the objective dimension of security (the existence of the threats), as well as the subjective dimension – actor's perceptions on the threats (Ghiță and Zulean, 2007).

However, the systemic analysis of the security risks implies reaching the same goals as in the traditional approach – the assessment of risk probability and impact – but by modeling the entire system of interest or some of its sections, as opposed to the sequential approach focused on assessing the risk *per se* (assessing each risk, with a view to the three major features – protected value/asset, vulnerability, threat). For instance, the systemic analysis of the collapsing risk for a bank (its probability and impact on Romania) will not have as center of gravity the bank itself, but it will take into consideration the modeling of the entire

banking system or at least of the segment where the bank holds most of its assets, in order to assess all the interdependences which could influence the above-mentioned risk.

As mentioned before, the uncertainty is one of the key elements of the systemic analysis of the security risks. Despite the association made by Klinke and Renn (2006) between uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity, in the systemic analysis of the security risks, the uncertainty can be rather perceived as a result of complexity, ambiguity and volatility. In this case, the complexity would be related to the state of the system at the moment of the analysis, meaning the number and the types of the agents comprising the system, as well as the potential relations between them. The volatility would describe the dynamics of the system, meaning the flows generated by the potential reshuffles of the actors and the relations between them. Last, but not least, the ambiguity would have the same meaning as mentioned by Klinke and Renn (2006), regarding the different interpretations of the same data/assessments.

### ***2.2. Three parameters for the systemic analysis of the security risks***

The analysis of the state of the system at a certain moment is based, from the perspective of the complexity, on the social network of the actors and their relations. From a structural point of view, such an approach will have as center of gravity the analysis of the features shared by all social networks – the centrality (connections' number and dispersion) and the prestige (the required/initiated connections) of the actors (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).

At the same time, the features of each actor (history, culture, etc.) involves the design of a number of strategies for its relations with the other members of the network. The actors use these strategies to signal or to act for accomplishing different objectives and the analysis of such a network starts from the fundamental principles of game theory – the players (namely the previously mentioned actors) have a rational behavior; each player knows that the others have rational behaviors; all the players know the rules of the game.

In the case of volatility, the central issue are the resources flows, which depict system dynamics over time. For instance, in the cybernetic analysis of the Indian social system, P.N. Rastogi (1978) identifies 11 cycles of such a system, the resources flows depicted by such a system having as regulator the government. The previously mentioned cycles are built on certain drivers such as the political-military pressure, the economic development or the social instability and they are influenced by some

elements such as history, climate or religion. At the same time, these cycles are interdependent – the political-military pressure for example influences both the economy, as well as the social instability (Rastogi, 1978).

The features and implicitly the parameters of the above-mentioned flows or cycles are dependent on the configuration of the actors and the relations identified while analyzing complexity, as well as on the potential scenarios associated to actor's "games".

The analysis of the third element which could influence the degree of uncertainty associated to the systemic analysis of the security risks, namely the ambiguity, has to take into consideration the perceptions of the actors, as well as those of the observer carrying out the analysis. An important role in analyzing the ambiguity could be played by the analysis of the motives determining a certain positioning of each actor toward other actors or with a view to a security problem.

According to C. Wright Mills (1940), "the intent or the motive (stated as "program") involves the awareness of the anticipated consequences" and, at the same time, "the motives represent acceptable justifications for the current, future and past programs". Moreover, the motives can be associated in some vocabularies with certain functions (e.g. interpreting the actors' behaviors) in specific social situations. In this regard, in the case of the security risks, the existence of a class of intents could be related to the build-up of vocabularies of motives for certain situations.

Meanwhile, the ambiguity can be determined including by way the analyzed actors are perceiving the narratives as the main means of experiencing the world. In this way, all the knowledge of the actors is the result of the juncture of numerous stories framing the social actions, influencing thus the risk perceptions and implicitly, the risk analysis.

Last, but not least, in the analysis of the ambiguity we could take into account including the use of the security risk as a power/manipulation instrument, related to the idea of self-fulfilling prophecy.

## **Conclusions**

Beyond the different theoretical approaches of the risk/risk analysis, there are a number of differences including at the practical level, certain domains being focused on the relation between the risk and the profit (economic approach), while some others are connecting the idea of risk to protected values (sociology, national security). At the same time, the globalization and the increase in the interdependences require the shift from the sequential risk analysis (assessing each risk, with a view to the



three major features – protected value/asset, vulnerability, threat) to a systemic approach.

The systemic analysis of the security risks would be based on modeling the entire system of interest or some of its sections, without altering the traditional objectives of risk analysis – assessing risk probability and impact. Such an approach would take into account including the influence of all the drivers on the analyzed system or on the actors composing that system. For instance, elements such as culture and history significantly influence the evolution of a certain actor/system.

In order to diminish the degree of uncertainty associated to the systemic analysis of the security risks, the modeling of the system of interest requires the modeling of three parameters – the complexity, meaning the state of a system at a certain time, the volatility, depicting system dynamics, as well as the ambiguity determined by actors' and observer's perceptions.

A number of complex instruments could be used for the modeling the three parameters, the current paper mentioning the possibilities of social networks, game theory or cybernetics, pending on the analysis objectives.

Last, but not least, the limits of the modeling instruments should be considered, given the challenges of replicating a social system or its segments, especially from the perspective of amplifying the ambiguity of the analysis or using the security risks as power/manipulation instruments.

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# **SOVIET RUSSIA – A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION OF THE ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES DURING THE EARLY YEARS OF THE INTERWAR PERIOD (1918–1924)**

**Ioan Codruț LUCINESCU\***

## **Abstract**

*The end of First World War proved that the strategic decision of the Romanian government to join the Entente in August 1916 was appropriate. This was due to the fact that the subsequent disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empire empowered the Romanian people to fulfill one of its major objectives: the creation of Greater Romania.*

*Overrunning the territory between the rivers Prut and Dniester - a historical Romanian region called Basarabia, ruled by the Russian Empire - led to serious political and military issues between the Kingdom of Romania and the newly formed Soviet Union. The latter considered itself a de facto heir to the Russian legacy, inasmuch as it did not accept such a territorial „loss”. Hence it used all the means available (including some subversive and terrorist practices) to abolish the historical accomplishment of March 1918.*

*This paper aims at analyzing the activity of the Romanian intelligence services (the General Directorate for the Security of the State, the Army Intelligence Service) in their fight against the Communist phenomenon, during the early years of the interwar period. The phenomenon was seen as being very dangerous as it developed both internally - by the propaganda spread among the Romanian military and civil population - and externally - by maintaining a tense atmosphere in the relations between Romania and the Soviet Union (their diplomatic relations were interrupted in 1918 and continued only in 1934). Most importantly, the paper highlights the actions conducted on the „secret front” by the newly formed Soviet intelligence service Vecheke (better known as Cheka) and the Romanian intelligence structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Army.*

**Keywords:** Soviet Russia, Romanian intelligence services, ideology, interwar period, Romanian Army.

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## **Introduction**

During the year 1918, Romania accomplished its national unity, by integrating both the Eastern and Western territories – meaning Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania – to the Old Kingdom. We may hereafter talk about a new state, in which the social, political and economic environments were totally different from the ones existing in pre-war Romanian state. The subsequently grasped exponential growth of various national indicators (territory, population, agricultural, industrial, military potential) generated new security problems, which were even more deepened by the failure of the Versailles system to impose an abiding security on the European continent.

The aggressive intentions of Soviet Russia lied in the fact that it broke any diplomatic relations with Romania in January 1918, it questioned and did not recognized the legitimacy of the unity between Romania and Bessarabia, it refused to yield up the Romanian Treasure (sent to Moscow in the autumn of 1916 with the view of keeping it safe) and it resorted to repeated acts of defiance on the border with Dniester River. Nevertheless, after suffering a defeat in the war against Poland (1921), Kremlin did not risk any other military offensive in its vicinity. Hence, the classical war was replaced by a “secret war”, which flourished especially during the time of V.I.Lenin and his fellow communist leaders, who granted a major importance to creating an impressive security and espionage apparatus, even from the beginning of the Bolshevik revolution.

Once the institutions responsible for providing security within the state were created in December 1917, a long period of terror, unprecedented espionage against European societies, assassinations and general fear followed. Not only Soviet citizens “enjoyed” all these, but also the European countries which were situated in Kremlin’s area of strategic interest.

### **Great Romania – ”strategic” target for soviet intelligence services**

Hence, in order to actively support the developing Bolshevik Revolution, on 20<sup>th</sup> December 1917, the first secret service of Soviet Russia was officially born. Its name was VECHEKA, also known as VChK (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage)<sup>1</sup>. The service experienced a rapid growth and, thus, in less than 2

years, by 1918, it had already had branches all over the Russian territory (which was still rotten by the civil war). Since its territorial structures were simply known as CHEKA, the whole institution was eventually *de facto* called CHEKA.

Aside from combating the “enemy from the inside”, CHEKA also had external missions from the very beginning, as it aimed at discovering and discouraging any actions against the revolution or attempts of sabotage, developed within the Russia borders or abroad. As a consequence, in December 1920, the external department on CHEKA was founded (Inostranny Otdel) - INO<sup>2</sup>. Its first targets were the organizations gathering former Tsarist officers who fled to Germany and Great Britain – the latter was considered by the Soviet leaders the main great power capable of driving the capitalist world into accepting Bolshevik Russia<sup>3</sup>.

Due to excesses in combating “the enemies of the people”, at the beginning of the third decade, the name CHEKA became the State Political Directorate – GPU. Subsequent to the formation of the Soviet Union in December 1922, GPU was promoted to union agency, hereafter called Joint State Political Directorate – OGPU. By the middle of the third decade, the external department of OGPU – INO, had more than 1300 agents spread in the entire world, as a result of the initiation of several complex espionage actions.

The already legendary Felix Dzerzhinsky, leader of CHEKA and later GPU, became further the head of OGPU, until his death in July 1926. As much as the Soviet Union consolidated, the prerogatives of OGPU expanded so that, by the end of the 1920s, the institution exceeded any other capacity of internal repression that existed within the state until then.

In July 1934 a new organization of the security apparatus is elaborated, according to which OGPU is integrated in People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), security structure created in 1918 but which only then reached maturity. From that moment on, NKVD would get to represent for more than a decade the spine of the Soviet security and intelligence community, being involved at a large scale in espionage affairs and assassinations all over the world<sup>4</sup>.

During the whole interwar period, the Soviet leadership clearly established the goals of the offensive that was being developed against Romania, on the secret front:

- Obtaining complete information about the Romanian army: structure, dislocation of military units, personnel, weapons, buildings, trainings and war strategies, collaboration with allies etc;

- Knowing the exact position of the key locations that would serve as resistance points against a potential Soviet attack – ammunition and fuel depots, strategic communication channels, airports, fortified locations etc;
- Spreading of provocative news regarding the political, economic and financial state of the country;
- Describing “the joyful life of the working class” in the Soviet Union, by using manifestos, brochures and stirrers;
- Provoking protests and strikes that would generate aggressive reactions of the authorities; the Soviet intelligence services did not refrain from planning and executing terrorist attacks against Romanian military and political personalities;
- Structuring a strong communist party within Romania, that would directly follow the orders from Moscow; this way, the Soviet secret services accomplished its two main objectives: to have an expanded espionage network in Romania - able to provide useful information to Kremlin - and to create social and political tensions whenever it was needed.

This was possible based on the fact that the Communist parties which adhered to Comintern (the Communist International), were forced to follow Moscow’s policies and to support the Soviet subversive actions. Relevant for this situation is part of a speech delivered by Karl Radek - a leader of the International – at its 2<sup>nd</sup> Congress in 1921: *“Inasmuch as Russia is the only country in which the working class gained power, workers from the entire world should now become Russian patriots”*<sup>5</sup>.

In 1921 the Communist power consolidated even more as the White Army was defeated. As a consequence, Moscow started structuring several complex espionage networks in Central Europe, having Wien as its main center. In the Austrian capital, the branch of CEKA targeted countries like Romania, Hungary and the ones from the Balkan Peninsula. Furthermore, it intensely flourished, as it comprised departments for Communist propaganda, planning of terrorist attacks, procurement of false identity documents and a photo-chemical laboratory<sup>6</sup>.

Complex espionage actions are initiated against Romania, as Kremlin wanted to discover its defense capabilities. Under the direct guidance of the branch from Wien, in 1922 a complex espionage network was founded in Romania. Its headquarters was located in Bucharest, but it had numerous other branches in Braşov, Sibiu, Cernăuţi, Bacău and

Chişinău. The leaders of the network were Alexander Kiselof, probationary attaché at the Bulgarian legation and the Romanian major Jak Ciaikovsky<sup>7</sup>. The connections with Wien were made with the help of couriers, postmen or by using the diplomatic suitcase of the Bulgarian legation. As the organization had significant financial resources, most of the agents disguised their activity by pretending they belonged to various enterprises or trade representatives (shops and banks in particular).

The espionage network was discovered only after it had operated for two years. All its 43 members (Romanian military personnel and public servants, who agreed to collect information - regarding the Romanian military bases, defense plans in the case of an offensive launched by the Red Army in Bessarabia - in exchange of large sums of money) were condemned to prison on 24<sup>th</sup> December.

A spectacular success of the interwar Soviet espionage against Romania is represented by the so called *Ludovic Mircescu* case. The moment it was brought in the public eye (fall of 1930), it produced strong emotions among national public opinion, due to the personalities involved, and it determined king Carol the 2<sup>nd</sup> to order a thorough investigation.

In other words, it was about the theft, in the summer of 1926, of several original documents of great importance for the security of Romania. They described in approximately 100 pages, the mobilization plan of the Romanian Army, including its personnel, the exact locations of the military bases along the borders of the country, the available ammunition and various tactical and strategic maneuvers planned in the event of hostilities at the Eastern border. It was exactly what the Soviet authorities needed in order to know precisely what the Romanian military capabilities were, especially considering the fact that Romania was seen by Moscow as an enemy which needed to be eliminated using any possible means (the unity between Bessarabia and the Old Kingdom in 1918 was perceived by the Bolshevik authorities as an act of war).

The spectacular espionage action was due to the infiltration in the entourage of the Minister of War – General Ludovic Mircescu – of a young agent who also became his mistress. She stole the priceless documents while she was accompanying the General in his vacation in Vatra Dornei. Subsequently, she managed to quickly pass the Romanian-Polish border<sup>8</sup>.

During the first post-war years, the newly established national community of intelligence maintained the structure it had in the First World War. The Department concerning the Security of the State (part of

the Ministry of Interior) continued to act as the spine of the intelligence and counter-intelligence activity. Nevertheless, the situation of the country and of Europe in general was radically changed as compared to the one existing 4-5 years before and new quantitative and qualitative dimensions were added to the institutions dealing with national security.

The experience gained during the war by the Romanian army led, during the following years, to the creation of new specialized structures, apart from the one existing within the General Staff and grouped within Section V Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence (starting from 1927, Section II Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence was created and this structure format remained until the rise of Communism in Romania).

Therefore, in 1924 Romania had its first modern intelligence service created – Secret Intelligence Service (SSI). Further on, it would carry the toughest fights on the “secret front” against similar structures belonging to states that had territorial claims from Romania – such as Hungary, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. During the following years, one can notice a qualitative leap of the Service in as far as the collection and analysis of data gathered abroad and domestically is concerned. The military and political leaders of the country were constantly updated about the military, economic and financial activities of the neighbor states, especially with regard to possible preparations of war against our country.

### **Conclusions**

Moscow did not appreciate correctly the reserved attitude of Romania during the Russian Civil War (1918-1921), as our country did not join the military intervention against the Soviet state, despite the pressures made by France and Great Britain. Like in the case of Hungary, neither the Soviet Union (formed in December 1922) managed to bring Romania a territorial loss. As a consequence, the hardest part of the fight against the “Romanian imperialism” was left to the Soviet secret services and the Communist International.

At the beginning of 1924, the heads of the “world Communist revolution” from Kremlin, elaborated “Kolarov Plan” (named after a Bulgarian leader of Comintern), which shaped the dismemberment of Romania in five areas, by using paramilitary groups brought from the USSR<sup>9</sup>. Each area was supposed to be ruled by a Comintern “troika”, assigned by Moscow; “Kolarov Plan” envisaged also an intervention of the



Red Army in the country after the protests initiated by the Communist stirrers escalated.

They even tried implementing this plan by triggering, in September 1924, the so called “revolution” from Tatar Bunar – in fact organized by the Soviet secret services through the Communist networks from Bessarabia. Nevertheless, the firm and rapid reaction of the Romanian authorities, which used even the artillery to annihilate the Bolshevik bands<sup>10</sup>, obliged Moscow to give up its desire to make the entire Eastern Europe a communist camp (if the action had been successful, the “flame” of the revolution would have embrace Bulgaria too).

From that moment on, until the Second World War, no other attempt or direct action of Soviet Russia was recorded on our national territory, as the fight against “imperialist” Romania was assumed by the secret services.

Granting recognition to Romanian national intelligence services, starting with the third decade, came also from the secret American services; during the fall of 1944, the senior American officer, major Robert Bishop, who came in Romania with the view of gathering information about the Soviet Union, declared that the files of SSI “contained one of the best data collection regarding the Soviets from the entire Europe, except for the files found in Germany. They present a continuously updated data base, starting with First World War.”

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# **INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AND SHARING ADVANTAGES. THE CASE OF THE INTERWAR ROMANIAN SECRET SERVICE (SSI)**

**Bogdan Alexandru TEODOR\***  
**Mihaela TEODOR\*\***

## **Abstract**

*Romania had during the interwar period a modern Service concerned with providing legal beneficiaries with accurate intelligence analyses and with the counterintelligence protection of its activity, all this making possible the transition from information to intelligence. The experience of the First World War, during which intelligence sharing proved mutually advantageous, led to the continuation of this sensitive activity in the shape of correspondence and mutual support, which may be translated into the principle of modern intelligence activity „need to share”. The collection and exchange of information, both between domestic departments and with foreign partners led to the achievement of remarkable results in the intelligence field in interwar period of Romanian history. Some of the achievements were a result of the information exchange with foreign partners, which proved the viability of cooperation and intelligence sharing.*

*This paper aim to provide a new historical perspective on the intelligence sharing and cooperation activities conducted by the Romanian Secret Service (SSI) during interwar period as well as the lines of actions undertook in order to make the SSI one of the most efficient and successful intelligence services in Europe. The external intelligence cooperation was conducted on two important fields: firstly, within regional security alliances and secondly, between the Secret Intelligence Service and other Western partners, some of which serving as model for the modern organization of the Romanian service. The analysis of relevant archive documents summarizes information relating to sharing and cooperation in intelligence field in interwar period, and describes some of the factors that may*

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*be relevant to a discussion regarding the applicability of the British intelligence model to the Romanian Intelligence Service.*

**Keywords:** intelligence, cooperation, sharing, interwar period, Romanian Intelligence Service (SSI)

## Introduction

The strength and fame of intelligence and national security agencies is given by the quality of the intelligence provided, the efficiency they display in solving the operations they conduct, their analysis, synthesis and prediction capabilities, their capacity to provide legal accurate intelligence to legal beneficiaries and last but not least the efficiency of their counterintelligence measures. Romania had during the interwar period a modern intelligence service concerned with providing legal beneficiaries with accurate intelligence analyses and with the counterintelligence protection of its activity, all this making possible the transition from information to intelligence. Milestones in the Romanian interwar intelligence structures activity:

### □ 2 periods

- 1918–1928: the first decade of the interwar period, 1919–1929, was for the Romanian Intelligence a period characterized by confrontation with asymmetric threats, such as: terrorist attacks, revisionist actions and Bolshevik aggressions on the Eastern border, which culminated with the Tatar-Bunar revolt (1924). The necessity to counter these phenomena imposed more and more the idea of intelligence cooperation and exchange.

- 1929–1938: the period when Mihai Moruzov, the grey figure of the Romanian Intelligence field, manages to ensure the Secret Service he was leading, the monopoly over information collection from abroad and makes the transit from information to intelligence

### □ 2 leaders

- Traian Roman (1918–1924)
- Mihail Moruzov (1924–1940)

### □ 2 major changes

- 1917 – Provisional instructions on intelligence
- 1934 – Statute of the Secret Service

Based on the definition provided by Mark M. Lowenthal, we are trying to identify inside the structure of the Secret Service of Romania, in the interwar period, the defining elements of intelligence, represented by Figure 1<sup>1</sup>.

Figure 1: The Defining Elements Of Intelligence



In this respect, a fundamental element for any intelligence service is its organization, its internal structure, which allows it to fulfill the missions it was given inside the national security system. The modernity of the Romanian Secret Service, which we believe to be a feature of intelligence services, is revealed by the manner in which the agency was organized. Firstly it was structured on two layers: the central apparatus and the territorial units. The territorial units were organized in the form of counterintelligence centers, which acted in each province. Their main mission was to elaborate synthetic reports, comprising accurate information, required by the General Staff in the military decision-making process. The centers also had the role of coordinating the activity of the territorial police sections, insuring and conducting common operations in special circumstances.

The existence of documents which regulate the activity of the Secret Service for the entire interwar period shows the permanent concern of the Service's leadership and of state authorities to provide the legal framework necessary for conducting intelligence activities. Another permanent concern for the Service's leadership in addition to training the human resources was insuring its counterintelligence protection. This was achieved by hiding the identity of the employees. Each member of the Service used for the transmission of information a numerical code, and he communicated only with this direct hierarchical superior.

In the same time, during the entire time he ran the Secret Service, Mihail Moruzov strived to introduce modern principles for conducting the intelligence activity. For this, he emphasized the need for compartmentalizing the activity, insuring that each employee only has access to the information he needs to do his job. We can associate this concern with a current principle of the intelligence activity, namely „need to know”.

Another modern principle is the permanent concern to train the human resources. This was done through the creation of the special schools, dedicated to the training of the employees of the Secret Service.

In addition, the other fundamental principle „need to share” was put into practice through the intelligence exchange with partner services. This paper aims to provide a historical perspective on the intelligence sharing and cooperation activities conducted by the Romanian Secret Service (SSI) during the interwar period as well as the lines of actions undertaken in order to make the SSI one of the most efficient and successful intelligence services in Europe.

### **The rules of intelligence cooperation and sharing**

Intelligence cooperation, be it intranational, bilateral, or transnational, evolves around the basic idea of some kind of sharing. There are some other rules besides common interest and trust when it comes to sharing information:


- ❑ The common interest of each side is the main reason for cooperation in the first place.
- ❑ Thus there is an unwritten rule, which is called “trust.” The only way things as sensitive as intelligence cooperation and intelligence sharing can work is that parties must trust each other.
- ❑ The first information to be shared is the “perishable” information.
- ❑ Intelligence agencies share only those pieces of information that could be useful to their partners, but they leave out any information that could harm them or their sources.
- ❑ To follow any third-party agreements that may exist between two countries that have agreed to share information; such agreements dictate that information exchanged will not be shared with anybody else.

The heads of Romanian Intelligence Structures from the interwar period understood these rules and the importance of cooperation and sharing. The experience of the First World War, during which intelligence sharing proved mutually advantageous, prompted further this sensitive activity in the shape of correspondence and mutual support.

### **Principles of Interwar Romanian intelligence cooperation activity**

In interwar period, intelligence sharing activity was based on a traditional concept of bilateralism, but it has started to take on more multilateral aspects with the Little Entente and League of Nations, the Figure 2 being representative:

Figure 2: From bilateral to multilateral cooperation



In this respect, the external intelligence cooperation was conducted on two important fields. Firstly, within international and regional security alliances. Romania supported the League of Nations in its efforts to establish collective security seeking, at the same time, to discourage

revisionism by entering into regional alliances such as the Little Entente and the Balkan Pact. Without doubt, Romania's foreign policy in the early 1940s was marked by the activity of Nicolae Titulescu, who led the Romanian diplomacy for 4 years (1932-1936) regardless of what leading political parties succeeded one another during that time. He confined a special attention to the Little Entente, the Balkan Pact of 1934 as well as to improving Romanian-Soviet relations.

Romania maintained external intelligence cooperation relations with allied countries from the Little Entente, but they were of an informal nature and were mostly directed against Hungary and the USSR, two of the states who sought border revisions in the detriment of their neighbors. During the period 22-23 May 1929, in Bucharest took place a political-military conference of the Little Entente. The Chiefs of Staff of the three countries took this opportunity to exchange data regarding the fighting capacities and technical capabilities of Hungary. In the following period, the cooperation in intelligence also extended to the domestic arena, especially because of the accentuation of certain social problems. Within the Little Entente, the Romanian-Polish relations had a special significance, thus including intelligence cooperation relations aimed against the USSR.

Secondly, between the Secret Intelligence Service and other Western partners, some of which serving as model for the modern organization of the Romanian service. The inter-war period, Romanian diplomacy considered France and Great Britain the main guarantors of peace after the First World War, the major forces that could oppose the revisionist demands of the Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria. Bilateral cooperation almost always involves sharing of intelligence information and analysis on topics of mutual interest. Intelligence was especially important to Romania bilateral relationships. To that effect, following the Great Union of 1918, recognized by the Great Powers through the Paris Treaties, Romania started to put its defense policy into practice by immediately focusing on opening offices for the Romanian military attachés in the USA and England (1919), followed by Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Japan, France, Turkey, Belgium, Austria, Bulgaria, Serbia, Italy, reaching a number of 23 military attachés accredited abroad on the eve of the Second World War. The Polish-Romanian Alliance signed in Bucharest on 3 March 1921 represented the first bilateral treaty Romania concluded in the inter-war period<sup>2</sup>. The cooperation in intelligence represented only a deeper exploration of a field, in strong connection with the good political and economic relations.



### **Case studies for bilateral cooperation**

he general orientation towards France and Great Britain remained, but starting with 1936, Romanian political circles and King Carol began considering ever more seriously the German option. In this respect we propose two case studies representative for the Romanian interwar bilateral intelligence cooperation activity.

#### **□ The cooperation between Romania and Great Britain**

In order to support the achievement of the intelligence interests of the two countries, Romania organized starting with 1921 a transit area for British agents between Tighina and Cetatea Albă, while French agents crossed into the USSR through the Soroca sector. The relations with the British evolved to a higher level, especially as, following the operations they conducted, the Romanians acquired a rich body of knowledge on the situation across the Dniester. At the same time, the national counterintelligence agencies have closely monitored the organization of the Intelligence Service unit in Romania, cooperating with a part of its members. The British residency was led by Archibald Gibson, the commercial attaché of the British legation, being organized in three services: The intelligence service on Romania, personally led by Gibson; The intelligence service on the USSR and counterintelligence on Soviet refugees led by Victor Bogomoletz; The intelligence service on the Communist activity in the Balkan Peninsula. The Romanian side regarded the Intelligence Service as being “highly organized”, and Victor Bogomoletz, who introduced himself as a press correspondent “seems to work on what is happening in Russia”, but he also channeled his efforts towards targets inside Romania. The headquarters of the organization were located in Bucharest, but the department for Russia was coordinated from Chişinău.

In the 1920's, a distinct role in enlarging Romanian-English rapports was played by Nicolae Titulescu, and also Colonel Ion Antonescu, who was appointed military attaché in London through. As a military attaché in London, he had a fruitful collaboration with armament factories in Great Britain; negotiating a Romanian-British military co-operation in aeronautics, which was in full development in 1925; informing about Soviet politics and its possible implications for Romania. In all period the Romanian military attachés in London kept Bucharest up to date with all the information the English General Staff possessed about Russia

The relations between the Romanian intelligence services and the Intelligence Service deteriorated in mid-1928, mainly as a result of Romanian suspicions that an attack organized by Russian monarchists

inside the USSR, through General Leontovici was “disclosed” to the General Staff by Bogomoletz. In turn, the head of the British espionage in Russia started to eliminate the cooperation relations with the local structures and created his own contact points on the banks of the Dniester, without informing the Romanian side. Nevertheless, the British official continued to inform his Romanian counterparts of the individuals suspected of affiliations with the USSR, some of these being Finish citizens from Romania, who were acting on behalf of the Bolsheviks. Without doing business or having visible sources of income, these individuals were travelling all throughout the country, spending large sums of money and expressing their interest in certain military objectives or infrastructure targets<sup>3</sup>.

□ The cooperation between Romania and Germany

In the early twenties, relations between Romania and Germany were dominated by two issues: the reestablishment of bilateral trade and German reparations for war damages incurred during the World War I German occupation. From 1928 onward Germany began to pursue its political and economic interests more actively. This shift affected all aspects of Romanian-German relations. German-Romanian relations, both political and economic, suffered after the Nazis seized power in Germany and demanded a radical revision of the World War I peace treaties. This policy was diametrically opposed to Romanian interests. The beginnings of the German-Romanian rapprochement date back to 1936 after the moment when Nicolae Titulescu was discharge from the office of Foreign Affairs minister. It was an important moment in the foreign policy of the country. However, it did not mark a reorientation in the Romanian foreign policy, but only a shift of accents determined by the new geo-strategic configuration of the continent. The general orientation towards France and Great Britain remained, but from that moment on, Romanian political circles and King Carol began considering ever more seriously the German option.

Romania’s complex political situation and Germany’s immediate interests at the time, the preparations for war with the Soviet Union and the campaign in the Balkan, constituted the backdrop for a special Romanian-German relationship. The change of the foreign affairs policy was motivated by economic interests and by security considerations: keeping Hungarian revisionism in check and to protect Romania against potential Soviet threats. As a result, by 1938 Germany had become Romania’s most important commercial partner. Throughout the war Romania remained a

sovereign state, but committed itself more and more to dependence on its new ally.

After the loss of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union in June 1940, the Romanian government envisaged Germany as a defender against Hungarian and Bulgarian revisionism. On October 15, 1940, Antonescu invited a German military mission to Romania to train the Romanian army and consolidate the border defense. The German officers who visited Romania, led by General Tippelskirch.

Beginning in spring 1941 Gustav Richter, diplomat and member of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA; Reich Main Security Office), was active in Bucharest. Moreover, shortly before June 21, 1941, the Romanian Special Intelligence Service (SSI) created a select unit called the Esalon Special (Special Echelon), which bore similarities to the Einsatzgruppen and was entrusted with the mission of “defending the rear of the Romanian army from espionage, sabotage, and terrorist actions.”<sup>4</sup> Like the Einsatzgruppen, the Esalon Operativ, as it was also called, was divided into smaller echipe (teams). The Echelon was comprised of 160 elite men and was soon assigned to Bessarabia. Its first operation was carried out in Iasi, on July 29 and 30, 1941. From Iasi, the Echelon moved on with the Romanian Fourth Army into Bessarabia, where it collaborated with Einsatzkommando 11B in the executions in Balti and Chisinau. In fact, as soon as the Echelon and other Romanian military units involved in the killings crossed the Prut River, they collaborated with the Einsatzkommandos. Nonetheless, relations between the various units of Einsatzgruppe D and the Romanian army, gendarmerie, police, and Special Echelon were far from ideal. The Germans were content only when the Romanians acted according to their directives and were dismayed at the disorder the Romanians displayed.

## **Conclusion**

During the entire interwar period, Mihail Moruzov strived to introduce modern principles for conducting the Romanian intelligence activity (as documents stated). For this, he emphasized the need for compartmentalizing the activity. We can associate this concern with a current principle of the intelligence activity, namely „need to know”. In addition, the other fundamental principle „need to share” was put into practice through the intelligence exchange with partner services. In interwar period, intelligence sharing activity was based on a traditional concept of bilateralism, but it has started to take on more multilateral aspects with the Little Antante and League of Nations. The collection and exchange of information, both between domestic departments and with

foreign partners led to the achievement of remarkable results in the intelligence field in interwar period of Romanian history. Some of the achievements were a result of the information exchange with foreign partners, which proved the viability of cooperation and intelligence sharing. The analysis of relevant archive documents summarizes information relating to sharing and cooperation in intelligence field in interwar period, and describes some of the factors that may be relevant to a future discussion regarding the applicability of the British intelligence model to the Romanian Intelligence Service.

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**(IN)SECURITY PRODUCTION: COUNTERING  
CONFLICT, RADICALIZATION & VIOLENCE**



# VIOLENT EXTREMISTS RISK ASSESSMENT A BAYESIAN FRAMEWORK

**Davide BARBIERI\***  
**Elaine PRESSMAN\*\***

## **Abstract**

*The Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA) is a formal, validated and reliable protocol designed to assess the risk and threat that an individual may be a violent extremist or a terrorist. The tool uses empirically identified indicators associated with violent extremism. It is essentially a qualitative albeit structured approach and relies on the analyst's judgment to reach a conclusion. Given its evidence-based and iterative nature, VERA is a good candidate for a statistical approach based on the rule of Bayes, which is the standard in medical diagnostics. Bayesian inference will give the VERA method a solid quantitative background, and allow analysts to reach conclusions which can be expressed in terms of mathematical probabilities.*

**Keywords:** Violent extremism, risk assessment, probability, quantitative analysis, Bayesian inference.

## **Introduction**

The Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA, Pressman 2009) is a formal and validated protocol designed to assess the risk and threat that an individual may engage in violent extremist or terrorist actions. The tool uses empirically identified indicators associated with violent extremism. It follows the *Structured Professional Judgment Methodology* (SPJ, Webster et al. 1997). This approach is considered to be the most appropriate and

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relevant for the assessment of violent extremists (Monahan 2012). The objectives of VERA are basically two: (i) to evaluate the risk that an individual will commit acts of ideologically motivated violence when at liberty, and (ii) to use the information obtained from the protocol to assist in the development of counter-terrorism strategies and programs for the individual while in detention or in community countering violent extremism programs.

The VERA-2 (Pressman and Flockton 2012) is an updated version of the protocol that includes a set of 31 indicators. These indicators can be divided into the following subsets:

1. Beliefs and attitudes.
2. Context and intent.
3. History and capability.
4. Commitment and motivation.
5. Risk Mitigating/Protective

These evidence-based indicators pertain to accepted narratives, personal needs, networks that support violent extremism, capacity of the individual and intention to act. Examples include the rejection of democratic values, justification of the use of violence to further ideological beliefs, grievances, identity issues, personal needs, contact with violent extremists, family or close associates involved in violent ideologically based actions.

VERA-2 uses a SPJ approach, that is a *qualitative* method. It adopts criterion-based ratings for each indicator. Evidence related to each of the indicators is documented. Weightings of the indicators in terms of overall importance to the final judgment are provided by the analytical experts undertaking the risk assessment. These weightings are based on the knowledge of the context and the information available from other reports and reliable sources. The final judgment is determined by the analyst after consideration and rating of all the variables (indicators) on the basis of pre-determined criteria, all the evidence available pertaining to these variables and a weighting of these indicators in terms of importance.

Predictive validity is difficult to obtain in risk assessment methods when populations are small, access is problematic, and individuals are cognitively normal and have the capacity to volitionally modify their decisions to act. Nonetheless, statistics, which consists of mathematical methods for evaluating hypotheses on the basis of evidence, can be used to estimate risks. The adoption of a specific statistical method will allow analysts to express their predictions (or estimates) in quantitative – and therefore less ambiguous – terms.



### **A methodological framework for risk assessment**

Assessing violent extremists on the basis of some collected evidence can be conducted within the framework of the scientific method as described by Karl Popper in most of his works (see for example Popper 2002b), during the XX century. According to the Austrian epistemologist, the whole method could be synthetically described by means of the following deductive process:

1. State a problem.
2. Find a tentative solution (hypothesis).
3. Try to falsify (reject) it by means of some collected evidence.

If the hypothesis can stand the challenge of evidence, then it is temporarily accepted. A hypothesis can only be corroborated by evidence, but never demonstrated to be absolutely true. When it will be – sooner or later – falsified, then a new (probably harder) problem will arise, which will be tackled by means of a new tentative and possibly more creative solution, in a virtually infinite cycle of production of knowledge (Popper 2002a).

The framework of the scientific method is similar to that of a trial, which is, in its turn, similar to SPJ. The possible outcomes of a trial are summed in the following contingency matrix:

	A is guilty	A is not guilty
A is judged guilty	TP	FP
A is judged not guilty	FN	TN

The null – or starting – hypothesis  $H_0$  is usually that A is not guilty (presumption of innocence). The degree of confidence in  $H_0$  is the prior assumption. Evidence must be brought in by the prosecutor in order to demonstrate that  $H_0$  must be rejected, and that the alternative hypothesis  $H_1$  (that A is guilty) must be accepted. The defense lawyer will do the opposite: he/she will bring evidence to defend  $H_0$ . The prior is updated accordingly. It must be highlighted the fact that evidence is collected only in favor or against, in order to either support or refute a hypothesis.

A final decision is taken: the judge will choose, coherently, the hypothesis with the higher probability, either confirming  $H_0$ , or rejecting  $H_0$  and accepting  $H_1$ . When the judge acquits a suspect who is actually innocent, we have a true negative (TN); if instead a guilty person is condemned, then we have a true positive (TP). If the judge condemns an innocent accused, then a type I error (i.e. a false positive, FP) is committed; if instead an accused who is actually guilty is acquitted, then a type II error (a false negative, FN) is made.

Errors may have different weights: in general, in democratic countries, condemning an innocent is considered to be worse than freeing a criminal, which means that in court a FN is better than a FP. But this is not always the case: in medical diagnostic as in VERA, a FN may be worse than a FP (e.g. failed cancer diagnosis, a devastating terrorist attack). Therefore, analysts can start from the assumption that an individual is a terrorist, and then try to falsify or corroborate it.

### Definitions of probability

Probability can be defined in different ways. When (i) the possible outcomes of a test or trial are known, and (ii) they have the same chances to happen, as it is often the case in gambling, then the traditional definition by Laplace could be adopted:  $P(E)=m/n$ , where  $P(E)$  is the probability of event  $E$ ,  $m$  is the number of favorable cases and  $n$  the number of possible cases. An example is the probability of obtaining a head when tossing a coin: 1 (favorable case) on 2 (possible cases).

If the two assumptions above (one or both) do not hold (e.g. in VERA the possible outcomes are known: violent extremist or not, but they do not have the same chances) than the *frequentist* definition of probability can be applied, based on the *law of large numbers*:  $P(E)=\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} f(E)/n$ , where  $f(E)$  is the frequency of event  $E$  and  $n$  is the number of trials. Given a large amount of available data, the frequency of an event tends towards its theoretical probability. Again, two assumptions are needed: (i)  $n$  must be *very large* ( $n \rightarrow \infty$ ) and (ii) the limit must have a finite result, i.e. there must be sufficient reasons to believe that the relative frequency of the event will reach a finite limit as  $n$  tends to the infinite. This is the *first basic assumption*, according to Von Mises (Schield and Burnham 2008).

In intelligence analysis - and in terrorist risk assessment in particular - it is unlikely that the amount of evidence will be anywhere close to large. If neither of the two definitions above can be applied, then it is possible to resort to a third definition of probability. According to De Finetti (1931), *probability is the degree of personal belief or confidence in a hypothesis*. It cannot be defined by means of an equation, but it can still be measured by betting: How much would the analyst bet on his/her hypothesis? How much does he/she really believe in it? Of course, he/she must be coherent.

The first two definitions can be considered objective (whoever applies the equations correctly will get the same results), while the third one is subjective, in the sense that it represents the personal judgment of an

individual. However we define it, the probability  $P$  of an event  $E$  is always between 0 and 1:  $0 \leq P(E) \leq 1$ . If  $P(E)=0$  then the event is impossible. If  $P(E)=1$  instead, the event is certain.

### The Rule of Bayes

In most cases, probability is conditional. For example, we say that the probability of getting a head when tossing a coin is  $1/2$ , but this is correct *given that* the coin is fair, which is the prior assumption (most people do not acknowledge it at first, but they accept it unconsciously). This is what happens in VERA, when the probability of an individual to be a violent extremist increases given some positive risk indicators: What is the probability that the suspect is a terrorist given that he/she has a previous history of violent crimes? What is the probability that the suspect is a terrorist given that he/she has a commitment to use violence to further his/her political goals? It is a prediction, an estimate.

In fact, there is always an *a-priori* assumption, a starting hypothesis  $H_0$ : the human mind is not a white board. This is acceptable given that it is stated *explicitly*. If  $A$  were considered a violent extremist ( $H_0$ ) beyond any doubt ( $P(H_0)=1$ ), there would be no investigation. The same if  $A$  were considered innocent ( $P(H_0)=0$ ). Therefore  $0 < P(H_0) < 1$ . Usually, if an analyst resorts to the VERA 2, there is some concern that the individual under evaluation may be vulnerable to violent extremism. If this concern were not the case, the VERA 2 should be coherently applied to the whole population, which is not feasible or intended. In democratic countries, everyone cannot be considered a potential terrorist and the VERA 2 is not a screening tool for the general population.

In order to calculate conditional probabilities, the rule of Bayes (Bayes and Price 1763) can be used:

$$P(H|E) = P(E|H)P(H)/P(E)$$

where

- $P(H|E)$ : posterior or revised probability, the probability of hypothesis  $H$  given evidence  $E$ .
- $P(E|H)$ : *likelihood* of event  $E$  in case  $H$  is true.
- $P(H)$ : prior probability of  $H$ , i.e. the base rate or starting hypothesis.
- $P(E)$ : marginal probability of  $E$ , i.e. the probability of  $E$  in the whole population, including both violent extremists and not.

The rule of Bayes is the standard in medical diagnostics, where the posterior (i.e. conditional) probability of an individual to be ill is evaluated

after the results of some medical exams (like blood analysis, x-ray etc.) are available. It has also been historically applied to intelligence analysis (Barbieri 2013). VERA is a sort-of diagnostics tool, by means of which the probability of an individual to be a violent extremist is evaluated given some indicators.

In diagnostics,  $P(H)$  is the prevalence of the disease, which is usually known from epidemiology. In intelligence analysis instead, it is not always possible to evaluate the rate of a crime, especially in case of rare events like terrorist attacks. Therefore, a subjective prior can be adopted.

Likelihood is the probability to have a positive indicator, given that the suspect is a terrorist: How likely it is that he/she has the intention to act violently to support his values? How likely it is that he/she is in contact with other violent extremists? Likelihood may be calculated as the frequency of an event in the past, as opposed to posterior probability, which is an estimate, a prediction of something we do not know yet. Historical databases can be used, but if they are not available, then a subjective evaluation can be used.

The rule of Bayes can be applied recursively, as new evidence becomes available, as many times as needed. It will give the best estimates of conditional probability on the basis of the collected data. A simple algorithm to do the calculation automatically could be implemented by means of any software language.

### Conclusions

The rule of Bayes is a formally correct way of calculating conditional probabilities given some collected evidence and on the basis of a subjective estimation of risk. It says: "Given your evaluation, this is the corresponding probabilistic estimate of the threat". It will therefore assist the analysts in expressing their views quantitatively and coherently.

The VERA approach has an iterative and evidence-based nature. Consciously or not, the analyst adopts an initial hypothesis, or assumption, that the individual being examined is likely to be a violent extremist or is vulnerable to being a terrorist. In fact, if there were no doubts, he/she would not apply the system, as non-suspects are neither interviewed nor investigated and those known to be terrorists are not necessarily assessed. The analyst must simply acknowledge the assumption, quantifying the starting hypothesis.

Subsequently, the first hypothesis is revised according to the collected evidence. A final, *ex-post*, result is reached after all the included

risk supporting indicators are evaluated in terms of their presence and level of risk. The accuracy of the prior is not so relevant, since after 31 iterations the posterior can be very far from the initial hypothesis. Given this procedure, the rule of Bayes can be applied to VERA consistently.

A few *caveats* must be taken into proper consideration. If the indicators were binary (positive or negative), as it is often the case in medical diagnostics, then the rule of Bayes would be of immediate application. VERA is not natively binary, although a version of the VERA could be made so with possible adaptations. Nonetheless, the rule can be applied also to multinomial, ordinal values such as the low, moderate or high ratings used in the VERA. Also, a degree of correlation between indicators cannot be excluded. Some items may be simultaneously positive because of overlapping semantics (e.g. synonyms), which would imply an excessive weight given to similar concepts expressed by different indicators. This fact would not prevent the adoption of the rule in its “naïve” form, i.e. assuming explicitly that the indicators are independent (even if they are not). A revised, diminished (and therefore less correlated) list of indicators may be adopted in the future, following additional research. These issues will be the topic of further study.

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# **APPROACHING EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES WITHIN THE EU FRAMEWORK. NEW TERRORIST THREATS AND HYBRID WARFARE INSIDE THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONTEXT**

**Ana BIRCHALL\***

## **Abstract**

*Recent evolutions have raised a set of serious challenges to the security of the European Union. The emergence of terrorism, a specific threat in our current century, has been significantly boosted by radicalization and by the security gaps created after many of the democratization processes in the Middle East and North Africa failed. To the east, the Crimean and Ukrainian crises have revealed a new type of threat in the presence of hybrid warfare. Last but not least, the current migrants' issue reveals not only new threats to the security of the EU, but also the vulnerabilities currently existing inside the European construction.*

*The security risks these recent evolutions imply, especially concerning the risk of terrorists being infiltrated among migrants, bring up the necessity to strengthen cooperation between institutions with specific attributes in preventing and fighting against organized crime, terrorism and human trafficking, especially inside the EU member states.*

*Externally, such risks can be diminished by improving policies and actions to strengthen EU borders within the missions directed through the EU common security and defense policy. However, we must be aware of all of the vulnerabilities and difficulties, starting from the ones implied by the characteristics of the challenges, to the actions of certain states, organizations or non-state actors.*

*An extensive and comprehensive strategy is needed, which will contain economic, social and educational measures in the countries of origin, measures concerning crisis management and post-conflict stabilization through a better utilization of external financial instruments and of the EU development policy, the*

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*cooperation with third party and transitory states, as well as a better cooperation with countries included in the eu neighborhood policy.*

*Romania has an important strategic position and represents one of eu`s and nato`s providers of security, stability and economic growth in the region. equally, romania is one of the most exposed eu member states to emerging security threats, bearing a responsibility to assure both the security of romania and that of the eu and nato, as their regional representative.*

**Keywords:** Emerging security threats, Terrorism, Hybrid warfare, Migration, Romania Security, EU Security

### **Terrorism**

Defining the concept of terrorism is an elusive task because labeling actions as terrorism promotes condemnation of the actors and a definition may reflect ideological or political bias. But nevertheless, the acts of terrorism constitute one of the most serious violations of the universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity, the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The terrorist phenomenon represents a **major threat** to representative democracy, political pluralism and the rule of law, in an attempt to impose the will of a radical minority upon the majority of population through the use of violence and terror of will; this phenomenon encuproses those actions that create a state of terror.<sup>1</sup>

**The right to life is the fundamental right and the moral principle** that dominates the hierarchy of human rights and therefore it should represent the main criterion that determines the priority, urgency, intensity and the dimensioning of resources necessary for the action of EU or its Member States in the field of security.

Following the events that succeeded the so-called “Arab Spring”, as well as the retreat from Iraq and Afghanistan, we have continuously witnessed an **emphasized radicalization of Islamism** and the **emergence or reemergence of extremist and terrorist organizations** mainly Al Qaeda and particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. As demonstrated already, **these actors can and are expected to make use of the migrants’ crisis to infiltrate in the Western countries. The attacks in France and Belgium represent viable proofs in this aspect.**

Furthermore, throughout the past year, we have witnessed many decision makers as well as representatives of Eurosceptic or radical nationalist parties in Europe and the entire world, claiming that the crisis determined by the migratory waves in Europe can and will be used by terrorists to exploit the integration programs in order to fulfill their



objectives. Certainly, as proved by recent events, this is becoming a reality! Apart from such possibility, these claims are often used as ammunition by these groups and parties in trying to capitalize influence in their states of origin and in exacerbating the population discontents. The most important proof in this direction is definitely the recent referendum regarding the United Kingdom`s exit from the European Union, whose unexpected result is also due to the situation and fears created by the migration crisis and by the worrying increase of terrorist acts in Europe.

In 2015 and 2016, the number of terrorist attacks has increased both in Europe, as well as in Asia, Africa and in North and South America. For example we have witnessed terrorist attacks in France, Brussels, Copenhagen, Ankara, but also in Texas, California and, recently, in Orlando, Florida. It is a worrisome sign of the increasing activity and range of the terrorist organizations, with particular reference to the Islamic State, whose influence and spread seem to spin out of control. <sup>2</sup>

Furthermore, recent evolutions with regard to the migrants coming from the Middle East and North Africa across the Mediterranean currently represent **the main challenge for both EU and Europe**. The tragic events that continue to take the lives of so many people crossing the Mediterranean, the tense situation of migrants stuck near the borders of EU, as well as the uncertainty with regard to the fate of the migrants already found inside the EU borders – these all impose the necessity for a **coordinated, effective and responsible approach from everyone involved**, both directly and indirectly, proving that Europe, and perhaps the whole world, has the capacity to successfully handle such a crisis, without affecting its integrity and identity.

The security risks these recent evolutions imply, especially concerning **the high risk of terrorists being infiltrated among migrants**, bring up front the **necessity to strengthen cooperation** between institutions with specific prerogatives in preventing and fighting against organized crime, terrorism and human trafficking, especially inside the EU member states.

From this point of view, we can consider the activity of the criminal networks which organize transportation for large numbers of migrants as being connected to the terrorist phenomenon. **On the one hand, they can make use of these travels to infiltrate terrorists, while on the other hand, the substantial profits they achieve from the migrants who pay for their transportation might benefit the terrorist organizations as well.** This kind of combination is a part of the **new pattern of terrorism**, which will definitely make use of the migrant`s issue at the maximum level.

Externally, such risks can be diminished by improving policies and actions to strengthen EU borders within the missions directed through the EU Common Security and Defense Policy. However, we must be aware of all of **the vulnerabilities and difficulties, starting from the ones implied by the characteristics of the territory and the history of population movements, to the actions of certain groups and organizations, partially determined by organizational traditions and social practice specific to the area.**

Another line of conduct in tackling the complicated security context existing in Europe and the world is represented by an **intensification of our cooperation, at EU and NATO level, with tertiary states**, especially through the instruments of **the European Neighborhood Policy**, both on its **Southern and Eastern Dimension**. **EU should take into consideration further measures in regard to reducing terrorist threats present in the Eastern and Southern EU neighborhood** and intensify the means and the use of instruments brought about by programs such as the Eastern Partnership.

A good example of the positive outcome that the cooperation with institutions with prerogatives in fighting terrorism from partner states in the EU neighborhood is represented by the generally positive outcome of the cooperation between security structures in the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and even Ukraine, which led to diminishing the terrorist threat as well as the presence of terrorist groups in those countries.

On this level, it is highly relevant to remind of the 10-point plan of actions to be taken in response to the crisis situation in the Mediterranean, adopted last year in regard to tackling the migration crisis and the threats it imposes. Among the measures proposed within this plan, I want to underline the necessity of a systematic effort to capture and destroy vessels used by the smugglers, as well as the importance of holding regular reunions of EUROPOL, FRONTEX, BESA, EASO and EUROJUST, and establishing a new program for rapid return of irregular migrants coordinated by FRONTEX from frontline Member States.

In order to diminish the terrorist threat in the current migration issue, we must not only identify the terrorists already infiltrated among the refugees. **Another important issue is to keep the terrorist influence at the lowest among the migrants, not allowing the spread of terrorist or radicalization inside the migrant groups.**

The thorough planning of immigrant integration programs is necessary to reach the objectives set, but additional programs should be prepared, meant for immigrants that encounter difficulties in integration; **in case of immigrants who display anti-social tendencies,**

**including by radicalization, special programs should be designed, with the involvement of both specialists in the field of education, as well as law enforcement authorities, whose monitoring might have a dissuasive effect.**

We need an **ample and comprehensive strategy**, which will contain **economic, social and educational measures in the countries of origin, the crisis management from these states, the post-conflict stabilization**, through better utilization of external financial instruments and of the EU development policy, **the cooperation with transitory states, including the candidate states for EU, as well as the fight against human trafficking.**

A special attention should be given to the root causes of terrorism, in particular the foreign terrorist fighters' phenomenon and to radicalization. When doing so, we should strive to ensure the imperative of internal security and that of securing a good security environment in the neighbourhood.<sup>3</sup>

At a particularly challenging time for the Union, when a different type of challenge emerges – that of a member state's withdrawal from the EU, it is of greatest importance to prove solidarity and unity on topical issues, it is important to avoid promoting any divisive initiatives at EU level in order to prevent a terrorist onset in the context of a potential destabilization; this unprecedented situation is to be dealt by the EU, under Slovak leadership that has to overcome the challenges to the Union's security.

### **EU Framework on terrorism**

Europe's security remains a priority in today's dynamics. Developing and promoting common standards in the management of EU external borders is particularly important, especially in the current challenging context for the EU member states national systems of internal security, border control and migration management.

In order to develop a sustainable and comprehensive approach in fighting the terrorist scourge, the European Union has rallied to the initiatives to diminish the conditions that encourage terrorism through the promoting of democracy and justice.<sup>4</sup>

The attacks carried out on European soil in the course of the last three years, culminating with -the recent attacks in Brussels, Paris or Nice, tragically illustrated that every threat can materialize, hence the need to scale up the EU-level response by adapting it to the threats.

The context determined by the new terrorist attacks in Belgium and France reconfirms the urgent need of pursuing firmly the ongoing work on the measures agreed at EU level, such as the swift completion of legislation on combating terrorism or intensifying the measures to ensure a high level of supervision and control of the EU borders.

The cross-border dimension of the terrorist threat is not limited to travel to conflict areas in third countries. Terrorists consider evasive techniques to avoid raising suspicion: they circulate within the EU and may transit through countries other than their country of residence/nationality with a view to circumvent controls and surveillance. In addition, recent attacks perpetrated in the EU demonstrate that terrorists travel to other Member States to carry out attacks or for logistical reasons (e.g. funding, procurement of weapons).<sup>5</sup>

The European Agenda on Security stipulates the launch of an impact analysis which will reside in a future update of the EU Framework Decision on combating terrorism in 2016 and it also sets the frame for a closer cooperation in order to work together to deliver an area of security and protection where the fundamental rights are respected.

The gaps and the fragmentation in information exchange between the same structures in the different member states must be addressed in order to make sure that the cooperation is effective and the national authorities work together to address common challenges in an environment characterized by confidence and communication.

It is necessary that the fight against terrorism should draw on new technologies and capabilities that are able to detect the threats.

A key element of the fight against terrorism in the EU consists in strong cybersecurity measures; from a European standpoint, these measures tend to become a landmark in the fight against terrorism as the means of communication used in perpetuation of this scourge have to be controlled.

Member States must act together in increasing the information critical infrastructure protection, both at the national and European level. Besides the common conducts in this field, we must also make efforts to harmonize our policies and developments related to information critical infrastructure protection, by identifying proper common solutions and by performing an efficient exchange of expertise and capabilities.

The main issue on the EU legislative level is the lack of an explicit and thorough definition of terrorism in any of the multilateral conventions regarding the fight against terrorism, as also stated in the latest Opinion issued in this field by the European Affairs Committee from the Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of Romania. We were arguing that, in this regard, the

European Commission should act in a more determined manner in firmly defining criminal offences relating to terrorism. Also, it is necessary to incriminate training for terrorism irrespective of its form of organization, including self-study.

In the joint efforts to fight terrorism, the European Affairs Committee from the Chamber of Deputies has recommended the European Commission to track the evolutions of the terrorist phenomenon and periodically propose such modifications, taking into consideration the respecting of the current consultative and decisional framework for the adoption of EU's decisions. Another recommendation issued by the European Affairs Committee from the Chamber of Deputies for the European Commission is to take into consideration the **development of a comprehensive document that would serve as an instrument of unitary interpretation for preventing and combating terrorism in the EU law system**. Such document might even become an Annex to the Treaties of EU, similar to the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Any solution to stopping the terrorist scourge must be based on the EU principles and values, such as the principle of solidarity, the volunteering of decision and the consensus between member states.

At the same time, it is necessary to once more turn our attention to strengthening the external borders of the EU and the security of EU and our partners in the neighborhood, as well as to providing a proper solution to this crisis at its origins. This can be achieved first and foremost by finalizing the peace process in Syria and by conducting and supporting a solid reconstruction of the Syrian state and society.

### **Terrorism on the national level**

Romania has an important strategic position and represents one of EU's and NATO's providers of security, stability and economic growth in the region. Equally, Romania is one of the most exposed EU Member States to emerging security threats, bearing a responsibility to assure both the security of Romania and that of the EU and NATO, as their regional representative. Furthermore, Romania is interested on a coordinated and decisive action of EU in regard to assuring a space of stability, security, prosperity and good neighborhood, built on common European values and starting from a tighter cooperation between member states.

Although Romania is not confronted with a direct and imminent terrorist threat, we expressed our solidarity in the context of joint EU efforts to combat terrorism and firmly supported the measures aimed at setting up the necessary instruments for the defense of EU citizens and for

the consolidation of cooperation both at EU level and with non-EU partners to that end.

On the national level, the **National Defense Strategy 2015-2019** states that the main attribute of a strong country is given by the way it provides security for its citizens regardless of their location or residence.<sup>6</sup> Romania, as well as every member state, must have the institutional capacity to counter all the threats to the security of the state and its citizens, as well as to interact at the EU level. So far, Romania has not only demonstrated its capacity to defend its own citizens, but also our readiness to export our good practices, expertise and human resources in a sign of solidarity both bilaterally and within EU and, perhaps particularly, at a NATO level.

Romania has expressed, from the very beginning, its commitment towards the principles of solidarity and responsibility in the common efforts at EU level to respond to today's challenges and has already committed to the EU efforts, acknowledging the urgency of the situation while bringing a substantial contribution to the actions of FRONTEX, INTERPOL, EUROPOL and EASO, as well as to the successful defence of the second largest segment of the EU external border.

Romania has always been in the front line of contributors to the activity of European agencies which activate in the field of migration and asylum (FRONTEX, EUROPOL and BESA) from a triple perspective – provider of expertise, qualified human resources and high class technology equipment. Furthermore, our country has been a part of the EU relocation scheme since 2008 and has assumed its role as a relocation country in 2010, already heaving a certain experience in such operations.

In the current crisis context, as “de facto” Schengen members, Romania defends 2070 kilometers of EU borders. From this perspective, we would not oppose re-introducing border controls in the Schengen Area, but we do not think this would solve the matter. In fact, the Schengen Convention always allowed border controls in the border area. We congratulate the European institutions and the member states supporting the idea that the Schengen Acquis should be preserved and protected against any attempt to use security threats, or migration, to restrict the freedom of movement. Romania is a de facto member of Schengen area and I am expecting this status to be recognized formally as Romania deserves to be in Schengen as since 2010 we proved to be a provider for security and stability in this very turbulent region providing security for every EU citizen!

Further, from a mutualistic perspective, Romania strongly stands by the idea that by strengthening the cooperation and the contacts between

parliaments, both bilaterally and at the level of the cooperation with the European institutions, we can achieve not only a better collaboration, but also successfully exchange expertise in fulfilling the desire of the population for democracy and modernization.

### Hybrid warfare

Hybrid warfare incorporates the most potent attributes of an insurgency while minimizing the drawbacks associated with using conventional force. It is a strategy born not out of weakness but out of strength. Thus, in the Baltic context, Russia's strategy aims to weaken NATO's willingness to follow through on its own deterrent threats. Military solutions overlook this dimension of Russian hybrid warfare because they focus disproportionately on modifying or restructuring military capabilities. These capabilities can deter some forms of aggression, but they may be insufficient to prevent Russia from sowing local discord. Political solutions that lie beyond NATO's ambit are necessary if the Baltic countries are to address their greatest vulnerability to hybrid warfare: namely, the presence of large stateless populations in Estonia and Latvia.

After the Vilnius Summit in 2014, we have all witnessed a **reemergence of the Russia Federation in the region**, as well as to the emergence of the so-called **hybrid warfare**, consisting in tactics and techniques that make use of **unconventional practices** in order to achieve the objective of the one using it, **without assuming its role**.

The events in Ukraine, starting with the illegal annexation of Crimea, and continuing with the civil war in Eastern Ukraine, have represented but the tip of the iceberg of the Russian policies in the region, the most visible part of it. The political influence manifested through intermediaries and persons faithful to Moscow, including amongst some influential politicians or businessmen in the region, altogether with a powerful propaganda inside the societies in the region, have all constituted the main tools Russia has attempted and significantly managed to extend its influence in the region. A good example is represented by the outcome of the elections in the Republic of Moldova, with the victory of the Socialist Party lead by Igor Dodon, of pro-Russian orientation, the emergence of some extremist parties as well as the comeback of the Communist Party in the foreground. All demonstrate the efficiency of the Russian propaganda and the threat it poses to the instruments of the European Neighborhood Policy, especially with regard to the cooperation with the countries in the Eastern Partnership.<sup>7</sup>

Since February 2014 Russia has conducted two distinct phases of operations in Ukraine, beginning with the occupation and annexation of Crimea, and continuing with the invasion of Eastern Ukraine's Donbas industrial region. Crimea began as a covert military operation, combining ambiguity, disinformation, and the element of surprise at the operational level with more traditional aids such as electronic warfare. The annexation was completed by a traditional military invasion and occupation of the peninsula, using Russia's airborne, naval infantry, and motor rifle brigades. This operation was unique, because Russia's Sevastopol naval base, status of forces arrangements in Crimea, and additional agreements on transit of troops in Ukraine enabled deployments and tactics that would not otherwise have been possible. These operations are, accordingly, not easily reproducible elsewhere.<sup>8</sup>

Hybrid war has become the common descriptor for the elements of national power Russia is employing directly in Ukraine, but it is a poor descriptor, and has already led Western analysts and policymakers down an unhelpful path. It appears to be an over-correction by the West for inadequate attention previously paid to Russia, resulting in a misguided attempt to group everything Moscow does under one rubric.

Given current tensions in and around Ukraine, which have resulted in a complete deficit of trust between Russia and its neighbors, fears that Moscow will continue to intervene in its neighborhood are fully understandable.<sup>9</sup>

Currently, the most difficult situation in the European neighborhood dimension is brought by the crisis in Ukraine, with EU's position being of strong support for the de-escalation efforts and for the identification of a solid political solution, based on the respect, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

We have all witnessed the unfolding of the Russian propaganda throughout not only Ukraine, but also the entire region, with a particular emphasis on the countries in the former Commonwealth of Independent States. The anti-western ideas promoted by an extremely complex set of tools, including a mobilization of the pro-Russian and Europhobe parties and groups in countries like the Republic of Moldova or Georgia, but also inside NATO and EU countries in the region, such as Bulgaria or the Baltic States, are a very important part of the Russian mechanism of conducting hybrid warfare and can be considered as the most dangerous ones as they can escalate the vulnerabilities currently existing in all these countries.

Furthermore, another very important domain used by Russia to conduct their own interests in other countries has been unveiled before the crisis in Ukraine and draws back to the war in Georgia in 2008.



By successfully using the vulnerabilities of the cyberspace, the Russian Federation has and can certainly use cyber-attacks from now on as a very effective weapon that demands a continuous adaptation, development and cooperation at EU, NATO, but also at a bilateral level, by sharing expertise and developing common programs in this field. By continuing to increase the cyber security of our countries and structures, we will not only be able to fight against any kind of cyber threats coming both from states and non-state actors, but also to provide the security of individuals and private properties, and, perhaps even more important, that of our critical infrastructures, which are amongst the most important possible target of cybercrime.

Apart from these events, another domain in which the hybrid warfare can affect EU is **the energy security**. The European energy system faces an increasing need for durable, accessible and competitive energy for all its citizens. The excessive dependence on a limited number of supply sources, especially in the field of natural gas, creates a high vulnerability to supply disruptions. It is therefore necessary first of all to reduce the dependence on fossil fuels as well as the emissions of greenhouse gas, and secondly, to reduce our dependence on a limited number of suppliers, especially when it comes to big, external actors which try to take advantage on their position in this field when it comes to the relationship with EU.

The existing instability situation imposes the **necessity to consolidate the strategic profile of the European Union and of the European Neighborhood Policy**, which could ensure a **better reaction capacity** of the Union to the geopolitical changes occurred in its neighborhood.

Romania is interested that the EU behave in a coordinate and decisive way with regard to providing a **space of stability, security, prosperity and good neighborhood**, forged on European values and on a tighter cooperation.

We see equally important the **initiation of a new type of dialogue on security** with the partners from our neighborhood and the neighbors of the neighbors through establishing bilateral and multi-lateral multi-dimensional cooperation tools or even '**security trusts**'. A more efficient use of the CFSP/CSDP, of development instruments and of concrete projects in these fields should be pursued. This would ensure a **welfare belt** and, as a result, **would enhance security in the EU neighborhood**. Effective use of ENP instruments and of the ownership concept is key to successful outcomes to this end.

## **NATO Warsaw Summit**

**‘NATO remains a fundamental source of security for our people and stability for the wider world’<sup>10</sup>**

The NATO leaders’ gathering in Warsaw was maybe the most important meeting in the history of the alliance since the end of the Cold War. Every two years, the heads of state and government get together in order to address crucial issues that the member states face.

It is for the first time that this Summit was held in the capital of a central European country that was once under Soviet domination, location that tends to underline an important message, that of a renewed Alliance, strong and capable of providing the necessary resources to ensure the security of every member state, especially to the Eastern European ones.

This year’s major subject was Russia and the invasion of eastern Ukraine that started a war that claimed 9,000 lives. In the light of these events, NATO has, once again, the core mission to ensure Europe’s collective security and territorial defense.

The past events that engrave the recent years of Europe create a sense of urgency – Russia’s assertiveness, terrorist assaults, migration, cybersecurity, Brexit – and it is necessary a display of western unity around Europe.

NATO leaders have now made important decisions intended to bolster the defense of the alliance’s eastern members, with new means to do it. Initial reactions from Moscow have been hostile, but with some hedging.

In the light of the strong message of unity, NATO leaders decided to strengthen the Alliance’s military presence in the east, with four battalions in Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on a rotational basis – to be in place starting next year. They also agreed to develop a tailored forward presence in the south-eastern part of the Alliance. Allies also declared Initial Operational Capability of NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense, pledged to strengthen their own cyber defenses, and recognized cyberspace as a new operational domain.

Also, they took decisions on projecting stability through support for partners – including an agreement to start training and capacity building inside Iraq. Leaders also decided that NATO AWACS surveillance planes will provide information to the Global Coalition to counter ISIL, and agreed to an expanded maritime presence in the Mediterranean Sea.<sup>11</sup>

Another strong message sent from Warsaw was that of a more ambitious partnership between NATO and the European Union

materialized in a Joint Declaration signed by the Secretary General of NATO and the President of the European Council and the European Commission. The Declaration sets out areas where NATO and the EU will step up cooperation – including maritime security and countering hybrid threats.

### **Conclusions**

The current international context is a very difficult one, with negative and surprising evolutions taking place very fast and with serious consequences particularly when referring to the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The NATO Summit in Warsaw has proved that the Alliance is ready to adapt to the new threats, as well as vulnerabilities, and to provide a proper, solid and cohesive response, whenever there is political will among all member states. A similar situation is available for the European Union. With a more fair treatment in regard to every member state and the institutions representing them, the leadership in Brussels can produce going forward a cohesive answer on behalf of the Union to the current challenges, starting with the relationship with Great Britain after the referendum on exiting the EU and particularly in regard to the emergent threats that we are facing today, such as terrorism, migration and the hybrid war with all their composing elements.

There is a long way ahead of us, and we must be ready to provide an answer that would address not only the current issues, but also the future ones. As one of the eastern-most countries both within EU and NATO, Romania has the possibility to continue to prove that we are ready to stand by our allies and partners in facing all these challenges. Being in a very tense, yet extremely important region, Romania can and has to be not only a center of stability in the Black Sea area, but also a key player in the security equations that will take place in the region, as part of NATO and EU. And when talking about the current threats, especially referring to hybrid threats, the reemergence of terrorism and the migration crisis, our country must remain the same reliable partner, strongly attached to the European and Euro-Atlantic values, and to continue to prove our capacity and the capacity of our institutions to adapt and to be a part of the answer to every challenge we are facing.

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# **TURMOIL IN PURSUIT OF MODERNITY AND DEMOCRACY. MAJOR PROCESSES AND POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST THROUGHOUT THE ARAB SPRING AND WINTER<sup>1</sup>**

**Mihai SANDU\***

## **Abstract**

*The 21<sup>st</sup> century is defined by a limited set of concepts, specific to the evolution of humanity, states and societies – stability, peace, welfare, but also tolerance, interculturalism or integrity. all these concepts are characteristic to development, to globalization and, of course, democracy, the engine of welfare, as demonstrated mainly by the western example. the reality of democracy's advantages has been transformed, during the most recent history, in the most important goal of societies and peoples even when the states did not necessarily pursue it.*

*The task for development and democratization, partially natural, partially influenced by external involvements, has been at the center of the evolutions in one of the most troubled regions of the world, that of the middle east and northern africa, from where it has also extended its influences in the neighboring regions.*

*The arab spring, started in 2010, has been most regarded with hope and enthusiasm, as it marked the will to develop. at the same time, this phenomenon was from the very beginning a puzzle, as it happened inside a region seemingly blocked in an ancient mentality dominated by a modern form of feudalism and by social and cultural discrepancies full of restrictions and differentiations, all of which can not be easily removed. The road to democracy, started five years ago, demanded for a modernization of the societies which so far has failed to be achieved, thus turning the spring into a winter which tends to be colder every day.*

*As the most important wheel of the entire process, the population has been at the center of the entire period, marking change in both spring and winter, as*

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*well as reacting to it. the social movements have marked the beginning of the wave, and the movements of population mark the so far climax of it.*

*As the most important component of a society, population is affected by and affecting change, and when people are on the move, it means change is present and about to come, one way or another.*

**Keywords:** Arab Spring, Crisis, Change, Instability, Modernization, Democratization, Failed States, Foreign involvement, Migration.

Started in December 2010, in Tunisia, with a series of public manifestations against the Tunisian leader Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, and further spread in Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, Syria as well as throughout the entire Greater Middle East, the phenomenon known as the *Arab Spring* represented a catalyzing of the desire for change manifested amongst some categories of the population, particularly concerning youth, in the direction of a democratization of the states and societies in the region.<sup>2</sup>

Widely considered as a phenomenon which has characterized the region throughout the entire period of time after the end of the Cold War, mainly due to the transformation processes that have gradually occurred in the area<sup>3</sup>, the Arab Spring can be considered as originating from the transformation process that have covered the Greater Middle East following events in the beginning of the 1990s, such as the manifestations against Saddam Hussein after the end of the First Gulf War in 1991.<sup>4</sup> The large street demonstrations have proved, both in 1990 and especially in 2010-2011, during the *Arab Spring*, the existence of a transition taking place inside the Muslim societies, particularly in the Arab ones, as determined by a combination of circumstances beginning with the occurrence of new generations, influenced by globalization, as well as the consequences of the technological revolution, responsible for the fast spread of ideas of progress, modernization and even democratization throughout the entire region.

Except on Tunisia, however, the movements in 2010-2011 have either been violently suppressed, or have slowly given up ground and eventually died out, even if, in some cases, have managed to determine fragile changes be decided by the governments.

The main explanation for this evolution lies in the huge inter-generational gap, as well as in the absence of a modernization visible and solid enough, including at the mental level, which would have allowed change to occur among states in the Greater Middle East. The violent reply of the autocratic regimes in the region and the propagation of violence have led to the installation of instability in the entire area, particularly visible in states such as Syria or Iraq.<sup>5</sup> Of course, if we have accepted the somehow

exhaustive comparison, largely used in 2010 and 2011, between the *Arab Spring* and the *Spring of Peoples* from 1848 Europe, we can also further accept the idea that, similarly to the European cases, change can't come instantaneously, but rather is announced and preceded by such events and processes.<sup>6</sup>

Moving on, we might say that, once the security crises in the region get solved and the path of several states, such as Syria or Iraq, will be identified in the direction of the rebuilding of state capacity to represent the society and to ensure the necessary conditions for its existence, we might witness a revival of movements such as those started during the *Arab Spring*, all the more as there is an example of success in the region, the Tunisian one, which might become a real example for others.

Having an experience of a republican-shaped form of organization for a short period of time during the '50s, Tunisia currently represents an exception for states in the Greater Middle East after the Arab Spring. Separated from the geopolitical battles that shocked the region particularly during the 2000s, mostly due to the absence of hydrocarbons, we have witnessed the emergence, in Tunisia, of moderate political factions who have come together around political parties that understood the stake of national interests above those dictated by party rationalities and thus succeeded to defeat or sideline the influence and actions of radical Islamist groups, be them domestic or transnational.<sup>7</sup>

Unlike other cases, Tunisia did not witness the destruction of previous institutions, or the fight for power started by coercive groups or factions. The Tunisian recipe was, after 2010, to allow moderate parties, no matter of orientation, to participate in politics, thus organizing parliamentary elections in order to decide upon the fate of the country. A special role was played by the civil society, who chose to consolidate a common voice and position, in the shape of the so-called *Quartet for Democracy*, thus being able to put a significant amount of pressure on the authorities and eventually getting international recognition for the role played in the development of Tunisia and for its democratic approach under the shape of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015.<sup>8</sup>

The Tunisian example can also offer us several possible explanations in regard to the evolution of North Africa. Generally speaking, the countries in this region have always been among the first affected by streams of change, particularly due to their geographic proximity and cultural changes with European Mediterranean states, with whom they have shared commercial and cultural routes across the Mediterranean Sea throughout history. It is eloquent, in this sense, to remind that states such as Tunisia, Algeria and even Morocco, have been among the first affected by political

movements in the '30s, seriously drawing attention upon the decompose of colonial empires before other regions did so. Despite the negative example of Algeria, remarked by its long and difficult transition, Morocco and Tunisia have gained their independence in 1956, with the latest even becoming a republic for a short period of time in 1957.<sup>9</sup>

Coming back to the *Arab Spring*, beyond the geographical aspect, we can identify another explanation for the divergent evolution of events throughout and after the movements in 2010-2011 in the historical continuity of some peoples, particularly in North Africa, such as the Tunisians and the Egyptians, inside more or less the same territories, with a historical state experience and manifesting a solid ethnic, linguistic and socio-cultural experience, unlike other cases, such as Libya, Syria or Iraq, whose history as a state is almost identical with the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>10</sup>

An example with an atypical evolution is Egypt, situated somewhere between the Tunisian recipe and a failed state. The protests that have caused the retreat of president Hosni Mubarak lead to the installment of a minority government, that of the Muslim Brotherhood, and old Islamist organization, who initially tried to win full power, only to be removed and replaced by a return of the army government under the leadership of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a former Supreme Commander of the Egyptian Armed Forces. The paradox of the army's return to power in Egypt lies in the fact that, despite a reemergence of authoritarianism, we don't seem to witness a return of an exacerbated form of nationalism, as somehow expected when looking back into the quite recent history of Egypt, particularly in the case of Gamal Abdel Nasser, but rather the installment of a regime that mainly aims at stability.<sup>11</sup>

Considering the emergence of forces that combine radical Islamism with pan-Arabian nationalism, such as the case of the Islamic State, the kind of paradox such as the one met in Egypt can lead to a viable alternative for the region, mainly due to the fact that it presumes a return of stability. Taking into account the modernization process having proved to be at least incomplete in the region, a stable regime, with a stable state and society, which would avoid abuses and prevent any extremist or radical manifestation, might be a solution not only for Egypt, but also for the entire region.

Unlike Tunisia and, somehow, Egypt, in the negative extreme, we find states like Syria, Iraq or Libya, that can be seen today as what is called *failed states* in literature. The most eloquent case, from this point of view, both when referring to the present and also relevant to the future, is, undoubtedly, the Syrian case. In Syria, the cultural mosaic, based on ethnic



and confessional separations, has always caused major difficulties for the state in managing internal issues, all the more as, following the rise of president Hafez al-Assad, in 1971, the power system was built on clientelistic and family relationships and mostly composed of members of minorities, be them national, ethnical or confessional, particularly the *Alawites*, *Shia*-oriented, whose leaders were the Assad family. This type of organising structure is based on the concept of *asabiyyah*, a solidarity group based on ethnic, confessional and territorial connections or relying on the existence of a common purpose.<sup>12</sup> In Syria, such groups have kept the Baas Party and the Assad family to power, even if it often meant a co-optation of members from other ethnic and confessional groups, leading to representing almost exclusively the own interests of the families or groups in charge without taking into account the situation or interests of the majority of the population.

For people in vast areas within Syria, the modern, laic state, founded after the winning of Syrian independence, has never been fully recognized, all the more as the population has never felt like being fully represented by the factions found to power.<sup>13</sup> For this reason, both in rural areas and in the suburbs, groups of people were established on basis of tribal heritage who got to *de facto* wield power inside their own communities. In the urban environment, as we move away from the center, or, at a national level, from the capital city, the power of the state weakens, becomes permeable and falls into the background. Such a tendency is observable in many states from the Greater Middle East, a viable proof being the power and authority vacuum installed in Iraq and Libya, following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and Muammar al-Qaddafi.

In Syria, like in the other similar states in the region, such differentiations and power vacuums, overlaid on an increasing feeling of dissatisfaction and on the will of change found especially amongst the young population, have led to a behavioral radicalization that happened inside the local communities, due to the fast spread of Islamic ideas through the mass-media and social media. Without an express regulation from the Syrian state, the *Sunni* majority has adopted the veil and long dress in the women clothing, while the mosque became once again the social center for the male population.<sup>14</sup> A decisive role in this sense was played by the existence of the *Al-Jazeera* independent television, who benefitted from the almost unique frame of the region built on the prevalence of the Arab language, as well as by the presence of the Internet, very well spread in Syria and Iraq and who helped the fast and large scale propagation of ideas such as those promoted by jihadist groups also taking advantage over the general wave of popular dissatisfaction.<sup>15</sup>

Benefitting from all these factors and circumstances, radical ideologies have easily and rapidly found adepts throughout the region, spreading at the same time with the increase of distrust in the government, of the anti-western feelings, of the general dissatisfaction and the will of change, as well as following the failure of movements considered part of the *Arab Spring* and once the failure of the process of modernization throughout the Greater Middle East became obvious. Certainly, the most well-known and influential cases of organizations who took advantage over these situations in order to spread their ideas are *Al Qaeda* and, maybe even more relevant in the current context, *ISIS*.

Originating from Iraq, in 2003-2004, as a local branch of *Al Qaeda*, the organization has used its current orientation since the rise to power of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and started the path of a *Sunni awakening* and got called "The Islamic State of Iraq", or *ISI*.<sup>16</sup> Taking advantage over the situation in Iraq, where the minority Sunni population, accommodated with the Sunni leadership during the reign of Saddam Hussein, felt outraged by the discriminations made by the Shia government of Prime-minister Nouri al-Maliki, *ISI* spread its ideas initiating a revanchist ideology in the name of the Sunnis, further fueling the fissure from inside the Islamic world. Afterwards, profiting from the Syrian civil conflict, *ISI* extended their area of influence by getting support from the majoritarian Sunni Syrian population and their conflict with the Alawite leadership of Bashar al-Assad.<sup>17</sup>

Having become *ISIS* after making their presence known in Syria, the organization extends and transforms into one of the main radical and terrorist groups activating in the Greater Middle East, and also into one of the most successful cases of Islamic reawakening and anti-Occidentalism in the history of the region. With a Mafia-type structure, *ISIS* could constantly win from the arms and oil trafficking and created an army who could be conventionally mobilized, benefiting from a performant information apparatus and using a very good propaganda.<sup>18</sup> Taking advantage of the technological revolution and the general will for change unleashed by the Arab Spring, *ISIS* created an unexpectedly efficient presence in the mass means of information, especially on the internet. Further, paradoxically, *ISIS* could combine Islamic fundamentalism, present in the region as an adversary of the 20<sup>th</sup> century laic nationalism, with the *Baas* doctrine, also a secular one.<sup>19</sup> Through this combination, *ISIS* could claim a state structure, proclaiming the *Islamic State*, in June 2014 and adopting the *caliphate* as form of organization.<sup>20</sup>

Apart from the unprecedented challenge that it offers as a terrorist organization, the Islamic State represents a challenge for the current

international order, claiming its statehood and the idea of rebuilding the Arab unity on Islamic bases. Beyond the fact that it thus becomes a much more influential actor in international relations, it constitutes, at the same time, a challenge for the history of the region and its relationship with the West, considered by the followers of the Islamic State as their main enemy. The presence and perpetuity of this actor in the region marks one of the most catastrophic consequences of the failure of modernization in the Greater Middle East, transposed through the failure of the two states currently fueling, at least territorially, the Islamic State.

The symbolic of the success of ISIS comes in direct contact both with the missed process of modernization and with the failure of movements during the Arab Spring, as well as with the presence and the leadership of the West, confronted today, also, with failure. Particularly relevant, from this point of view, is the event that basically founded the Islamic State, on June 10<sup>th</sup>, 2014 – the symbolic elimination of the border at Yaarubiya, that separated Iraq from Syria, an event suggestively named by the ISIS followers as *the destruction of the Sykes-Picot frontier*, creating connections with the secret treaties negotiated by France and Great Britain, following the end of the First World War, regarding the division of the territories of the Ottoman Empire into French and British spheres of influence.<sup>21</sup>

Modernization in the Middle East has had a few characteristics that proved nefarious at the very least. First of all, it has been achieved in three main directions: military, economic, and political, creating expectations that could not be equaled with results. Performed very fast and almost without a precedent in the history of the region, modernization has led to the power take-over by groups who created autocracies, mostly military, while in the economic sphere, despite the discovery of oil and its advantages, wealth was taken over by the same groups found to power, or by the western forces who benefited from fossil fuels, all while poverty has perpetuated amongst the majority of population. All these factors constantly created instability, determining the population to permanently search for culprits with the West coming every time as the handiest.<sup>22</sup>

On the other hand, the modernization process in the region focused to a very small scale on the social and cultural aspect, creating a gap between the high political and economic environment and the population stuck in a stance that is strongly impregnated with traditional elements and which could therefore easily be influenced by radical groups and their ideologies. Last but not least, it becomes obvious that modernization was performed gradually and many times the former progresses had been taken away before initiating a new process of reforms. The example of the military

dictatorships that have removed the government and administrative systems instituted by the West before and after the end of the Second World War, as well as that of the authoritarian governments, either radical or taken over by minorities, such as the case of Syria, Iraq or the Islamic Republic of Iran, all represent clear evidence in this direction.

Under the circumstances, the incomplete character of the process of modernization in this region not only deepened the social discrepancies, but also created social, economic and political mutations, very hard to understand and to manage. An example of such mutation is the Baas Party, as is also the clientelistic organizing system that we can found in Syria today. So much as secularism has often been perceived as being conflictual with its own tradition derived from religion, in the economic field, the capitalist system has many times provoked major dissatisfactions amongst the population who witnessed as the economic power, organized according to western influences and models, was held more and more by a rich social stratum that kept widening social divergences by gaining wealth from the loans granted to regular population and often using this situation to impose disastrous conditions to debtors. Replacing the role held by the banks in the Western world, such persons or social groups, also known as *waqfs*<sup>23</sup>, didn't only implement the ideas and the capitalist economic system for their own benefits thus creating a new deviation of modernization, but also create new reasons for mutiny among the population, a mutiny that was afterwards directed both against their own governments and against the Western structures and states, often considered the main responsible for their situation.

Last but not least, modernization, much like the democratization process that follows it, are represented inside the scientific literature as a partnership between generations, perceived both as a social contract, as well as an economic one, represented by the distribution of income and costs between generations, both when referring to the *macro* level or the entire society.<sup>24</sup> Although it also constitutes a challenge for the developed societies in Europe or the West in general, with cases where the following generations became impoverished by the actions or the debts left behind by the former ones, this partnership constitutes, in time, one of the foundations of modernization – an unwritten understanding that perpetuates progress and development and sometimes leads to change, the young generations being characterized by dynamism and being the first affected by the major social, economic and political trends.

In the Greater Middle East, one of the main characteristics from a demographical point of view of the past quarter century is the increase of young population and its share inside the society. In the general context of

the so-called *global political awakening*, this population sector is by far the most predisposed both to change and to violent manifestations driven by the will to change, no matter what is the direction of this desire. Leading the process of change through their fast and handy access to means of mass information, particularly referring to Internet and Social Media, youth in the Middle East today represent by themselves an acceleration of history, so much as they also represent a proper environment for a return to traditional ideas.<sup>25</sup>

Another problem connected to the demographical evolution of the region is represented by the increasing percentage of urban population, as a result of a spectacular urbanization and a massive migration registered throughout the past two or three decades, from the rural areas to the cities, that modified radically and in a very short period a predominantly rural society, whose traditionalism and social organizing were synonyms to the tribal social and political structural organization.<sup>26</sup> The result of these processes was the creation of a veritable social mutation that determined the appearance, in the urban environment, of centers of spreading traditional ideas that easily got represented by radical Islamic ideas, founded, also, on strong traditional elements connected mainly to the Islamic *sharia*.

For many western theoreticians and political analysts, the main problems implied by the tense situation in the Middle East are connected to the presence of terrorism and the risk of its proliferation, fueled by the presence and emergence of radical social and political trends, including through a possible acquisition of mass-destruction and even nuclear weapons, in a worst-case scenario. "Blocking this combination involves politics regarding counteracting and fighting against terrorism, the achievement of nonproliferation, ensuring a better protection of foreign nuclear materials and, particularly, creating stability in the Middle East and increasing the attention given to failed states".<sup>27</sup>

The solution for the last two problems mentioned earlier has been regarded for a long time as a matter of increasing economic and educational growth in the region, of developing and supporting civil society and an increase of political participation, particularly in what concerns the young population. Solutions of this kind have been, however, dismantled, in turn, by the failure of the Arab Spring, by the prevalence and the multiplication of failed states throughout the region and, particularly, by the Islamist resurgence happened simultaneously with a retreat of the Western involvement largely determined by West's own strategic analysis that often tend to exclude the situation in the states from the Greater Middle East.

In the context of the negative outcome of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and of the disastrous management of recent crises in Libya, Syria and Iraq, the western presence and its influence are perceived more and more in a negative and less quantitative manner in a region that can entirely collapse in the not-so-far future. The lack of a foreign leadership that would moderate the powerful sectarian divisions inside the Islamic world and which would manage the establishment and stabilization of institutions, in a region that has almost never been left alone at least in the past century, and that hasn't yet completed its early modernization process, has accelerated the disintegration processes under way in many states in the region and will most likely lead to a perpetuation of instability. This is even more possible taking into consideration that, on the internal level, we are dealing with authoritarian and abusive governments that no longer represent the population in its entirety and that can no longer ensure the existence of state as a whole. No matter of the position of looking at this evolution, the western forces have had a significant contribution to the current situation and may very well have to perform an emergency return in the region, whether they desire for it or not, particularly taking into consideration the current migration crisis and the reemergence of terrorism that practically made the Greater Middle East come into the West.

Furthermore, we must take into account the situation in the more stable, modernized and stronger states in the Greater Middle East, whose eventual destabilization may lead not only to the perpetuation and extension of instability in the region, but also to further destabilizing the entire international system, with particular reference to the Republic of Turkey. Being amongst the first countries in the region that has oriented itself after the western models of development and modernization and on secular bases, Turkey currently distinguishes itself from the other countries and societies in its part of the world by developing and constantly consolidating, for the past hundred years, institutions, as well as economic and political practices specific to western-shaped development.<sup>28</sup>

Furthermore, after the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey through the constitution in 1928, the Islamic law, *sharia*, has been replaced by laws influenced from the European experiences, while the institution of the *caliphate* fell into the background and had its influence on the Turkish society diminished and being later abandoned. This model represented the debut of the secular system in the Greater Middle East, being at least partially imported throughout the region for the entire 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>29</sup>

Being a strong model as well as the most important center of stability in the region, along with Saudi Arabia and Israel, Turkey has the

capacity to largely influence the processes taking place in the region, both on a political level, and perhaps, most important, on a social level.

On a social scale, Turkey is by far the most important actor in tackling the migration crisis that has affected the region particularly during the last year. Considering the fact that it represents the main target for refugees and economic migrants in the most destabilized areas in the Greater Middle East, especially Iraq and Syria, as well as the main transit country on their road to Europe, Turkey's stability is directly influencing the migration flow as well as the security of the European countries in the Mediterranean and, by extension, of the European Union as a whole. The decisions assumed at the EU-Turkey Summit in March 2016 prove that Turkey represents the key actor in managing the migration crisis and the possible terrorist infiltrations that might occur.<sup>30</sup>

So far, migration has had a twisted and inconstant evolution, with various moments that have determined sudden increases of migration both throughout the region, and outside of it, with the main target being the European Union and particularly the northern part of it.

Throughout the 2000s, we have witnessed several moments of raise in the migration numbers from the region to Europe, particularly determined by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as due to economic reasons. The outburst of the Arab Spring at the end of 2010 has triggered serious fears inside the European Union of massive waves of migrants taking their way to Europe, due to the increasing instability, particularly after most of the democratic movements ended up in prolonged crises of instability in countries such as Egypt, Yemen and particularly Iraq and Syria, all being somehow doubled by the economic crisis that covered almost the entire world in 2010-2011.<sup>31</sup>

The evolutions up to and following the events in the *Arab Spring* did not, however, immediately justify the existing fears. The only solid exception has been represented by the European Mediterranean countries, whose history in dealing with migration from the Middle East or Northern Africa had led before to specific agreements signed with countries of origin, such as the case of Egypt, Tunisia and Italy, or Morocco and Spain. Also, another particularity was represented by migration inside the region, with massive amounts of people targeting countries richer in resources and with a well-developed industry, such as Saudi Arabia or Libya before the civil war in 2011. This kind of migration, however, was a rather irregular one, manifesting under the shape of a migration of the labor force and with people often returning to their homelands where they helped the economic development in a significant manner.<sup>32</sup>

The situation dramatically changed, however, following the Libyan crisis in 2011, as well as after and due to the situation in Iraq, Syria and even Egypt, where the prolonged instability, manifested by very fast changes in the governmental forces created a crisis that affected the Egyptian population. From a country used to receive migrants, Libya transformed into a serious emigration spot, with Libyans spreading across the already unstable region in 2011. Following the Libyan example, the prolonged civilian and political crisis in Syria has determined Syrians to flee from their homeland in search of security, most of them settling in other countries in the region, particularly Lebanon, Turkey or Jordan.

The situation in Syria was doubled by the instability in Iraq, another failed state in the region, as well as by the emergence of *ISIS* and the proclamation of the *Islamic State*. The waves of refugees originating from Syria and Iraq couldn't be stopped and started to threaten the stability of the entire region as well as the one of Europe and the European Union, furthermore as the refugees were mixed with economic migrants and perhaps even radicalized persons, connected to the terrorist organizations or to the ideologies they promoted, considering the simultaneous increase of terrorist attacks in Turkey and in the European Union with the boosting of migration.

Despite the apparent solution achieved after the EU-Turkey summit, migration will continue to be one of the main challenges to the security and stability to both the region of origin, as well as to Europe and the European Union. As we are witnessing the extension and deepening of the crises in Syria, Iraq or Libya, and the spread of instability throughout the entire Greater Middle East, it will be very difficult to tackle the migration crisis from afar, without a strong involvement of both Western organizations and states as well as other major actors in the international sphere.

Examples of stability, such as Saudi Arabia, the Arabia monarchies in Bahrain or Jordan, and even the fragile Egyptian example, or those where the transition towards democracy has so far achieved some success, such as the case of Tunisia, can, of course, be exported in the region as a counterweight to the ascension of radical Islamism. At the same time, it is equally probable to witness, in the near future, a perpetuation of state failures that can lead to a failed region.

The evolution of states in the Greater Middle East and of the entire region as a whole, during the past decades, reveal a world found in an ongoing process of self-defining and transformation, in a period in which dynamism is the main particularity on a political, economic, social and cultural level. Without succeeding in revealing a general model or a stable



settling of the region, the past decades, with a special emphasis on the current one, prove the existence, in the region, of a succession of events and processes leading to a grim outcome, at least for the moment, both from the internal perspective of the region, as well as in regard to the relationship with the West.

Without having a single possible line of evolution in the region, the Greater Middle East represents one of the most dynamic hot areas in the world, with the potential to become the starting place of a change of the international order as we know it, insomuch as it represented in the past the source and cradle of civilization. Whether this change will be for better or for worse, the answer depends on a broad framework of factors, among which there definitely are the processes of modernization and stabilization of the region, as well as the rational, well and correctly confined as well as integrative involvement of external forces, both from the regional proximity, and in what regards the major powers, including, and, perhaps especially, the Western ones.

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# INSIDERS – A NEED-TO-KNOW FOR MANAGERS AND SECURITY PERSONNEL

Florin BUȘTIUC\*

## Abstract

*The effectiveness of an individual in meeting security responsibilities is proportional to the degree to which the individual understands them.*

*So it is important for managers and security personnel to understand that insiders exist and what to do about them, because insider threats are influenced by a combination of technical, behavioral, and organizational issues and must be addressed by policies, procedures, and technologies.*

*And this is a necessity, because the thief who is harder to detect and who could cause the most damage is the insider – the employee with legitimate access, who is stealing information or products in order to benefit another organization or country. So, an insider can have a negative impact on national security and industry.*

**Keywords:** security responsibilities, insider threats, legitimate access

The overall objective of the organization is to protect values such information (decisions), image/reputation, financial resources, products, services, personnel, equipment and physical spaces etc. Briefly, the organization regulates its protection on these dimensions: document security (access, copying, destruction, transmission, transport etc), security of its IT and communication systems (access, copy, delete, storage, encryption etc.), physical security (delimitation of the physical space for manipulation and storage of its data and products, the implementation of the technical systems involved in protection - video surveillance, alarms, cabinets etc.) and security personnel (selection criteria, verification procedures, indicators describing vulnerabilities / threats etc).

In today's society defined as "information society" the fundamental benchmark with regard to security/protection is the human component,

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both as originator/user of the information and equipments/systems, and as protective factor.

And whether within the organization relevant information is being circulated (classified, confidential, internal use only, economic secrets, banking secrets etc) which if exposed/modified in an unauthorized (and illegal) manner would have a negative impact in terms of economic or financial or functional level, then the integrity of staff, reflected in fairness, trust, responsibility, with outcome in taking charge of the objectives, rules of requirements the organization (and meeting them) becomes all the more important.

Moreover, currently, the organizations have grown aware and supplemented the most basic ingredient of the human component – competency- with integrity. Therefore, the emergence, functioning and continuity of an organization has as fundamental necessity the existence of staff (and partners) with traits and behaviors that are reflected in using the values of the organization in their professional activity according to its efficiency and integrity requirements<sup>1</sup>. „Corporations, large or small, need to know that the employees, vendors, contractors, suppliers, resellers, brokers, and whatever partners they choose to work with are who they say they are, have the credentials they claim to have, and operate with overall honesty and integrity...The decision to work with, trust, and grant access to sensitive company data is, no doubt, a monumental one”.<sup>2</sup>

The emphasis is on the requirement of integrity in work, based on the argument that lack integrity can negatively impact efficiency. The need arises for methods to identify character traits or behavior that indicate lack of integrity, as a necessary step in assessing "compliance for starting/continuing professional activity" ("professional compliance").

Therefore, personnel security aims to prevent the emergence of situations where some individuals *exploit legitimate access to the organization's values and affect those by different actions or inactions such as espionage, unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information, fraud, theft, sabotage, facilitation of third party access.*


Such an individual reveals himself as *an internal threat and is defined as insider* (depending on the activity, an insider may affect national security, the security of critical infrastructure or the security of the organization).

An insider may fall into the following categories: a) **preset insider** - person enrolling in the organization with the deliberate intention to exploit legitimate access to the organization's values, b) **self-generated insider** - a person that did not have that intention initially, but at some point decided (amid vulnerabilities) to exploit legitimate access, c) **built**

**insider** - a person that did not have that intention , but is pushed (amid vulnerabilities) by a third party to exploit legitimate access.

To the goal of certifying "compliance for starting/continuing professional activity" a thorough review is needed, of behavioral indicators that qualify the person as an actual/potential internal threat to the organization, that is an insider.

Figure 1 – SECURITY & INSIDER



“Most insiders are discovered through monitoring, mistakes, or through an organization receiving tips. To help prevent this activity at the time of hire, an organization can conduct employment and education verification, civil and criminal background checks, county record checks, multi-state fingerprint checks, credit checks, substance abuse checks, even national FBI background checks. Additionally, a periodic review of employees makes good sense to ensure that the person originally hired is the same as the person presently employed. Depending on the organization, some of these checks may be overkill, but for mission-critical environments containing sensitive information, they are merited. It is important to talk with various stakeholders such as executive management, legal and human resources to first determine what the disqualifying issues may be”<sup>3</sup>.

It was found that in most cases, getting employment in an organization (or establishing contractual relationships involving access to organizational values) is not a premeditated means for using access in unauthorized (illegal) ways. A person becomes an insider in the context of the emergence of vulnerabilities/motivations that relate to personality characteristics/behavior or circumstances that may be exploited to influence a person to commit an act against protecting information. We have the following vulnerabilities:

- *Personal problems* - divorce, bankruptcy, medical problems, addiction are factors that create the possibility of exercising influence by concerned external factors.

- *Disloyalty* - belonging to different groups, ownership or use of large sums of money (large-scale financial fraud), exploitation of security knowledge to determine any deficiencies

- *Feelings of revenge* - generated by the existence of a tense atmosphere, measures that are perceived as unfair.

- *The need for money* - payment of debts resulting from gambling; stinging lifestyles.

- *Mental or emotional disorders/alcohol* - shows up in equivocal/disorganized behavior. These people can be used for criminal purposes directly (by coercion) or indirectly, by exploiting the "gray" areas in their field of responsibility.

- *Ideology* - some individuals adhere to certain values / ideas which, in their view, are "not respected" in social practices and actions of the institution, and therefore they disclose information.

- *Vanity* (often correlated with lack of professional appreciation) - they attempt to harm through the discovery and exploitation of vulnerabilities for demonstrating that they are competent.

### **Pre-insider indicators**

Pre-insider indicators are originated in the selection process in which preliminary verification is performed by using specific minimal tools - *CV, the standard form, the protective interview, references* - and involves collecting and verifying information. Moreover, the specificity of preliminary verification consists in establishing professional compliance - data are collected about the "real" motive of the termination of contractual relations, the level of professional performance, relational abilities, behavioral traits and habits at work - *a repeated/frequent behavior is a predictor of integration, integrity and efficiency levels in future employment*, and therefore focuses on identifying characteristics such as *underqualification, lack of professional involvement and vulnerabilities* (additional to detection of inconsistencies between what the candidate said and reality).

If a candidate misled others by presenting some aspects false in the resume and standard interview forms (and premeditated that references not disclose some factual information putting him at an disadvantage), a legitimate question arises, which is associated with the concept of integrity /honesty - *If he is currently trying to deceive will he do likewise in the future? (If the person lied to be eligible for a job, is he likely to keep on lying in order to keep it; thus the selection process is a test of character).*

In the course of pre-employment checks a number of factors may, individually or in combination, raise concern about the integrity or reliability of the applicant. These factors include<sup>4</sup>:

- *involvement in illegal activities*
- *unsent criminal conviction relevant to the role, particularly if not volunteered by the applicant and only revealed by other checks*
- *false or unsubstantiated claims on CV or application form*
- *unsubstantiated qualifications*
- *unexplained gaps in employment history*
- *discrepancies in career histories, e.g. applicants being overqualified or underqualified*
- *dubious spontaneous applications*
- *adverse references*
- *questionable documentation e.g. lack of supporting paperwork or concern that documents are not genuine*
- *evasiveness or unwillingness to provide information on the part of the candidate*

In our opinion, pre-insider indicators are filling a gap in the preliminary verification – nowadays it is difficult to get references from

previous workplaces exposing characteristics such as *underqualification*, *lack of professional involvement* and *vulnerabilities*; references are habitually limited to workplace and position confirmation, for ruling out calumny charges, defamation and private life intrusions.

### **Indicators for intervention by counseling - type 1 indicators**

Type 1 indicators point to personality traits that can produce undesired effects in workplace interactions. Where self control is underdeveloped, feelings of disgruntlement, dissatisfaction, frustration can lead to the emergence of "acts of revenge/punishment" which collide with the values of the organization. With respect to these indicators we hold as necessary an early intervention by counseling, with behaviour adjustment as the desired outcome. The traits involved are<sup>6</sup>:

- *Immature* (e.g. lacks life experience, is naïve and requires excessive guidance, has difficulty making life decisions);
- *Low self-esteem* (e.g. lacks confidence, is extremely dependent on recognition and praise, struggles to cope well with adversity, setbacks and difficult tasks);
- *Amoral and unethical* (e.g. lacks moral values or personal integrity, acts in an unscrupulous manner and shows no remorse, engages in unethical behaviour);
- *Superficial* (e.g. lacks a sense of identity and is hard to get to know, provokes a range of different opinions among people in the workplace);
- *Prone to fantasising* (e.g. believes they are engaged in activities that have no basis in reality, likes to create the impression that they are engaged in something special);
- *Restless and impulsive* (e.g. requires constant stimulation and cannot tolerate boredom, needs or seeks instant gratification and does whatever feels good in the moment, shifts from one thing to another);
- *Lacks conscientiousness* (e.g. does not comply with rules, neglects responsibilities and is unconcerned with duties and obligations, shows poor attention to detail and demonstrates poor judgement, shows a lack of focus);
- *Manipulative* (e.g. uses charm to get their own way and is very persuasive, nurtures relationships and manipulates others to serve their own self-interest, tends to adopt whatever position or attitude will result in getting their own way);
- *Emotionally unstable* (e.g. is prone to exaggerated mood swings, overreacts to problems, complains about unimportant or trivial things);
- *Evidence of psychological or personality disorders.*



### **Indicators for intervention by soliciting clarifications – type 2 indicators**

Type 2 indicators describe actual deeds of the persons which border the “negative interpretations” or go as far as violate organizational security /administrative rules. The emergence of such indicators calls for immediate request for clarification, so as to prevent the person and others from inferring that trespassing rules or occurrences of atypical situations have no relevance whatsoever, making some requirements theoretical only (without practical application). The indicators are as follows<sup>5</sup>:

- *Undue curiosity or requests for information about matters not within the scope of the individual’s job or need-to-know.*
- *Unauthorized removal or attempts to remove classified, export-controlled, proprietary or other protected material from the work area.*
- *Offering extra income from an outside activity to a person with a sensitive job, in an apparent attempt to entice that person into some unspecified illegal activity.*
- *Any part-time employment or other outside activity that may create a conflict of interest with one's obligation to protect classified or other sensitive information, and that has not been approved by the security office.*
- *Unexplained affluence, or life-style inconsistent with known income. Includes sudden purchase of high-value items or unusually frequent personal travel which appears to be beyond known income. Sudden repayment of large debts or loans, indicating sudden reversal of financial difficulties.*
- *Irregularities in personal environments (lavish lifestyle, signs of alcoholism, drug addiction, compulsive gambling or excessive debts).*
- *Working odd hours when others are not in the office without a logical reason, or visiting work areas after normal hours for no logical reason.*
- *Shows unusual interest in the personal lives of co-workers; asks inappropriate questions regarding finances or relationships.*

### **Indicators for pre-confirming acts of espionage, fraud, theft, sabotage - type 3 indicators**

Type 3 indicators rule out the assumption that a person "does not know what they're doing" or "actions do not pose a real problem." In most cases, actions/inactions have a correspondent in violation of default security rules, supposedly introduced explicitly in official documents of

the organization, and generating application of at least some administrative sanctions.

Whether in relation to indicators of type 1 and 2 peers/managers can argue they didn't notice that entirely noticeable behaviours may signify a security issue, the distinctive characteristic of type 3 indicators is "reasonable evidence", which urges an active attitude to directly signal the existence of a security issue.

What should it be reported directly? Because otherwise the principle of diffusion of responsibility becomes operational- maybe someone else noticed too and will report it – leading thus to loss of important time for a preventive intervention, at the time when is very likely that interests/values of the organization are about to be compromised, which consequences up to major disruptions/extinction of the organization putting at risk everyone's own job (and financial resources). We have the following indicators<sup>6</sup>:

- *Asking others to obtain or facilitate access to classified or unclassified but protected information to which one does not have authorized access.*
- *Obtaining or attempting to obtain a witness signature on a classified document destruction record when the witness did not observe the destruction.*
- *Retention of classified, export-controlled, proprietary, or other sensitive information obtained at a previous employment without the authorization or the knowledge of that employer.*
- *Extensive use of copy, facsimile, or computer equipment to reproduce or transmit classified, sensitive, or proprietary material which may exceed job requirements.*
- *Taking classified materials home or on trips, purportedly for work reasons, without proper authorization.*
- *Bringing cameras or recording devices, without approval, into areas storing classified or other protected material.*
- *Storing classified material at home or any other unauthorized place.*
- *Disregards company computer policies on installing personal software or hardware, accessing restricted websites, conducting unauthorized searches, or downloading confidential information.*
- *Maintaining ongoing personal contact, without prior approval, with diplomatic or other representatives from countries with which one has ethnic, religious, cultural or other emotional ties or obligations, or with employees of competing companies in those countries.*

- *Concern that they are being investigated; leave straps to detect searches of their work area or home; searches for listening devices or cameras.*

- *Attempt to conceal any activity covered by one of these indicators.*

In isolation, the indicators cannot certify that the person is likely to be involved with espionage, sabotage, fraud or theft, but they can be joined using the following rules:

- Existence of one or more type 3 indicators denotes a maximum probability that the person is involved in illegal activities.

- Type 3 indicators are sufficient, not requiring conformation of additional type 1 or 2 indicators, but they do require verifications, starting with technical means of identification and monitoring atypical / unusual cyber activities.

- Type 1 or 2 indicators denote a medium likelihood and makes mandatory countermeasures for identifying type 3 indicators through interviews with managers/peers and technical monitorization in search of atypical / unusual cyber activities.

- Isolated type 1 or 2 indicators denote minimal likelihood but, nonetheless, require identification of adjustable behavioural traits or reactivity to certain social-relational contexts that produced the indicator. The process of identification can be viewed as useful for testing the availability and willingness of the subject for being approached by: a) interviews with the person concerned and requests for completion of security forms tailored for identification of denial/diverting attitudes / behaviors; b) depending on reaction, discussing the case within the workgroup, both to the end of adjusting the undesired behaviours and signalling the necessity for the group to support the adjustment, as well as react promptly to deviations from the authorized activities; c) implementation of technical means of identification and monitoring atypical/unusual cyber activities.

The use of indicators attempts to build a predictive model for addressing the probability of occurrence/existence of an insider.

In the context, it's viable to object that some behaviors/attitudes can be exhibited by "normal" persons in terms of integrity, and that it is impossible for anyone not to be forced at some moment to face stress stimuli or difficulties generating insider-like behaviours. But it is unlikely for these behaviours to be exhibited simultaneously by a majority within the group (provided that this kind of devious behaviours are still an undesired exception – and not regular - within the group).

We hold the differentiation of indicators, their correlation and the quantifying of the "seriousness" of the interventions based on indicators effective for avoiding extremism by interpreting behaviours in a exclusively negative and suspicious way.

And referring to interventions, it is appropriate to present some **protective principles** that limit the potential damages:

*Need- to-Know* - access to information is granted individually only to persons who, for service duties, must work with such information or have access to them; it follows that access to information will not be granted based on function, position or access authorization.

People need to be aware of their obligation to ensure privacy, keep sensitive materials in predefined areas, to verify whether a person requesting information truly has need-to-know, and need to follow internal procedures in place to prevent unauthorized access to that information.

*Least privilege* - everyone's access to the IT systems is limited to the level allowing them to perform their duties. This minimizes the consequences that may result from unauthorized use, accident or error.

*Separation of professional duties* - a particular area / theme should not be fully controlled by one person ; cooperation should be mandatory for the fulfillment of the overall objective.

*Authentication* - the identity of the person should be cross-checked, and not based on physical control sequence only.

*Access control* - the physical control sequence which involves both monitoring and direct intervention by designated staff.

Moreover, we evaluate as reasonable the assumption that a security perspective should consider a "limited naivety", because persons performing or planning illegal activities will do their best to avoid being discovered or to get caught in a revealing context. Therefore, the indicators are a useful tool for facilitating preventative interventions and contain damage. And the indicators refer to behaviors, not individuals.

Also, the relation between the organization and individual complies with the rules of fair play since the studies on insider behaviour are public, indicators are public, and the organization explicitly states what is prohibited and uses minimal intervention for warning.

So why would someone whose overall behaviour or early behavioural traits is insider-like, and following a "warning" do not reduce but enhance their uncompliant behaviors, all in continuing work within the organization, be entitled to claim they're being approached unfairly?

In order to avoid all possible questions, we recommend that members of the organization be introduced to its security policy towards an

insider, to what behaviours are not accepted, to what support interventions will be initiated on their identification and, finally, which are the serious offences leading to termination of contractual relations and sanctions pursued administratively or criminally.

Finally, we consider that the issue of insider would fall, in terms of principles/concepts of the Romanian intelligence in the area of training and counterintelligence protection.

Counterintelligence training creates the skill to seize behaviors/actions specific to an intelligence entity/interest group in social-relational contexts, thus protecting against initiation and development of a relationship that would be exploited for: unauthorized disclosure (voluntary or not) of confidential information (starting with vulnerabilities, personal difficulties and up to secrets); facilitating access in areas of interest, access to documents, equipment, etc; indirectly helping with approaching people of interest (by disclosing biographical details and psychological characterization).

Counterintelligence protection is the defensive activity of protecting values, and which is run mainly by the security department by managing threats, vulnerabilities and risks posed by the human factor.

Why? Because the primary risk posed by an insider is the use, dissemination and/or unauthorized modification of information. From a pragmatic point of view, it can be implied that insiders' access to information and inner working of the organization can eventually make the organization vulnerable to insiders' ability to affect other organizational values too.

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<sup>1</sup> effectiveness/efficiency is the achievement of tasks/professional responsibilities (quality of results); integrity refers to preserve the values of lawfulness, loyalty, honesty, discretion and responsibility.

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# ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF RUSSIAN EMBARGO ON THE ROMANIAN FOOD SECURITY

**Bogdan BAZGĂ\***

## **Abstract**

*The main topic of this article is the role of food security as fundamental component of Romania national security. The author analyzes the influence of agriculture and agricultural policies on food security of Romania in the context of sustainable development and Russian embargo. Sustainable development, one of the components of food security, refers to both socio-economic factors, as well as those that have a major impact on population. As far as food security is part of complex social, economic, political, cultural contexts, it is difficult, if not impossible, to detach the role of agriculture from food security and food production, rural agricultural reform and economic development. Russia is the third food trade partner of the EU and the recent embargo has made the exports to fall. Food prices decreased, the European farmers are looking for funds to cover their losses in fruits and vegetables sector and are seeking for new food markets. The direct impact on Romanian food market may not be so crucial, because Romania is not a major partner for Russia, but there is also pressure that comes from the other European members which export food on Romanian market and generate competition for the domestic production. New markets have already been found and the competitors are divided between winners and less lucky countries that bear the embargo's consequences. According to many experts, the food security of a country is the most important dimension of its national security. A country has food security only when it has enough available food and agricultural products to provide nutrition for all its inhabitants, while ensuring forage for animals and water in case of natural disasters, crises, war, etc. Food insecurity may generate internally social tensions and convulsions can physically and psychologically damage population, may create economic and political instability, and externally may generate unwanted political, economic and diplomatic tensions that endanger the national security.*

**Keywords:** food security, security, agricultural policies, price volatility, agriculture, Russian embargo.

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## **Introduction**

The Russian Government adopted a list of products that are banned for a period of one year from the EU, United States, Norway, Canada and Australia. These products cover almost all milk and dairy products, meat products fruits and vegetables, as well as fish and crustaceans. These restrictions put serious pressure on the European agro-food sector because of the temporary loss of a significant commercial market and because of possible cascade effects leading to oversupply on the internal market given the volumes involved and the quantity of perishable products banned in full harvesting season. The EU sanctions on Russia from 31 July 2014 represented a turning point for the economy of the majority of the European Member States, regarding to food production and goods markets. The sanctions were imposed by sectors and included two rounds led by the USA. The Western countries sanctions targeted sectors as energy, finance, defense and high-tech<sup>1</sup>. Soon after that, Russia officially announced the ban of food imports with fruits, vegetables, meat, fish and cheese from the USA, Canada, Australia, European Union and Norway, those countries that opposed Russia.

The implications on the European food market will be settled according to economic criteria. On the one hand, the dependence between Russia and EU on food trade will hurt both of them and local food production. In 2013, the EU countries exported about 14 billion dollars worth of food to Russia. Since the ban has entered into force, the EU developed surplus of food products, which pushed down the prices and let countries to experience financial losses. On the other hand, Russia remained the second trade partner of the EU, even if the recent crisis had generated a dramatic drop in sales, by -23%.

The embargo was a choice that Russia made in response to EU sanctions, but in addition it had to face up economic decline, beginning with its currency revalorization. Moreover, the rise of inflation and lower food consumption has been a negative effect in Russia. Even though Russia is now encouraging the modernization of agriculture by increasing domestic production, as most of the food imports are banned from the Western countries, as follows:



Table 1. Value of embargoed food products to Russia, 2013

	Exports to Russia	Exports to extra-EU27	Share of extra-EU exports	Share of total EU exports
	mEuro	mEuro	%	%
Meat	1,177.5	6,375.1	18.5%	3.2%
Fish	153.8	3,322.6	4.6%	0.9%
Dairy	1,348.6	9,427.6	14.3%	3.5%
Vegetables	728.5	3,006.1	24.2%	3.9%
Fruit	1,256.9	3,907.9	32.2%	5.4%
Prepared foods	539.0	5,158.2	10.4%	3.8%
Total	5,204.3	31,197.3	16.7%	3.5%

**Source:** Russian Government – Trade data.  
<http://government.ru/en/search/?q=trade+data&type>

The restrictions will continue as there is no sign from the EU side to come to a common decision to end the sanctions. Food surplus will become a problem on long term, so there is a need for efficient policies to shift perishable items. The EU exports to Russia in 2013 accounted 11 billion euro, meaning 10% from the EU agricultural food exports and the major exporters are worried. The EU markets, including Romania, are the most affected, because 73% of its exports to Russia were banned. According to the European Commission, the most concerned products are: apples, tomatoes, peaches, nectarines, pears, mushrooms, cucumbers, sweet papers and cabbage. These are the products for which exist alternative markets, but it will take time to integrate them in a new food chain.

Table 2. Share of imports from the countries affected by the ban in Russia's total imports of the product in 2013, (in %)


Products	Beef	Pork	Poultry	Fish and seafood	Milk and milk products	Vegetables	Fruits
Australia	4.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.1
Canada	0.0	11.1	0.0	4.1	0.0	0.1	0.0
EU	4.6	58.9	10.6	7.5	37.4	31.9	23.5
Norway	0.0	0.0	0.0	39.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
USA	0.0	0.9	37.7	2.6	0.0	0.3	3.6
Total sanctioned	8.7	70.9	48.3	53.2	38.4	32.3	27.3
World	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

**Source:** UN Comtrade, <http://comtrade.un.org/>

On the European level (EU 28), a fundamental negative macroeconomic impact regarding to Gross Domestic Product will be seen in Lithuania (2,6% share of exports to Russia in GDP, in 2013), Estonia (0,4%) and Latvia (0,3%), on the assumption that no alternative markets could be found. Finland and The Baltic States are the larger cheese partners with Russia (85% of these countries' cheese exports) and this sector seems to be the most affected by the ban. Thus, the Nordic and Baltic states are the most exposed to retaliatory measures of Russia, because they are strongly dependent of Russian gas and have more developed trade relations with their neighboring country to the east.

For a further understanding of food trade between the EU and Russia, it is absolutely crucial to mention that the two actors had a very close trade relationship since 1997, when they joined the *Partnership and Cooperation Agreement* and that bilateral trade and investments usually grow fast. Russia gained its membership in WTO in 2012 and a New Agreement with the EU is still in progress for a predictable and more stable economic partnership. Until 2008 their economies had an upward trend, interrupted by economic crisis, but still in progress in 2012.

Figure 1. The EU trade flows and balance with Russia, 2005-2014



**Source:** European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade.  
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/>

The common goal of both sides is to develop harmonious economic relations as well as promotion of trade and investment. The EU is the most important investor in Russia, 75% of Foreign Direct Investment stocks in Russia coming from EU Member States. The following table will provide indicators of foreign direct investment between 2010-2013 and its annual growth:

Table 3. The EU Foreign Direct Investment to Russia

indicator	unit	2010	2011	2012	2013
stocks: inward	Billions of euros	50.3	57.2	76.6	36.2
stocks: outward	Billions of euros	130.6	169.4	189.5	154.8
stocks: balance	Billions of euros	80.3	112.2	112.9	118.6
flows: in	Billions of euros	7.6	3.1	8.4	-2.3
flows: out	Billions of euros	27.7	8.3	16.2	4.7
flows: balance	Billions of euros	20.1	5.2	7.7	7.0

**Source:** European Commission, Directorate- General for Trade.\*  
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc113440.pdf>

### **The map of food products trade after one year of Russian embargo**


The international trade has begun to change since Russia extended the embargo on food imports. Nevertheless, there are negative consequences for both sides, the EU and the rest of the world. Actually, a good analysis should start from Russia and the negative effects from its domestic food market. Then, the world food competition had been divided in winners and losers, as a first impact of the embargo.

Russia is a major importer of the European food products, being more sensitive at dairy products (42%), beef (31%), processed meat (37%) and fruits (32%).<sup>2</sup> European cheese imports are the most important, accounting 87% from Russian imports. The following countries are the most exposed to side-effects, because their share of food products with Russia is high<sup>3</sup>:

- Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Finland - almost 20-30% of their production goes to Russia, especially dairy products;
- Norway – 11% of fish production (mainly salmon);
- Poland – 60% of apples production.

The Russian Government has taken action to replace the missing products and to supply food imports from other countries, on which sanctions have not been imposed, such as countries from Latin America, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, China, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. They succeeded in supplying grain, sugar, vegetable oil and potatoes from local reserves, enough to ensure food security, but fail with the remaining types of food, meaning fish, meat, milk and salt, which all were part of Russian food policy.

Figure 2. The sanctioned countries and the winners of the embargo



**Source:** European Commission,

[http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/russianimportban/pdf/infonote-03-09\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/russianimportban/pdf/infonote-03-09_en.pdf).


Measures have been taken to counteract the growing food prices on domestic market, especially when the traditional partners were gone. Moreover, a problem consists of the competitiveness of the domestic market in term of prices and quality, because most of the food is not processed in Russia. The development of a strong agricultural sector in Russia had been a peripheral target, so it is a lot more to invest in lands, agricultural machinery production and services and research centers until we be able to see a strong recovery. Five projects have been launched to invest in meat, fruits and vegetables domestic production, for which have been allocated 220 billion rubles in 2015. In general, the Russian agricultural sector is now stable and on a growing path to becoming more competitive.

The biggest concern for the European countries is the agricultural production, which generated surplus and an increase of the inflation, being cheaper.<sup>4</sup> This is the main factor that brought satisfaction for several nations and more pressure for others in the international food trade, because is not just the economy that has been threatened, but food security as well.

### Challenges for the EU suppliers to Russia

For more than one year ago, the officials in Brussels have been struggling to find measures in order to soften the impact of food security that could size the value of exports market into half. The main exporters in Russia seemed to be trapped in decisions that offer them alternative solutions in terms of food trade. The major trade partners of Russia, as Germany, Netherlands and Poland are more concerned about the specter of recession across Europe.


Figure 3. The most affected imported goods, 2014-2015



**Source:** Trading Economics.com<sup>5</sup>. <http://www.tradingeconomics.com>

Many European countries suffer because of the decrease in food products prices, a general overview confirming this statement. Poland for instance, the biggest apples exporter in the world is now facing a record in domestic production of apples and the prices of the Spanish peaches and Greek nectarines fall with 50%. The overall food production registered great losses and as a result of the Russian embargo, more than 12 billion euros were lost by the EU in a year.<sup>6</sup> Hence, the European Union has activated an emergency place and said it will support the producers of fruits and vegetables with an estimated budget of 125 million euros. But the European Commission has suspended financial aid to European farmers affected by the Russian embargo on agricultural exports only 10 days after its launch. The amount of requests for money grants to some products is several times higher than the annual value of trade between the European Union and Russia.

Figure 4. Top food suppliers to Russia



**Source:** Source: European Commission

[http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/russianimportban/pdf/infonote-03-09\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/russianimportban/pdf/infonote-03-09_en.pdf)

*Germany* is the most valuable exporter of meat and dairy products for Russia, the biggest export being pig meat. In 2014, the total value of pork sold in Russia worth one billion euro and more than a quarter came from Germany. European meat exporters have found new markets in Philippines, Japan and South Korea and the Russian embargo isn't the major concern for Germany.

- *France's* 27.000 fruits and vegetable farmers produce 100.000 tons of these food products that leave the country, especially for Russia every year<sup>7</sup>. As many lorries are stopped at the Russian border, there is a concern that the glut of fruits and vegetables will flood the EU markets and the prices will be dragged down as well. In France the issues are not about the unsold stocks, but the produce in transit.

- *Netherlands*, the largest exporter of vegetables to the Russian market, is now confronted with a dramatic reduction in prices for their domestic products. The impact of this decrease can be much greater than the effect of the embargo on Dutch vegetables, estimated at around 780 million euros. Its total trade with Russia accounts 9,6% and in 2014 was lower with 0,1%.

- *Poland*, the largest exporter of apples in the world, found in Germany alternative market for part of the production from 2014, as a solution to reduce losses caused by the embargo. However, although there is an alternative market, Poland expects for 2014 losses of 85 million euros, resulting from the embargo.

- *Spain* had 30.000 tons of tomatoes, peaches and mandarin oranges that were sent to Russia and now, like every other European

countries has to discover markets for the general glut from the continent. By contrast, the good thing for Spain is that the wine and olive oil were not included in the embargo.

Following the evidences, an immediate negative impact on prices emerges in some sectors and this applies to situations where there is food surplus (egg, relocation of seasonal and perishable products to EU markets, combined with the difficulties in identifying alternative markets) and for the "psychological" effects which appear with the announcement of the ban. According to several analyzes developed by different working groups, not only the countries that traditionally exported substantial quantities to Russia are affected, but also surplus can expand on domestic markets.

### **What about Romania and its food market?**

This article will reveal something that for much time has raised questions about competitiveness of the Romanian agro-food market. The answer clearly will come if we look at the existing demand and at the following analysis. Fundamental characteristics that transform Romania into a typical agrarian country, whose main component is arable farming are extensive, high employment and the majority of the rural regions, covering 87.1% of the total area of the country. Romania has "55.8% of the area used for agriculture, being competitive at European level and the share of gross value added in agriculture usually accounts between 6,5-7%, which places the country above the EU average of 1.7%"<sup>8</sup>. These statistics indicate that Romania is a country with great potential that makes efforts to invest in sustainable development policies and to integrate the EU standards, with the responsibility to provide food security for its citizens.

This section of our research is looking to establish the evolution of the Romanian food market, the agro-food production for fruits and vegetables and the most affected goods after the Russian embargo. Table.3 reveals the production for the major crops with the statement that Romania recorded a better production in 2013 than the previous year, which means that the economy has made progress since the 2008 financial and economic crisis.



Tabel 4. Total production for Romania's main crops 2010-2013  
(thousands tones)

Major crops	2010	2011	2012	2013
Grains	16713	20842	12824	20940
Wheat	5812	7132	5298	7296
Rye	34	31	18	24
Barley	1311	1330	986	1542
Potatoes	3284	4077	2465	3290
Sugar Beet	838	661	720	1029
Sunflower	1263	1789	1398	2196
Vegetables <sup>1</sup>	3864	4176	3535	3961
Fruits <sup>2</sup>	1420	1480	1129	1280
Grappes <sup>2</sup>	740	880	746	992

1,2 \* including family farms. **Source:** Romanian National Institute of Statistics, 2014<sup>9</sup>.

One of the first consequences of the evolution in Romanian crops production had a crucial positive impact that boosted the agro-food trade, despite of the decline from 2009-2010, due to the effects of international economic crisis. Hence, the Romanian export's offer has diversified and includes mainly raw products. Cereals and oilseeds stand at the top of the Romanian export, from which maize and wheat represent 50% of the total cereals export and rapeseeds and sunflower seeds account 95% of oilseeds export<sup>10</sup>. Romania is also a major exporter of live animals, bovines, sheep's and goats accounting 98% of total live animal exports. This is why Romania became a reliable trading partner with a dynamic agro-food sector, in 2014 recording a surplus in agro-food trade, up by 60% compared to 2013.

The share of its total cereals imports and exports and its major trading partners are included in the table below:

Table 5. Romanian agro-food trade partners for cereals export-import, 2014

Cereals exports	Cereals imports
1. Egypt: \$516.2 million (19.7%)	1. Bulgaria: \$213.8 million (56.1%)
2. Jordan: \$201 million (7.7%)	2. Hungary: \$61.3 million (16.1%)
3. Spain: \$191.1 million (7.3%)	3. France: \$32.3 million (8.5%)
4. Italy: \$166.7 million (6.4%)	4. Moldova: \$9.8 million (2.6%)
5. Netherlands: \$140.1 million (5.3%)	5. Italy: \$9.6 million (2.5%)
6. Libya: \$119.1 million (4.5%)	6. Germany: \$9.5 million (2.5%)
7. Turkey: \$117 million (4.5%)	7. Greece: \$8.3 million (2.2%)
8. Saudi Arabia: \$107.4 million (4.1%)	8. Austria: \$8.1 million (2.1%)
9. Ukraine: \$77.2 million (2.9%)	9. Chile: \$6.6 million (1.7%)
10. Russia: \$69.8 million (2.7%)	10. Serbia: \$6.1 million (1.6%)

**Source:** World's Richest Countries<sup>11</sup>.

[http://www.worldsrichestcountries.com/top\\_romania\\_exporters\\_trade\\_partners.html](http://www.worldsrichestcountries.com/top_romania_exporters_trade_partners.html)

### **Romanian agro-food trade with the Russian Federation and the effects of the embargo**

Romania does not export heavily to Russia and has not been directly affected, but the overall impact of food prices downturn will be a major concern for the food industry, because the products banned may enter on the domestic market at dumping prices. The EU solutions are not satisfactory for Romania, because most of the EU countries will send products at lower prices for big markets and, Romania is a large food market.


Hence, the Romanian exports of vegetables and agro-food products to Russia blew away in 2014 in the first months of the year and reached the value of 69,9 million dollars, 23% higher than 2013, according to Romanian Ministry of Economy. Among the food products that reached the Russian market we count cereals, fruits, seeds, sugar, fruits and vegetables cans, a variety of processed food and cacao. In 2013, Romanian sales of cacao were

almost one million dollars. Moreover, the value of fruits and vegetables exported in Russia accounted 51,5 million dollars, about 2,4% of total Romanian exports to Russia. The most valuable for the Russian market remain the cereals, which worth 45,6 million dollars.

Cereals are the traditional commodity in the Romania - Russian Federation trade and this is why Romania is a net exporter of grains to the Russian market, despite of the decline from 2007.<sup>12</sup> Maize seed seems to be the best selling product among all grains (accounting EUR 10 to 23 million). The other category that is constantly sold on Russian market consists of fruits, in quantities ranging between 1600-3200 tons annually, worth EUR 1,3- 2,5 million. On the strength of the fact that Romania isn't a major exporter of fruits and vegetables to Russia, the embargo's risks are lower.

Still, the dairy market is estimated to be worth around EUR 880 million a year in Romania. Romanian market has felt the impact of over production, the most affected being the milk. The entities from the industry announced the closure of more than 50 dairies, because the hypermarkets prefer private labels produced outside the country, where milk is cheaper because it remained Russian stocks, following the imposition of the embargo.

Figure.5. Romanian Exports of oilseeds, grain and fruits to Russia, 1992-2014



**Sources:** Source: UN Comtrade. <http://comtrade.un.org/labs/BIS-trade-in-goods/?reporter=642&partner=643&commodity=12&year=2013&flow=2>

The policy regulations for fruit and vegetable producers in Romania stipulate compensations from EU funds up to an amount of 3,000 tones, for the market withdrawals, for not harvesting and for green harvesting, according to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, after the extension of the Russian embargo on food products against the EU. The European producers are looking for new markets to maintain their business plans set up at the beginning of 2015. One of the destinations for vegetables, fruit and meat is Romania and this is an indirect concern.

The Russian embargo has not a fundamental impact in Romania, because the food export to Russia is worth only EUR 40 million. As much as 90% of that sum is constituted by corn, sunflower or rapeseed and most of the export consists of hybrid seeds used by farmers in the field. Therefore, the remaining 10% are fruit, sugar, flour, canned food and beverages.

Table 6. The value of embargoed food exports to Russia, 2013

Exporter	Exports to Russia	Extra EU27 exports	Share national extra-EU exports	Share total national exports
	mEuro	mEuro	%	%
LITHUANIA	913.7	1,125.8	81.2%	44.9%
POLAND	836.1	2,205.1	37.9%	10.0%
GERMANY	594.8	3,396.1	17.5%	2.7%
NETHERLANDS	526.8	5,468.7	9.6%	2.1%
DENMARK	377.0	2,871.6	13.1%	4.1%
SPAIN	323.6	2,878.5	11.2%	1.7%
FINLAND	283.4	451.6	62.7%	39.9%
BELGIUM	281.0	1,354.8	20.7%	2.5%
FRANCE	243.7	4,012.6	6.1%	1.6%
ITALY	163.2	2,119.9	7.7%	1.7%
GREECE	119.6	446.1	26.8%	5.8%
AUSTRIA	103.5	484.1	21.4%	3.2%
IRELAND	90.3	706.1	12.8%	1.9%
HUNGARY	78.3	408.3	19.2%	4.8%
ESTONIA	74.8	129.7	57.7%	15.9%
LATVIA	70.1	108.0	64.9%	13.1%
UNITED KINGDOM	39.9	1,468.9	2.7%	0.7%
PORTUGAL	14.8	431.3	3.4%	0.9%
SWEDEN	13.3	410.1	3.2%	0.4%
CYPRUS	13.0	58.2	22.4%	6.5%
CZECH REPUBLIC	11.5	141.9	8.1%	0.7%
BULGARIA	10.0	78.5	12.8%	2.4%
SLOVENIA	9.9	197.3	5.0%	2.1%
SLOVAKIA	6.2	33.1	18.6%	0.9%
LUXEMBOURG	4.5	8.1	55.9%	1.0%
ROMANIA	1.3	55.1	2.4%	0.3%

**Source:** Romanian National Institute of Statistics. [www.incs.ro](http://www.incs.ro)

More pressure on agro-food sector refers to some sort of fruits and vegetables, according to the EU regulations, as follows: tomatoes, carrots, peppers, cauliflower, cabbage, cucumbers, mushrooms, apples, pears, red fruits, grapes, kiwi, lemons, peaches and nectarines.<sup>13</sup> A similar situation of an impossible competition on food markets that stroke the European countries could also be seen at the Romanian farmers, who should keep the prices high in order to counteract the lower prices of food imports and make profit. The European Commission is willing to support the Romanian farmers by an amount of EUR 10 million.<sup>14</sup> The beneficiaries of the support measures may be producer organizations, as well as fruit and vegetable producers who are not members of a producer organization.

Taking into account two key facts, as for instance, that “Russian Federation absorbs more than 10% of the total value of the EU agro-food exports”<sup>15</sup> and the significantly positive trade balance surplus for the EU, it will be a great opportunity in the future for Romania to diversify its trade with the Russian Federation, the geographical proximity being a reliable asset. Thus, there will be a need for a better promotion of wines and processed food, apart from agricultural commodities, which are basic for Romanian agro-food trade with the Russian Federation.

All these targets will stand at the bottom of the capitalization of the potential market and will generate food security in the region.

## **Conclusions**

Russia is the EU’s second-largest market for food and drink and the valuable EU exports have been a support for the EU countries’ GDP. Nevertheless, with the Russian embargo, the GDP of most of the EU Member States is supposed to be modest, according to the European Parliament. Experiencing food surplus will generate financial losses across all Europe and job losses as well.

After the ban, for instance, Dutch tomatoes and cucumbers dropped 80% and the effect could be seen also for Spanish, Italian and Greek farmers, who are selling their agro-food products at lower prices and the profit is 30-50% less. The prices in Czech Republic were down 70% in 2014 than previous year, clear evidence that the ban affects the regional food trade partners.

The risk of a negative macroeconomic impact predicts a loss of 130.000 jobs across the EU-28 bloc, Poland being on the first place with

23.000 jobs lost.<sup>16</sup> The consequences of the embargo are painful for the EU economy and Russia have not foreseen the adverse impact for itself. The decisions had made the GDP falling at faster rates, the inflation grew higher and the capital flew out of Russia.

The target of this article was to show the effects of the Russian embargo over the agro-food trade across the EU. Romania, which is nearby Russia, was hit by a smaller impact food security, but like the majority of the EU countries, is still confronting economic side-effects on its domestic market and international agro-food trade. Currently there have been significant changes in global trade, as for example the growing importance of non-EU markets, development of new logistics, energy and transport corridors, and the development of new forms of virtual marketing. For Romania, exports are the decisive element of its competitiveness. But the average level of export orientation indicates that Romania needs to invest more to provide quality and give evidence of creativity in goods trade. The embargo may not affect so much the Romanian market, but it shows its regional the orientation, competing with countries such as Bulgaria, Italy, Ukraine, and Tunisia or Egypt. To continue promoting exports Romania needs to add value to national value chain.

The solutions for Romanian farmers and for the overall food production should counteract the embargo's effects, as follows:

- Weekly monitoring of market developments and prices fall – price volatility.
- Measures for the compensation, storage and promotion of sales market diversification:
  - Measures to support peaches and nectarines producers;
  - Private storage aid for milk and dairy products;
  - Funds for free distribution of the perishable food.
- Promotion of the EU agro-food products.

The Romanian rural economy, largely dominated by agriculture, is still poorly integrated into the market economy. In today's market economy, how understanding and applying marketing techniques are the main factors that provide the welfare of the rural and urban citizens and the welfare of farmers. Romania must mobilize its resources to find an extension of the scope of the measures and to provide diversification of tools, including the financial instruments that will keep its agriculture

breathing. There are difficult times and no excuse to show weakness, but cooperation and further political measures to overcome a potential food crisis and to limit a situation of instability on the food markets. The analysis is to provide an effective overview on the food security and the possibility to enhance a fundamental support to relaunch the food trade on local and regional markets.

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# AN ANALYSIS ON ILLEGAL MIGRATION – TRENDS, PERSPECTIVES AND APPROPRIATE RESPONSE

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## Abstract

*Looking ahead, everything points to a heightened likelihood of large numbers of illegal border-crossing into the EU and an increased number of migrants in need of assistance from search and rescue operations but also in terms of provision of international protection, in particular in the southern section of the external border of the EU, on the Eastern Mediterranean route and the Central Mediterranean route.*

*Many migrants who crossed illegally are expected to continue making secondary movements within the EU and the security situation within the European Union could become more complicated and dangerous because of the “import” of instability.*

*Taking into account the complicated situation from the Middle East, the illegal migration from the Eastern Mediterranean route and the Central Mediterranean route become more and more a humanitarian problem, many people from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan searching a better life within the EU, which causes big problems to the authorities from countries in this region.*

*Having in attention the humanitarian aspects, the EU organisms, in close cooperation with national authorities must take appropriate measures in order to diminish the risks caused by this phenomenon, which in some condition could be closed related to organized crime and possibly with terrorist acts.*

**Keywords:** migration, facilitators, illegal migration, migration routes, migratory flows

What happens now in Europe regarding migration phenomenon and refugee situation became more and more a humanitarian problem combined with a security problem of the European Union. Thousands of

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people have fled from war in Syria, the ISIS terror in Libya and dictatorship in Eritrea, but what is more dangerous is the resentment, the rejection, the fear directed against these people by some parts of the European Union population. Some extremists performed extremely actions by setting fire to refugee camps, pushing back boats from piers, physical violence inflicted upon asylum seekers or turning a blind eye to poor and helpless people.

In order to diminish the risks related to illegal migration is absolutely necessary to understand better these risks and the entirely migration routes and probably more important to take appropriate measures at the level of the European Union to identify all possible terrorists or smugglers who will try to destabilize the Europe and destroy the European values, especially democracy, stability and cohesion.

What we face nowadays regarding massive migration are effects and not causes, and a pragmatic way to resolve this problem is to intervene at the countries considered origins of migration phenomenon (e.g. Syria, Libya, African countries of interest), and more important to fight actively and directly against the Islamic State terrorist organization.

### **Migration routes into the European Union**

**Western African route** - is defined as the sea passage from West African countries, mainly Senegal and Mauritania, into the Canary Islands. Main nationalities using this route include Moroccan, Senegalese as well as nationals of Niger, Nigeria and Mali. Overall, the level of facilitation of departures from Morocco is low and it tends to be organized by individual smugglers, while migrants originating from West Africa are usually facilitated by loose networks with no permanent structure.

The migratory pressure from West Africa towards the Canary Islands was highest in 2006. That year saw almost 32,000 illegal border crossings – at the time the highest on the European scale<sup>1</sup>. After the 2006 peak, the following year saw a 60% decrease in the number of irregular migrants arriving in the Canary Islands. The reasons for this drop included: 1) two bilateral agreements signed between the Spanish authorities and those of Mauritania and Senegal, 2) a number of repatriation agreements with the migrants' countries of origin, 3) installation of the SIVE maritime surveillance system along the Spanish coast and, 4) the overall strengthening of border control activities, including Joint Operation "Hera" coordinated successfully by Frontex.

The years 2008-2012 saw a steady decrease in the number of migrants arriving in the Canary Islands and by 2012 there were just 170 reported cases with departures almost exclusively from Morocco. In 2013 and 2014 the migratory trend remained relatively stable.

Meanwhile, however, a slight increase emerged in the number of boats arriving from Morocco. Small boats found on Lanzarote containing much reduced numbers of migrants gave strong indications that drug smuggling was the primary goal of these journeys.

**Western Mediterranean route** - is defined as the sea passage from North Africa to the Iberian Peninsula, as well as the land route through Ceuta and Melilla. Most commonly it is used by Algerian and Moroccan nationals attempting to reach Spain, France and Italy, but over the years there have also been increasing numbers of Sub-Saharan Africans. Many migrants attempt to cross into Spain hidden in trucks and containers on ferries headed to the ports of Almeria and Algeciras.

West Africans trying to reach the Western Mediterranean coast (Morocco and Algeria) overland have a choice between the coastal route through the west of Africa and the route across the Sahara in the east. The coastal route is the shorter option for migrants leaving Senegal and Mauritania, but is also used by those leaving from most West African countries like Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire or Benin, who prefer to avoid the shorter but more hazardous Sahara crossing.

An important challenge to the Spanish authorities on that route are also drug traffickers, attempting to smuggle large quantities of cannabis, mostly resin (hashish), from Morocco on fast boats. Cocaine transiting through Western and Northern Africa and destined for the EU is also commonly detected by Spanish authorities in the Western Mediterranean area. In recent years, in addition to fast boats, drug smugglers have been reported to be using increasingly sophisticated vehicles, including small helicopters and planes.

Throughout 2014 conflicts and violence in Mali, Sudan, South Sudan, Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad and the Central African Republic have caused the displacement of large parts of the population and have added to the economic causes of migration in the region<sup>2</sup>. The migratory pressure peaked between July and September 2014 made this period most intensive since 2011. Despite the additional measures undertaken by the Spanish authorities to strengthen border control in Ceuta and Melilla, attempts to cross the fence have been frequent.

**Central Mediterranean route** - refers to the migratory flow coming from Northern Africa towards Italy and Malta through the Mediterranean Sea. Here, Libya often acts as nexus point where migrants from the Horn of Africa and Western African routes meet before embarking on their journey towards the EU. Until 2010, with its relatively prosperous economy, Libya offered good job opportunities for migrant workers from African countries who either used it as a final destination or as a transit country where they could earn money to pay the smugglers for the last leg of their journey to the European Union.

People smugglers put the migrants heading for Italy and Malta on old, unseaworthy fishing boats or even small rubber dinghies which are much overloaded and thus prone to capsizing. These vessels are typically equipped with poor engines, lack proper navigation systems and often have insufficient fuel to reach Europe - all factors which put migrants' lives at serious risk. In fact, in 2014 the vast majority of border control operations in Central Mediterranean turned into Search and Rescue (SAR) operations.

In 2014, detections in the Central Mediterranean area reached a staggering level. More than 170 000 migrants arrived in Italy alone, representing the largest influx into one country in European Union history. Many migrants departed from Libya, where the lack of rule of law and basic law enforcement allow smuggling networks to thrive. Syrians and Eritreans were the top two nationalities, but numerous Africans coming from Sub-Saharan regions also used this route.

The increasing number of migrants departing from Northern Africa also led to an increase in the number of people who perished at sea. According to UNHCR, in 2014 some 3,500 migrants lost their lives while crossing the Mediterranean Sea.

**Apulia and Calabria route** - refers to irregular migration coming from Turkey and Egypt and also includes the migratory movements between Greece and Italy. Most of the migrants using this route initially entered the Schengen area by crossing the land border between Turkey and Greece. Increasing numbers of migrants, usually from Asia, claim to have been living in Greece for a number of years before deciding to leave for other EU Member States due to the economic crisis in this country<sup>3</sup>.

The types of the vessels detected in the Ionian Sea are different from the ones used on other maritime borders – the smugglers tend to use yachts rather than fishing boats. The smugglers on board the sailing boats are the only people visible while navigating and are sometimes accompanied by women in order to avoid attracting the attention of the patrolling

authorities. All migrants tend to be hidden below deck in overcrowded conditions with insufficient ventilation. In some cases, the internal structure of the boat and the compartments are modified in order to add wooden bunk-beds to maximize capacity.

Smuggling networks from Egypt, on the other hand, typically make use of larger 'mother ships.' Rather than setting off from Egypt in fishing boats, the new method sees bigger vessels carrying larger numbers of migrants, towing fishing boats behind them. These larger ships leave from Egypt, collect additional passengers from Greek islands including Crete, and then proceed towards Italy. Once close enough to shore, the migrants are transferred to the fishing boats for the remainder of the journey while the mother ship returns to port. The main nationalities using this route include Syrians, but also Afghans, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. In 2014 smugglers operating in Turkey started using cargo ships to bring migrants to Italy.

In 2014 smugglers have started using much larger boats from Turkey - decommissioned cargo vessels departing mainly from the Turkish port of Mersin towards Italy. The profits smugglers make using this method are staggering considering that on average Syrians are charged about €6,000 each for the service. With freighters frequently filled with as many as 600 people, the revenue of the smugglers runs into the millions. Travelling this way not only circumvents the considerable danger of capsizing in a small boat in rough seas: it also avoids having to go to Libya. The departure point of choice for facilitator networks in 2014, this increasingly lawless North African nation appears to have become too dangerous an operating environment even for the criminal gangs. Libya's neighbors, furthermore, have strengthened their border security to contain the spread of Islamic extremists, which has made it much harder for the smugglers to operate via land.

The new route from Turkey is not without dangers however. The engines of the old ships are often highly unreliable. The danger of shipwreck is greatly increased by the smugglers' habit of switching off the freighter's AIS (the Automatic Identification System) to make the boat electronically invisible to the authorities but also to other boats and vessels navigating on the Mediterranean Sea. On numerous occasions, the crew would set the vessels on autopilot and either abandon the boat or hide among other passengers to avoid arrest.

**Circular route from Albania to Greece** was, for many years, one of the most significant irregular migratory flows across the EU's external borders. In 2008 and 2009, detections between Albania and

Greece represented nearly 40% of all detections of illegal border crossings at an EU level. In 2010, detections decreased slightly to 35 300, but still represented 34% of the EU total. The principal reason of this flow is mainly economic, with most migrants taking up seasonal jobs in agriculture and the construction business<sup>4</sup>.

Upon detection, Albanian nationals crossing the border illegally were immediately returned to Albania, but quickly attempted to re-entry to Greece. The fact that Albanian migrants could easily, cheaply and repeatedly attempt to illegally cross the border with Greece, and that Greek businesses which illegally employed Albanians were rarely prosecuted, combined to form strong pull factors.

Since visa liberalization, Albanian nationals are still detected illegally crossing the border into Greece but at a lower level than in previous periods. In 2014 worth noting was a high level of refusals of entry (mostly for having an alert in the SIS) and document fraud (counterfeit border-crossing stamps to fabricate travel histories and extended periods of stay in the Schengen area).

**Western Balkan route** - describes two main migratory flows: from the Western Balkan countries themselves, and the secondary movements of mainly Asian migrants who originally entered the European Union through the Bulgarian-Turkish or Greek-Turkish land or sea borders and then proceed, through the Western Balkans, into Hungary<sup>5</sup>.

This route shows the highest relative increase at the European Union level in detections of Syrian and Somali nationals. After arriving in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, migrants typically make use of an *open taxi* system which profits significantly from smuggling people to the Serbian borders.

The irregular migration trends in the Western Balkans region underwent rapid changes following the introduction of visa-free travel within the European Union. In just four years, the region transitioned from being largely a source country for irregular migration to mostly a transit area of irregular migrants from Greece.

In 2012, nationals from the Western Balkans were increasingly found abusing various forms of legal travel, detected either during border checks or while already in the European Union. The misuse of international protection provisions in Member States and Schengen Associated Countries was by far the most prevalent. In 2012, there were almost 33 000 asylum applications submitted by citizens of the five newly visa-exempt Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia

and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), or 53% more than in 2011. The number was the highest since the introduction of visa-free travel in the region and accounted for 12% of the total number of asylum applications in the European Union. Other abuses of legal travel channels were linked to overstay in the European Union. More precisely, there were roughly a fifth more detections of Western Balkans' nationals illegally staying in Member States countries – this group included mainly Kosovars, Serbs and Albanians. The latter group was also the most commonly detected nationality using document fraud to illegally enter the European Union/Schengen area from a third country in 2012. Almost one fifth of all detections were linked to the Albanian nationality, largely using counterfeit entry/exit stamps intended to hide overstay.

The year 2013 witnessed an unprecedented increase in the migratory flow at the Hungarian-Serbian border. During this period, almost 20,000 migrants illegally crossed the Hungarian-Serbian border section and nearly all of them applied for asylum after crossing. The nationalities reflected the dual typology of this route and included residents of Kosovo, Serbian nationals but also Pakistani, Afghan, Algerian Moroccan nationals as well as sub-Saharan Africans, many of whom had been living in Greece prior to travel.

Among many reasons for this sudden increase was the change in Hungarian legislation on migration and asylum introduced in January 2013 allowing those migrants who submitted an asylum claim to be transferred to open centers, which many of them left soon after.

The numbers of migrants apprehended at the Hungarian-Serbian border peaked in June, with an average of 130 migrants crossing the Serbian-Hungarian border in an irregular manner each day. In July 2013, the Hungarian authorities further amended asylum legislation to allow for the detention of asylum seekers in those cases where abuse of the system was suspected and strengthened their border control capacity. These measures contributed to a dramatic decrease of the migratory flow on this border area in the second half of the year.

Detections of illegal border-crossing reached their peak in 2014 and more dramatically in 2015. As a consequence, the Hungarian authorities accommodated them in open refugee centers from which they absconded to proceed to other European Union countries, particularly Austria and Germany, where they also applied for asylum.

**Eastern Mediterranean route** - is defined as the passage used by migrants crossing through Turkey to the European Union via Greece,

southern Bulgaria or Cyprus. Since 2008, this route has become the second biggest migratory hot spot, with the European Union external border with Turkey being the main nexus point on this route.

The people-smuggling networks are active mainly in Istanbul, but also in Izmir, Edirne and Ankara. The nationalities of facilitators vary, frequently reflecting the nationality of the migrants they smuggle into the European Union.

A noteworthy development was the liberalization of the Turkish visa policy towards many African countries, which created a pull factor for migrants from this continent. They now arrive in Turkey by plane with easily obtained visas before crossing illegally into the European Union via Bulgaria and Greece.

In terms of the nationalities of the migrants, Syrian refugees but also Afghans and Somalis, constitute the most numerous group. There are also increasing numbers of migrants coming from sub-Saharan Africa.

For the years 2008-2009, the number of migrants using this route topped more than 40 000 per year and accounted for approximately 40% of all migrants arriving in the European Union. The summer of 2010 saw a sudden increase in detections of illegal border-crossing on the small 12.5 km-long stretch of land not delineated by the River Evros, which marks the land border between Greece and Turkey. The surge in the number of migrants (mostly from Afghanistan and Iraq) was one of the single largest episodes of illegal crossings of the EU land borders recorded by Frontex. Detections peaked in October 2010 with some 300 people crossing the border near Orestiada each day. After receiving a request for assistance from the Greek authorities, Frontex deployed the first Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) in November of the same year. One hundred-ninety-one guest officers from 26 EU Member States were sent to support the Greek authorities in border control activities<sup>6</sup>.

However, after an initial drop in the migratory pressure, numbers climbed again in 2011, with a total of 57 000 illegal border crossings along the Turkish frontier. The migratory flow abruptly dropped in August 2012 due to a range of measures undertaken by the Greek authorities including a) operation Aspida, with the deployment of additional Hellenic police officers and equipment to the Evros region; b) Greek operation *Xenios Zeus* focused on inland detections of illegal stays and their return; c) construction of a fence along a 12.5-kilometre area of the north-eastern town of Orestiada; d) an extension of the maximum length of detention period for migrants; e) an increase in the capacity of detention centers for



identification and return; f) the reduction of the time during which irregular migrants had to leave Greece if not in detention centers from 30 to seven days. The Hellenic authorities have also strengthened their cooperation with Turkish border guards. These measures produced a 'displacement effect' to the Bulgarian land border and the Greek sea border with Turkey. Italy also reported the detection of migrants attempting to cross directly from Turkey. At the European Union level, Member States also reported a small increase in detections of migrants with fraudulent documents on flights departing from Istanbul.

2013 was characterized by an increased amount of migrants arriving to the Greek islands from Turkey as well as a high number of Syrian refugees arriving in Bulgaria from Turkey.

In 2014, the Eastern Mediterranean route was the second largest area for detections of illegal border-crossing in the European Union, almost twice as much as in 2013, but still fewer than in the record 2011. In 2014, the growth in migratory pressure was most significant in the Eastern Aegean Sea, while detections at the land border decreased compared to the previous year.

Although most of the migrants were Syrian fleeing the conflict at home, the migratory flows were mixed, as was the case of the Central Mediterranean route.

In 2015, the flow of migrants on this route exploded and cause the nowadays crisis within the European Union.

### **Eastern Borders route**

The European Union's 6,000-kilometre-long land border between Belarus, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and its eastern Member States (Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) present significant challenges for border control.

Smugglers along the green border often take advantage of road networks to move migrants before and after crossing the border. Since regular passenger traffic is heaviest at the land border with Ukraine, the likelihood of illegal border-crossing is also higher along the sections of the external borders with this country.

Worth noting is the introduction of a series of local border-traffic agreements between Ukraine and its European Union neighbors (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Romania), which allowed holders of local border

traffic permits to stay for up to 90 days per half-year. It is still premature to assess their impact on irregular migration.

Between 2011 and 2012, the overall passenger flow along the eastern land border increased significantly. This was particularly visible at the Polish-Russian border where the increase amounted to 70%, but also to a lesser extent at the Norwegian-Russian, Finnish-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian borders. The growth was driven by expanding legal travel channels and longer-term economic developments in the Russian Federation which stimulate increased cross-border movement of people and goods<sup>7</sup>.

Along the Eastern land border, abuse of legal travel channels is more common than illegal border-crossing. These *modus operandi* are mainly used by the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) including Georgians. The result of efforts to limit possible abuses is best represented by the fact that 39% of all refusals of entry in the European Union during 2013 were issued by the authorities at the eastern land borders.

Smuggling of contraband is a primary issue along this route, more so than anywhere else in the European Union. Price differences and economic disparities in the border zones are the main drivers of smuggling. Cigarettes and fuel are smuggled mostly towards the European Union, while smuggling of stolen vehicles, household goods (ranging from groceries to electronics) follows in the opposite direction.

In 2014 visa fraud and counterfeit border-crossing stamps, as well as cross-border crime were predominant features on this route – more so than detections of illegal border-crossing, which remained fairly low throughout the year. Along the land borders with Ukraine, the number of detections of illegal border-crossing remained very limited (less than 150) despite the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The impact of the Ukrainian conflict is however still felt in the growing number of asylum applications, mostly made inland within the European Union, as well as in the growing number of detections of illegal stay by the European Union Member States.

### **Perspectives**

Analyzing the data from Q2 2015 with the similar period of 2014 within the Western Balkans region, the following conclusions could be underlined:

- record pressure was exerted by non-regional transiting migrants, Syrians being the most detected nationality, closely followed by Afghans;
- increased presence of African migrants;
- various countermeasures introduced by several countries to the high migratory pressure in the Western Balkans region (e.g. Hungary, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - FYROM);
- low pressure exerted by the regional migration flow (migrants originating from the Western Balkans region)<
- increasing number of facilitators for illegal migration – 11% more facilitators (especially from Serbia, Hungary, Greece, FYROM etc.)

During the second quarter of 2015, there were 241 cases of false documents use reported by the six Western Balkan countries, Serbia continued to rank first, with 45% of all regional detections, followed by Albania (20%) and FYROM (14%). As far as detections of false passports are concerned, the majority (71) were reportedly issued by countries from the region. Most of these passports were Albanian (48), largely used by Albanian (48), largely used by Albanian nationals (47), most likely in an attempt to avoid entry bans following the abuse of visa liberalization.

This trend of use of false documents as is passports, border stamps and ID cards could be used by terrorists or by the Organized Crime Groups (OCG's) in order to penetrate the borders of the EU and produce harm within this region.

The number of detected illegal border-crossing by the non-regional transiting flow throughout the second quarter 2015 was unprecedented, setting an absolute record since data collection began for the Western Balkan region. More precisely the 54,437 detected illegal border-crossing by non-regional migrants was comparable to the of total detection of non-regional migrants in the two past years (54,692 in 2013 and 2014). Regarding the nationalities detected for illegal border crossing we have the following situation: Syrians (38%), Afghans (36%), Pakistani (6%), Iraqis (7%), the distribution being similar with the Eastern Aegean region.

### **Appropriate response**

The EU's external borders have increasingly been the scene of human tragedies to which the EU, together with its Member States, must take immediate action. Migration management is a shared responsibility,

not only among EU Member States, but also vis-à-vis non-EU countries of transit and origin of migrants. Illegal migration within the European Union is a global problem that need an appropriate global response of international community, not only of the EU or European states. The main issue remains the war in Syria and Afghanistan and the proliferation of international organizations worldwide (e.g. Islamic State – ISIL in the Middle East and Boko Haram in Africa). Within Europe is clearly that no EU Member State can effectively address migration alone, being needed a strong European synergic, organized and coordinated approach.

In these regard the involvement of the United Nation is essential not only with declarations or resolutions but also with real operations dedicated to help people in need in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, together with the continuation of the global fight against organized crime and terrorism.

In this regard, the EU working with the African Union as part of its global approach to migration and mobility, adopted in April 2014 an action plan which focuses on the following issues: combating trafficking of human beings, remittances, diaspora, mobility and la labor migration (including intra-African mobility), international protection (including internally displaced persons) and irregular migration.

Also, in May 2015, the European Commission (EC) presented detailed proposals for a common asylum and refugee policy and tripled the presence in the Mediterranean sea, helping to save lives and intercept smugglers. Also, the EC assisted Member States the most affected, sending teams from the EU border agency (Frontex), the EU asylum office (EASO) and the EU police network (Europol) to help the often overburdened national authorities identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants, speed up the processing of asylum seekers and coordinate the return of irregular migrants<sup>8</sup>.

By combining both internal and external policies, at 13 May 2015, the EC adopted the European Agenda on Migration (EAM)<sup>9</sup> which provides a new, comprehensive approach grounded in mutual trust and solidarity among EU Member States and institutions. Through the European Agendas on Migration, the European Commission is taking bold steps to improve migration management, foster cooperation and make Europe safer from organized crime and terrorism for our citizens. The national programs approved by the European Commission provide significant financial assistance to the Member States to address these challenges.

### **The short term priorities of the EAM**

According to this agenda, the EU aims at taking immediate action to prevent further losses of migrants' lives at sea by providing additional funding to Frontex joint search and rescue operations, to the safe and legal resettlement of people to Europe, to the Regional Protection and Development Programs and to the most affected Member States located at the EU's external borders. In addition, the EU aims to strengthen the role of Europol as an intelligence hub for dismantling criminal networks and intends to launch Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations in the Mediterranean to capture and destroy boats. The EU will also activate the emergency system provided in the Treaties so that asylum seekers may be relocated in a more solidary manner, as well as establish a pilot multi-purpose center in Niger, in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration and the UN Refugee Agency. An altogether new concept, the Hotspot, will allow European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Frontex and Europol to work on the ground in affected EU Member States to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint arriving migrants and to assist in investigating and dismantling migrant smuggling networks.

### **The medium to long term priorities of the EAM**

Migration is both an opportunity and a challenge for the EU, so in this regards the medium to long term priorities consist of developing structural actions that look beyond crises and emergencies and help EU Member States to better manage all aspects of migration. The Agenda is built upon four pillars:

1. Reducing the incentives for irregular migration: the focus is on addressing the root causes behind irregular migration in non-EU countries, dismantling smuggling and trafficking networks and defining actions for the better application of return policies.
2. Saving lives and securing the external borders: this involves better management of the external border, in particular through solidarity towards those Member States that are located at the external borders, and improving the efficiency of border crossings.
3. Strengthening the common asylum policy: with the increases in the flows of asylum seekers, the EU's asylum policies need to be based on solidarity towards those needing international protection as well as among

the EU Member States, whose full application of the common rules must be ensured through systematic monitoring.

4. Developing a new policy on legal migration: in view of the future demographic challenges the EU is facing, the new policy needs to focus on attracting workers that the EU economy needs, particularly by facilitating entry and the recognition of qualifications.

In order to fully implement this strategy, the European Commission has allocated €2.4 billion to support Member States, for the period 2014-2020. In this regard, 22 national programs were already approved in March 2015, and an additional 13 programs will be approved later this year<sup>10</sup>.

Managing the EU borders more efficiently also implies making better use of the opportunities offered by IT systems and technologies. The EU today has three large-scale IT systems, dealing with the administration of asylum (Eurodac), visa applications (the Visa Information System - VIS), and the sharing of information about persons or objects for which an alert has been created by the competent authorities (Schengen Information System). The full use of these systems can bring benefits to border management, as well as to enhance Europe's capacity to reduce irregular migration and return irregular migrants. A new phase would come with the "Smart Borders" initiative to increase the efficiency of border crossings, facilitating crossings for the large majority of 'bona fide' third country travelers, whilst at the same time strengthening the fight against irregular migration by creating a record of all cross-border movements by third country nationals, fully respecting proportionality. Following initial discussions on the first proposal and to take into account concerns raised by the co-legislators, the Commission intends to present a revised proposal on Smart Borders by the beginning of 2016. The development of high standards inside the EU will also make it easier for Europe to support third countries developing their own solutions to better manage their borders.

Initiatives in key African and neighborhood countries could be supported by Frontex as well Regulation 1052/2013 of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR): an information-exchange system designed to improve management of the EU external borders by enables near real-time sharing of border-related data between members of the network, consisting of Schengen countries and Frontex.

Also, at a joint meeting of Foreign and Interior Ministers, at 20 April 2015, chaired by High Representative / Vice-President Federica Mogherini and held in Luxembourg, Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship

Commissioner Avramopoulos presented a 10 point plan of the immediate actions to be taken in response to the crisis situation in the Mediterranean. The plan received the full backing of Foreign and Interior Ministers and consists of the following measures<sup>11</sup>:

- Reinforce the Joint Operations in the Mediterranean, namely Triton and Poseidon, by increasing the financial resources and the number of assets and extend their operational area, allowing the EC to intervene further, within the mandate of Frontex;
- A systematic effort to capture and destroy vessels used by the smugglers. The positive results obtained with the Atalanta operation should inspire the EC to similar operations against smugglers in the Mediterranean;
- EUROPOL, FRONTEX, EASO and EUROJUST will meet regularly and work closely to gather information on smugglers modus operandi, to trace their funds and to assist in their investigation;
- EASO to deploy teams in Italy and Greece for joint processing of asylum applications;
- Member States to ensure fingerprinting of all migrants;
- Consider options for an emergency relocation mechanism;
- A EU wide voluntary pilot project on resettlement, offering a number of places to persons in need of protection;
- Establish a new return program for rapid return of irregular migrants coordinated by Frontex from frontline Member States;
- Engagement with countries surrounding Libya through a joined effort between the Commission and the EEAS; initiatives in Niger have to be stepped up;
- Deploy Immigration Liaison Officers (ILO) in key third countries, to gather intelligence on migratory flows and strengthen the role of the EU Delegations.

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# FAILED STATE LIBYA - EUROPEAN SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

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## Abstract

*The 2011 series of protests and riots, known as the “Arab Spring” swept away Ba'athist and Nasserist regimes in North Africa. One after another, secular Arab world leaders were removed from power by the anger of a population caught between a secular and repressive plutocracy and the utopian fantasies of a Medina-type society promised by the Salafists. Ummah al arabiyah is day by day becoming Ummah al Islamiyah, as the Western democratic model is demonized and the specter of terrorism extends throughout Northern Africa. Libya's Gaddafi regime collapsed creating a hotbed of instability with reverberations across Africa and threatens to destabilize European countries, too. What are the implications of Libya's failure on European security? How serious is the situation?*

**Keywords:** Arab Spring, Nasserism, Libya, Gaddafi, illegal migration, organized crime, terrorism, hybrid war

**Motto:** *“We used to think of migration as a human security issue: protecting people and providing assistance (...) Now we clearly perceive—or misperceive—migration as a national security issue. And the risk of securitizing migration is that you risk legitimizing extraordinary responses.”*  
Khalid Koser- Brookings Institution's Senior Fellow

The year 2011 was the end of the postwar order in North Africa and the Middle East. The “Arab Spring” swept away Ba'athist and Nasser-type regimes and left behind a power vacuum contested between Islamist forces and the reformers. In Egypt, the army managed to remove the Islamists and to stabilize the country, in Libya, leader Muammar el Gaddafi's death at the

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hands of a mob resulted in a failed state mired in a hotbed of instability with consequences both in the sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. What are the implications of the failure of Libya on European security? How serious is the situation?

### **„The Arab Spring”**

On December 17, 2010, a Tunisian cart vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi, self-immolated in protest against the autocratic regime of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Riots broke out and Ben Ali fled the country. Shortly after, Egypt faced violent protests that led to the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011, after 30 years of totalitarian rule. The uprisings move on to Libya where, after 42 years of absolute power, Muammar el Gaddafi was killed on October 20, 2011. Then, Ali Abdullah Saleh, the Yemeni president, was forced to resign on February 27, 2012, after 32 years of leadership. The rallies spread throughout the region not always with a change in the political regime. These revolutions failed to replace faulty systems with more functional ones, on the contrary, dictators soon retook power. The Arab Ba'ath or Nasser-type nationalism represented a counterweight to the religious ferocity of Saudi Wahhabism or to the Hanbali movement, the “Muslim Brotherhood” (MB). Or, said in another way, Ummah arabiyah - the Arab world represented a counterweight to the Ummah Islamiyah - the Islamic world. The disintegration of these regimes was followed by the resurgence of Islam and transformation of the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East regions into a place of insecurity and conflict, a battlefield of proxy wars, with failed states as seedbeds for Islamist terrorism.

### **The fall of Gaddafi Libyan regime**

2011 Libyan “Arab Spring” fully expressed the concept of proxy war, conflict by third parties, when the powers in competition use internal states vectors to achieve their goals. Gaddafi had not been a reliable leader, on the contrary. He had a rebellious attitude in both the Arab League where he reinstated Libya in 2002, or in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation where his opinions consistently opposed those expressed by the monarchies of the Gulf. A resolute Nasser-follower, he was the promoter of pan-Arabism antipathetical to *Ummah Islamiyah* where the concept of ethnic and national identities is erased in the favor of Islamic identity. Gaddafi was

also a fervent promoter of the Pan-African idea, the African Union, the AU, was born in Sirte, Libya, in 2001. Between 1978-1987, a conflict took place between Libya and Chad on the right of sovereignty over the northern African Aouzou Strip. French intervention tipped victory to Chad. Although Gaddafi was the guest of French President Nicholas Sarkozy at the Elysée Palace in 2008, by 2011, the same French president used the French military to remove the Libyan dictator from power. Two explanations for this dramatic reversal lay in accusations that Libyan money helped finance Sarkozy's 2007<sup>1</sup> presidential campaign, and that Libya thwarted France's geopolitical interests in the Sahel. Moreover, Gaddafi's involvement in the AU and its manifest Pan-African attitude came into collision with France's *Françafrique* political concept with Paris' role of "protector" of her former African colonies. On the 17<sup>th</sup> of March 2011, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 that provided the legal framework for building a coalition that would carry out the mission of eliminating the Libyan leader. So, a proxy fight in the Libyan civil war has become an internationalized classical war.

France's inability to manage the Libyan crisis after Gaddafi's death generated prolonged instability and the emergence of multiple centers of power that have turned Libya into a failed state, ruled by clans in permanent confrontation, after the pattern of Somalia. The current Libyan government, located in Tobruk, controls the territory that surrounds the city and nothing more.

GlobalSecurity.org analysts<sup>2</sup> quote an expert on North African security, George Joffe of Cambridge University, who said in 2014, that in Libya around 350 militias were active. The same GlobalSecurity.org analysts cite other sources saying that, in the same period of time over 1700 armed groups were active in Libya most espousing differing, often conflicting ideologies. Along the border with Egypt three major groups operated, two of which remain affiliated to the MB, while the third is connected to Al Qa'ida (AQ).

The main groups operating in Libya, according to GlobalSecurity.org, are :

- Fajr Libya - Islamist militia backed by Turkey, that since 2013 controls Tripoli and its surroundings and is connected to Misrata Brigades;
- Misrata Brigades and Revolutionary Union Misrata - brings together more than 200 armed groups with over 40,000 members acting in the Misrata region where the training grounds of MB are located;

- Ansar al-Shari'a - an AQ affiliated Islamic radical group involved in the 2012 attack on the US Embassy in Benghazi where the American ambassador and three other members of the embassy were killed. Ansar al-Shari'a operates in Tunisia and Libya (in Benghazi and Darnah, where it is allied with Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council);
- Al - Zintan Revolutionaries Military Council - revolutionary militias in opposition to Islamist groups;
- Libyan National Army - a militia led by General Khalifa Haftar, opposes the Islamists. In May 2014, the LNA attacked the parliament and proclaimed the Libyan government illegitimate;
- Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room (LROR) - an alliance of militias. Until 2013, it was commissioned by the government to defend the capital, Tripoli. Libyan prime minister, Ali Zeidan, was kidnapped by members of this group which led to its termination of cooperation with the Libyan government;
- February 17 Martyrs Brigade - a powerful Islamist group that operates in the region of Benghazi;
- Al-Saiq militias - comprising former members of the Libyan Special Forces, they fight against Islamist militias in the eastern city of Benghazi;
- Facility Petroleum Guard - controls the South of Libya where Libya's oil reserves are located.

On October 5, 2014, Islamist Libyan militias, except Ansar al-Sharia Darnah and their allies from Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, announced affiliation to the Islamic State (IS) and creation of the caliphate in Darnah<sup>3</sup>. In February 2015, the IS militias conquered the city of Nawfaliya<sup>4</sup> but, in March, they were forced to withdraw after an offensive led by General National Congress forces, the new parliament from Tripoli<sup>5</sup>. In May 23, 2015, IS militias conquered the city Sirte, the birthplace of former Libyan leader Gaddafi<sup>6</sup>.

### **European security implications**

Failed states Libya, Iraq and Syria, were key factors in the dissemination of Islamist groups over North Africa, the Sahel and the Arabian Peninsula. A lack of state authority allowed free traffic of weapons and ammunition, training bases and safe havens for Islamist recruits, supply, and troop transport corridors. In the tumultuous North African and the Arabian peninsula the line between organized crime and terrorism

becomes thinner and more porous as the two phenomena move toward amalgamation. The situation is further complicated when these networks are involved in the management of illegal migration, which is both a source of income, and of extending the network in other areas. And, the situation acquires an explosive character when the three phenomena: migration, organized crime and terrorism, become instruments of hybrid war.

**Illegal cross-border migration, organized crime and terrorism.** The United Nations (UN) defines migration as a movement from one of the over 200 nations of the world to another, over a period of 12 months or less, regardless of the objective. Migration is prompted by the significant differences in economic and demographic growth, income, jobs, resources, security, and protection of human rights between countries of the world. International migration is also both an effect and cause of population growth. Governments have the capacity to adjust migration through passports, visas and border control. Regarding migrants, we must make the distinction between migrants on one side and asylum seekers and refugees on the other side. Migrants decide to emigrate for reasons other than those related to violence. In the second category there is a legal difference, refugees are asylum seekers whose application has been approved by the host state.

But when migration involves large masses of people who, during a short period of time, arrive en mass on the border of a country, it becomes a security threat to the targeted state because of economic, safety and public order costs that are generated by a massive influx of people. When these masses have a different ideological and cultural profile than the local population, moreover, when there are major differences that inevitably will collide, these threats may become explosive. When such a migration is coordinated by an originating state or a coalition of states, it acquires the character of aggression that can be enumerated among the categories of hybrid war.

The current “refugees” migration in Europe and especially into Germany falls into the category of massive migrations coordinated by organized crime networks with state connections. In the mid July 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel attended a TV show where one of the participants, a 14-year old Palestinian refugee named Reem Sahvin, burst into tears when the German leader told her that Germany could not afford to integrate all refugees<sup>7</sup>. From that moment, Angela Merkel became the target of an unprecedented wave of criticism in German and international media. Faced with image-related attacks about the attitude towards refugees, but also about the financial policy pursued over Greece

(threatening with leaving the European Union - EU), and based on a geopolitical calculation linked to the influence Germany might have in the post - conflict era in Syria, Chancellor Merkel declared in August 24, 2015 that her country would offer asylum to all Syrian refugees<sup>8</sup>. Thus, in August 2015, Germany announced the suspension for the Syrians, of the “Dublin Rules”<sup>9</sup> (which require sending back to the European country of entrance all of asylum seekers). The argument for this decision was that it represented a gesture of solidarity with Greece, Italy, Malta, Spain and the rest of the states on transit routes of the migrants. Shortly after that, the invasion began. Germany started to receive waves of thousands of migrants. After a wave of 40,000 migrants during a weekend<sup>10</sup>, in September 2015, Germany reinstated border controls. On the other side, the EU transit states were destabilized by the waves of migrants, and imposed protective measures: Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Slovakia, Poland<sup>11</sup> closed borders, Hungary, Spain, Portugal built protection fences, and Hungary decided to use her armed forces to stabilize her border. Then, with European unity at stake, Brussels imposed EU-wide mandatory refugee quotas under the threat of economic penalties. The crisis deepened.

Meanwhile, data appeared describing the demographic composition of the migrants. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<sup>12</sup>, over the first nine months of 2015, 499,826 migrants came to Europe by sea, comprising Syrians 54%, Afghani 13%, Eritreans 7%, Nigerians 3%, Somalis 2%, Sudanese 2%, with other nations represented, as well. The gender and age groups of the migrants provides further chilling information: 69% were men, 13% were women and 18% were children. With such a demographic structure it is very hard to accept that all these migrants are fleeing from violence, the definition of a refugee. If that were the case, then women and children would make up the majority of asylum applicants, but they seem to have been left behind while men have fled. There are field observations pointing out the male asylum seekers are overwhelmingly of military age. The explanation could be related to economic emigration (mostly of Asian and African migrants, and of the refugees from the camps in Syria's neighboring countries) or, as it has been rumored, many jihadists are among the migrant waves. The data do not include migrants who have arrived in Europe by land.

In Figure 1 the migrants routes from Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and Southeast Asia to Europe are shown. There are two categories of routes: prevailing sea routes from North Africa to European shores, and the prevailing land routes from Southeast Asia, Iran and the Arabian Peninsula. The key state in the smuggling of migrants by sea is Libya, where most routes

from the Western and Eastern Africa converge. This is due to the absence of a government in Libya able to destroy human trafficking networks and to the hundreds of militias and criminal groups who share, today, Libyan territory and that profit from transporting migrants to Europe.




Figure 1: Migration routes toward Europe<sup>13</sup>

Federica Mogherini, High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, asked in May 2015, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorization to use military force against human trafficking networks operating from Libyan shores and ports<sup>14</sup>. The inquiry was immediately rejected by the internationally recognized Libyan government, and the Russian Federation announced it would use its *veto* in the UNSC if such a proposal would be presented for a vote. In September 2015, according to deputy director of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Jeanne Park, Mogherini announced plans to resume talks about military intervention against traffickers vessels, an operation to be undertaken in cooperation with the Libyan authorities and the UN. The fact that, in May 2015, Mogherini raised only the problem of the sea routes meant terrestrial routes were effectively controlled by Turkey and Greece, so the main share of migrants was arriving from Northern Africa.

According to UNHCR, since the onset of hostilities in Syria in 2011, approximately 1.9 million refugees have crossed into Turkey, while another 1.1 million are in Lebanon and 630,000 in Jordan. The effects of this demographic pressure are intensely felt by the economies of the host countries<sup>15</sup>.

Polish war reporter and expert in intelligence, Witold Gadowski, in an interview with the Polish website *fronda.pl*<sup>16</sup> argued that *“the real victims of the war are currently in the camps of Iraqi Kurdistan, in Southern Turkey and Lebanon. They are there for over one year. They are Shiites, Christians, Yazidis. I mention them deliberately in that order, because that is the order of IS persecution.”*<sup>17</sup> Moreover, Gadowski said about asylum seekers in Europe that *“among them there are very few Christians, very few Yazidis and very few Kurds, those who are really suffering because of the IS. Most of them are “smart guys”(opportunists) who could afford to pay 10,000 Dollars to be transported on the Old Continent by the mob. Ninety percent of them are brought here by the criminal Turkish, Albanian and Russian Mafia.”* At the same time, Polish experts say the Russian Mafia is trading above 90% of the looted Syrian artifacts, the money eventually enriching IS leaders, while the Albanian Mafia controls and profits from the migrant smuggling through the port of Vlora.

Terrorism is a phenomenon that currently benefits from immigrant crises. Wars for resources fuel immigrants crises, which, in turn, fuel international terrorism. In the transatlantic security space it is estimated that the most serious threat is the IS. Many groups engaged in international jihad offer support to the IS in various forms: raising funds, recruiting and training new members. Their network is sufficiently developed to carry out terrorist actions on the territory of democratic states considered safe from terrorism. The threats represented by some terrorist cells, clandestinely operating in democratic states, produce also concern. Their ability to quickly regroup is the most serious challenge posed to intelligence services and for law enforcement agencies responsible for identifying and annihilating terror cells. “Lone wolves” are multiplying the threat, due to their lack of affiliation or communication with any known group. The specter of terrorists procuring a nuclear weapon has led to a state of permanent alert of security forces. Collected intelligence confirms that terrorist organizations are in the market for weapons of mass destruction, as well as searching the internet for information regarding chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear weapons.

In Witold Gadowski’s opinion, the wave of refugees who continue to pour into Europe, especially toward Germany, is organized by four centers:



*“one (emanating from) Ar-Rakkah, representing the capital of the Islamic State that foments an uncontrolled wave of refugees toward Europe, and among them, (they) infiltrate Agents...specialized in murders and suicide bombings. A separate department of IS deals with these things and maintains communication with all “lone wolf” networks scattered throughout the world and ready to commit “şahizi” – i.e., (act as) suicide bombers. This (broad dispersion of lone wolves) is very dangerous, difficult, and practically impossible to detect. Another center (of command) is in Ankara, which gave way to the wave of refugees. They clean their land of Kurds, but the Kurds don’t want to run. Instead, nearly 2 million refugees from Syria are now living in (camps in) Southern Turkey. They are free to go to Europe. In my opinion, another command center is in Moscow, which wants to involved itself in the Middle East more than ever before. And she wants by this wave of refugees to keep Europe preoccupied - even the United States, to a lesser extent. There is therefore (support for the migrant invasion of Europe) in at least three places, and I believe that Tehran is involved, too.”<sup>18</sup>*

If we look at the territorial distribution of the militias operating in the Libyan territory, we notice that the Misrata region and Tripoli port, (where it carries out a heavy traffic of migrants to the European shores), are controlled by Fajr Libya and the Misrata Brigades supported by Turkey. There are also numerous statements made by government officials or former intelligence officers who accused Russia of involvement in the resurgence of Al Qa’ida and the IS type of jihadism, such as former FSB Colonel Aleksandr Valterovich Litvinenko, and former chief of Estonian Espionage, Eerik Kross Niiles, Brigadier General Ahmad Aljjdeaa, deputy defense minister in the Syrian government in exile and the current Ukrainian Minister of the Foreign Affairs, Pavlo Klimkin<sup>19</sup>. The northern Libyan port of Benghazi is controlled by Ansar al-Shari’a AQ affiliate and their allies from Benghazi, the February 17 Martyrs Brigade and the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries. The port of Darnah is controlled by Islamist militias affiliated with IS. Considering these connections and conditions, it is possible for Russia to be involved in the flood of migrants from northern Libya.

Gadowski’s statements lay out a hypothesis with serious connotations, that the illegal migration as a hybrid war instrument, used by states that have direct interest in destabilizing Europe. Russia is obviously most interested in such disruption, since the economic sanctions imposed by the Occident, and oil prices slumping to \$46 per barrel (the Russian

federal budget is based on a per barrel price of at least \$100!) have serious negative impact on its economy. Turkey, in turn, is angered by American support for the Kurds. Also, Turkey seems determined to return to the Ottoman model. These issues are added to the challenges related to the control of hydrocarbon deposits in the Mediterranean Basin and the maintaining of the Russian energy vise upon Europe. Germany, and primarily Chancellor Merkel, as a promoter of economic sanctions against Russia, have become the main targets. Strategically, Russia needs to break European unity in order to reconvert the European map into a big geopolitical chessboard. This is the first step towards breaking up the NATO alliance and transatlantic unity.

### Conclusions

The “Arab Spring” ended *Ummah Arabiyah*, the Arab World, and replaced it with *Ummah Islamiyah*, the Islamic World. Failed states, Libya and Syria, have become a theater of proxy war which have generated an instability that has spread across three continents: Africa, Asia and Europe. Islamist barbarism has caused millions of refugees to flee their homes. Between the years 2011-2015, according to UNHCR, 3.63 million Syrian Shiites, Christians, Kurds, and Yazidis sought protection in neighboring countries: principally Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. By 2015, a peak of dislocation and conflict was precipitated as a result of a series of geopolitical events:

- Intra-EU conflict between Greece and its debtors, mainly Germany, over debts accumulated by Athens;
- image-related attacks against German Chancellor Angela Merkel following the incident with the Palestinian refugee Reem Sahvin;
- the ongoing conflict in Ukraine ;
- the US nuclear deal signed with Iran;
- the slumping price of oil and economic sanctions against the Russian Federation by the Occident ( Washington–Brussels-London-Berlin axis );
- serious domestic economic problems of the Russian Federation that undermined public confidence in incumbent president Vladimir Putin, who has built his reputation on a „winner – type” image;

- Turkey's aim to block a future Kurdish state at his southern border and current president Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Pan- Ottomanist renaissance;

- Russian intervention in Syria in support of President Bashar al- Assad.

In the context of a new Cold War in August 2015, Germany, some analysts have written, decided to abolish the "Dublin Rule" for Syrian refugees and to gain a geopolitical advantage in Syria in the post-conflict era. Statements regarding Germany's decision to receive without restraint Syrian refugees as a remedy for Germany's declining demographics is not supportable, as Eastern and Southern Europe suffers high levels of unemployment and poverty, but their unemployed is not encouraged to come to Germany. Consequently, resettlement of refugees in the Balkans would only exacerbate unemployment there.

Shortly after that, the invasion began, with the following features (September 2015):

- 69 % of the refugees are men;
- dominant age groups of migrant men is the one of 18-40 years, who recommend them for military service;
- only half of the migrants are Syrians, the rest are from South Asians (Afghanistan, Pakistan) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria , Eritrea , Sudan);
- migrants are mostly Sunni Muslims (given the areas of origin), the religion upon which ISIS is based;

The European states on the immigration route to Germany have been destabilized by the migratory wave and decided to close their borders. The same policy was also eventually adopted by Germany in September 2015, after a surge of 40,000 migrants arrived in Bavaria the first weekend in September.

In May 2015, the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, Federica Mogherini, tried to get Security Council approval to intervene militarily against Libyan traffickers of migrants, but faced the firm opposition of Russia and of the rump Libyan government. Relevant sources (intelligence officers, government officials) accuse Russia of involvement in the current resurgence of Islamism, and in the creation of IS. Moreover, Polish war reporter Witold Gadowski charges the Russian, Albanian and Turkish Mafia in management of migrant smuggling. Also, he states that a huge amount of money is obtained through smuggling and through the sale of Syrian artifacts, where Russian Mafia controls 90% of

the trade. The same Polish reporter observes that the real victims of Islamist barbarism are the Shiites, Christians, Kurds and Yazidis that were displaced in 2011, but remain in the Kurdish territories within the region, as well as in Lebanon and Jordan, rather than the current invasion of Europe consists mostly of opportunistic Sunnis able to pay the amounts of money requested by the mob. Part of them are economic migrants, some are jihadiis. Furthermore, he argues that this phenomenon is coordinated from four command centers: SI, Russia, Turkey and, possibly, Iran.

These combined elements suggest a state-directed invasion *via* routes managed by organized crime and terrorist networks in order to destabilize Germany, the motor of the EU; to attack the image of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, an *Atlanticist* leader of Germany in the mold of Chancellor Helmut Köhl, not in the image of former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder who is considered strongly pro-Russian; to destroy European unity, and subsequently to destroy the transatlantic relationship. These are all typical tactics of hybrid war. Therefore, the two outbreaks of instability, Libya, the most important African pier of the Trans-Mediterranean migrant route, and Syria have destabilizing effects on Central Europe. The situation is more serious as the wave of migration seems to be part of a hybrid war aggression with the aim of decreasing the responsiveness of the EU towards the aggressive plans of the Russian Federation in Syria and Ukraine, and to undermine Europe's determination to maintain the current economic sanctions against Russia. These conclusions should be read in conjunction with the current Russian President Putin's self-image to counterbalance domestic economic discontent, and maintenance of his image as the defender of Mother Russia, and all of Humanity in the battle against "American fascism".

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# THE ISLAMIC STATE VERSUS AL QA'IDA - WHO WILL WIN?

Alba Iulia Catrinel POPESCU\*

## Abstract:

*A new player in the global power equation came on the scene in 2014, the Islamic State. Born in the midst of the protracted Middle East crisis, the Islamic State organization is attempting to subsume Al Qa'ida (AQ) and to take over the leading role of the global Jihadist movements. Will AQ disappear? Will the Islamic State succeed in unifying and ruling the global jihadist movement? Might we witness the emergence of the global "caliphate", with "provinces" spread all over the world? Or, on the contrary, might the Islamic State disappear? Will AQ regroup and return in force, or we will face, instead, the fourth wave of terrorism, the "lone wolf" model?*

**Keywords:** the Islamic State, Al Qa'ida, the fourth wave of terrorism, Syria, FSB, Russian Federation

**Motto:** „Sometimes the root is more evil than any cause, though it's the cause that is usually most vilified.” Michael Connelly, *The Poet*<sup>1</sup>

The onset of 2014 brought a new player to the global power equation, the Islamic State (IS) that was born from the ruins of the ongoing upheaval in the Middle East. “The Modern Middle Ages”, as the prescient British political scientist Hedley Bull anticipated IS in the 1970's, benefits from information technology but is dominated by violence, barbarism, and ultra-conservatism. Will this exponent of the neo-Middle Age, the Islamic State, succeed in unifying and ruling the global jihadist movement?, Will Al Qa'ida disappear? Will we witness the emergence of the global “caliphate”, with “provinces” spread all over the world, or, on the contrary, might Islamic State, itself, disappear, making way for the fourth wave of terrorism, the “lone wolf” manifestation? Or, could terrorism subside and Moderate Islam win?

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### Brief Geopolitical and Ideological Remarks

In 1997, the Russian neo-Eurasianist, geo-politician Aleksandr Gelievici Dughin published "The Basics of geopolitics and the geopolitical future of Russia" in which he redefined, from a Russian point of view, Halford J. Mackinder's theory concerning world domination. Dughin argued in favor of Russia's need to strengthen the strategic axis of Moscow - Tehran - Damascus as a method of blocking the American geo-strategy in Eurasia and ousting the US from the strategic area around the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Dughin's strategy aim, the building up of the Eurasian Confederate Empire led by Russia, expounds as a "fundamental concept the so-called Eurasian geopolitical project"<sup>2</sup>, manifest in the aforementioned Moscow – Tehran - Damascus axis. Creating the Eurasian Empire will follow three specific steps. The first step will require "taking out of play" the "Atlantist" states of Turkey and Saudi Arabia through creation of an anti-Atlantist/pan - Arab realm, such as the Islamic Empire of the South, or a Caliphate, or a pan - African confederation. The second step will be the creation of *Euro - Africa* with the Mediterranean Sea transformed into an "inland lake". The last step will be the full control of Sub Saharan Africa. The vectors of the pan - Arab project would be anti-US states Iraq, Libya and Palestine, followed by reconstruction of a German-led European Empire<sup>3</sup>. Finally, Eurasian Hindu and Chinese autonomous areas would be added to complete the Eurasian Empire. The Arab inter-pivot area's importance is not only geo-strategic, but also geo-economic as host to the world's largest hydrocarbon reserves. Moreover, the Arab inter-pivotal space shows a common denominator represented by the culture and the civilization of the two major branches of the Islam doctrine: Shi'a and Sunna.

From the ideological point of view, Middle East is structured on two axes:

**1. Islamic Religious:** Sunna *versus* Shi'a and the Islamic denominations. In Sunni Islam there are four schools of legalisms, three of them accept to varying extent personal reflection and interpretation. The Hanbal school, underpinning Saudi Wahhabi ideology and "The Muslim Brotherhood" Movement, does not accept reflection and interpretation, but forbids any derogation from the rules attributed to the Prophet Mohammed's Medina period. Therefore, both Saudi Wahhabi (Salafi) and "The Muslim Brotherhood" are similar expressions of radical Islam which can be defined as ultra-conservative, militant, extremist and xenophobic. Conversely, Sufism, which overlaps the conservative schools, is a form of Islamic mysticism that emphasizes spiritual improvement.

**2. Ideological Islam:** Arab secular nationalism, or republicanism (Ba'athism and Nasserism), is expressed throughout the Arab world (*Ummah arabiyah*) in opposition to the Wahhabi Islam expressed by the



Sunni Islamic world (*Ummah Islamiyah*). Arab nationalism was geopolitically exploited by the USSR which established strong ties with Arab states in Northern and Eastern Africa.

### **Russian geostrategic axis and their stakes**

The 1979 Iran's Islamic Revolution, supported by France and the USSR, overturned the balance of power in the Gulf region, Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa with ramifications that are felt globally to this day. Iran, due to its geographical position, is the pivot, that if lost to Moscow, would break the inner Eurasian ring, part of the Russian security area, through three geostrategic axis: Moscow - Erevan - Tehran, Moscow - Damascus - Tehran, Moscow - Ankara - Tehran, with consequences for Central Asia and the Black Sea Region<sup>4</sup>. The loss of Iran's switched US attention from Sub-Saharan Africa to the Gulf region and has since forced US administrations to support Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iraq, despite their extremist ideologies and authoritarian governments.

The geostrategic axis of Moscow - Erevan - Tehran ensures Russian control of the Caucasus and the eastern Black Sea area, and is expressed through the hydrocarbon energy corridor running through Russia – Armenia – Iran, and a variety of special partnerships among the three states.

The Moscow - Ankara - Tehran geo-strategic axis, apparently strained by conflicting interests related to the Turkish minorities in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Iran, or by the “eternal” problem of the domination over the Straits, has proven effective in situations such as the Georgian War of 2008, the ongoing war in Ukraine and in the current war in Syria where Turkey managed its border favor of the IS<sup>5</sup>, but against the Kurds fighting alongside Syrian rebels against the pro-Russian regime of President Bashar al-Assad; blocked its air space for the transit of US military aircraft attempting to bomb IS positions<sup>6</sup>; and bombed pro-American Syrian and Iraqi Kurds positions, under the pretext of bombing IS positions<sup>7</sup>. Turkey applied *ad litteram* the provisions of the Montreux Convention regarding access by non-riparian ships to the Black Sea through the Bosphorus Straights, maintained economic relations with Iran in spite of a regime of international sanctions instigated by the US against “axis of the evil” Tehran.

After the implosion of the USSR in 1991, the Moscow – Damascus – Tehran axis became vital to Russian interests because the Tartus military base on the Syrian coast and military agreements with Iran support the Russian naval fleet patrolling the Mediterranean. The Axis also maintains Russian influence in the inter-pivotal Eurasian area and counterbalances Turkish leaders pan-Ottoman politics. But the most obvious expression of this axis has been manifested in the energy security field through the agreement signed by Syria with Iran and Iraq in 2011 for construction of

“the Islamic gas pipeline”. European energy dependence on Russian gas remains the main Western vulnerability, an Achilles-heel frequently exploited by Russia. All European attempts to reduce this dependence have been overcome by Russia namely in the failure of the Nabuco Oil Pipeline project, the failure of the Trans-Saharan pipeline project, and the *divide et impera* energy policy played by Russia in the European Union (EU). In 2009, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Turkey decided to build a gas pipeline to supply Europe using the old route of the failed Nabuco project<sup>8</sup>. This pipeline was projected to start in Qatar, to cross Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria to Turkey from where it would supply European pipelines. The Qatar - Turkey pipeline was expected to connect to another pipeline already operational, the Arab Gas Pipeline transporting Egyptian gas to Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Israel. However, President Assad's refusal to allow the Qatar - Turkey gas pipeline to cross Syria, combined with the initialing of a gas pipeline agreement with Iran that exclusively served Russian geopolitical interests in Europe, showed the power of the Moscow – Damascus – Tehran geostrategic axis.

The Tehran – Damascus axis is based on two elements: both the Shi'a Iranians and the Syrian Alawite leadership are seen by the Sunnis as heretics, and both the Shi'a and Alawites have benefited over the past 40 years from Moscow's support. This axis has been used by Russia to counter American and Israeli influence over Lebanon and Gaza regions that border the eastern Mediterranean where a huge gas field, estimated to 3.454 billion cubic meters, was discovered in December 2010. Called “the Leviathan”<sup>9</sup>, its boundaries are disputed between Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza Strip ( Hamas) and Cyprus. Both the pro - Iranian Hezbollah<sup>10</sup> and the Palestinian Hamas<sup>11</sup> had connections with the Russian Federation and were used as agents to foment geopolitical insurgency. Moreover, Russia is no stranger to this sort of operation, since its forerunner during the Cold War, the USSR, trained and equipped terrorist organizations and subversive groups. During the “Tri-Continental” Conference in Havana, in 1966, it was decided that the Communist states should fight by any means against Western “imperialism”. Soon, in Cuba, a center for training of the future terrorists was created under the direction of KGB general Viktor Simenov<sup>12</sup>. Later, under Directorate 1 of the KGB, the “Tri-Continental” Division was created to provide logistical support for movements, organizations, and terrorist groups in Great Britain (IRA), Palestine ( Hamas, PLF), etc. Terrorist organizations thus became proxies in the geopolitical competition of the great powers.

The discovery of “the Leviathan” oil field transformed the Levant basin into a geopolitical prize of prime importance, since oil and natural gas located in this region could undermine Russia's energy grip on Europe. In

this context, the states claiming parts of the great maritime gas deposit automatically become targets of Russia. Cyprus is considered one of the “Trojan horses” of the Russian Federation within the European Union. Russian interests in the region are also protected by Syria’s Assad and by the Hamas regime in Gaza. The only countries in the region where Russia lacks full control are Israel and Lebanon. In Lebanon, Iranian-supported Hezbollah, pro - Russian Hamas, as well as pro-American Israel operate. In 2000, Israeli forces withdrew from Southern Lebanon after 15 years of occupation and in the summer of 2006, Israel was strategically defeated by Hezbollah. In Israel, however, there is a possible Fifth Column in the form of an important community of Russian Jews who are supporters of right-wing parties, including current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud<sup>13</sup>. This community is increasingly hostile toward the the US and its partners, condemning, among other things, the recent nuclear agreement among a US-led alliance, and Iran; President Obama’s opposition to Israel’s plans to bomb the Persian state; an openness for dialogue with the Palestinians, and the concessions the Americans have offered Arabs since 1948. Moreover, there are voices within the Russian Jewish Community that argue the overthrow of Putin would endanger their survival<sup>14</sup>. It is obvious the possibility of supplying Europe with Levantine gas has created another flash point between Russia and the West, where the Moscow - Tehran and the Moscow - Damascus axis is vital to Russia’s energy strategy and her reassertion of Moscow’s super power status. In this context, it becomes increasingly clear that there is a connection between the Ukrainian conflict, the Russian aggressive policy in the Black Sea region, the war in Syria and the “Leviathan’s” implications.

### **The American geo-strategy, AQ and FSB**

In a relatively recent televised interview US General Wesley Clark spoke of a 2001 plan hatched by the George W. Bush administration to conquer seven states in the Gulf region<sup>15</sup>. From a geopolitical point of view this strategy has as a goal the creation of the trans-Eurasian belt. But, we have to remember Dughin’s geo-strategy too, where Iraq, Libya and Palestine were vectors for the pan-Arab union and for the creation of the German Eur-African Empire.

The year 1979 was marked by another major event, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. In conjunction with the events in Iran, we can say that USSR 1979 “victories”, including leaving Afghanistan a failed state, racked by civil war, became the trigger for global Radical Islam. The counterweight to the Soviet atheism was in Afghanistan, militant Wahabbi

Islam. Saudi–Wahhabi petrol dollars created and logistically supported the Mujahidin forces. US intelligence and military expertise facilitated Mujahidin operations. After the implosion of the USSR Islam's new enemies became the West and its culture. AQ was born from the ruins of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. American concessions toward Gulf monarchies to counter Iranian theocracy, facilitated Wahhabi Islam offensives in all Sunni lands, followed by the appearance of radical groups and the subordination of moderate leaders. As Hamas, Hezbollah, the IRA and other terrorist organizations were supported and trained by the Russians, AQ benefited from the support of the Saudis and their allies in the Gulf region. The US Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA, witnessed the rebirth of the modern Wahhabi movement, became Al Qa'ida's "midwife" then one of its targets, and, after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the CIA leadership was "put against the wall" by the US media and accused of incompetence<sup>16</sup>. Later, in 2011, the AQ leader responsible for attacks against the United States, Osama bin Laden, was killed and replaced by the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Pavel Stroilov, friend of the Russian Federation's Federal Security Service (FSB) of Colonel (defector) Aleksandr Valterovich Litvinenko, and editor of his book "Allegations"<sup>17</sup>, gave an interview to a British newspaper in which he described the connections between AQ leaders, the Russian Mafia and the FSB. He wrote: *"As the former leader of the terrorist organisation Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al Zawahiri was on international lists of most wanted terrorists for many years. In 1997, he suddenly re-surfaced in Russia, where he undertook a special training course at a secret FSB base in Dagestan. After that, he was sent to Afghanistan, and joined Al Qaeda as bin Laden's number two. Meanwhile, the FSB officers who had supervised him in Dagestan were promoted and re-assigned to Moscow. It was from them that Alexander (Litvinenko) learned about al Zawahiri"*<sup>18</sup>. Stroilov also quoted Litvinenko as saying *"it is possible to destroy the whole international terrorism tomorrow, along with the Russian Mafia. All you need to do is disband the Russian special services"*. Litvinenko described the recent rise of islamism as *Islamofascism*. Moreover, Litvinenko described the Kremlin as the *"center of world terrorism"*, describing the jihadi "lions of Allah" as, in fact, the "moles of Putin", and denounced FSB direct involvement with the so - called Chechen anti-Russian terrorism. In Stroilov's view, global terrorism is used by the Russian Federation to distract attention from other objectives pursued by Kremlin. In this regard, the defection to IS of the US-trained Tajik Colonel Gulmurod Halimov<sup>19</sup>, Commander of the Special Forces Brigade of the Interior Ministry, who found "true Islam" among IS, becomes less amazing.

In this frame of analysis should be included the documents discovered in Pakistan by the SEALs commandos who killed bin Laden which state that, despite the apparent divergence between AQ and Iran, that nevertheless there was ongoing cooperation allowing AQ to operate freely on its Iran national territory<sup>20</sup>. Moreover, the US Department of Treasury published on July 28, 2011, a report alleging a connection between AQ and the regime in Tehran charging the group led by AQ Yasin al- Suri operates on Iranian territory and provides logistic and financial support to AQ operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan<sup>21</sup>. The Russia - Syrian jihadii connection was also affirmed by the former Chief of Estonian Espionage, Eerik Niiles Kross<sup>22</sup>, who cited an investigation by Russian journalist Elena Milashina published in "Novaya Gazeta". Milashina described FSB involvement, since 2011, in creating safe transport routes for North Caucasus jihadists into Syria via Turkey. FSB involvement included procuring false passports, material support, and indirect support through tribal leaders. In 2012, according to Kross, Russian-speaking jihadis were already in Syria negotiating the unification of ISI and Jabhat al Nusra (JN) as ISIL, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The Western Front of ISIL, according to Kross, was led by Russian speaking jihadii while the Eastern Front was led by Iraqi Sunni officers trained in the USSR during the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, Pavlo Klimkin<sup>23</sup> Ukrainian Foreign Minister, also reported these connections. Kurdish fighters also reported the existence of Russian military operational outposts in the region. Also, Polish war reporter Witold Godowski cites the statements of Brigadier General Ahmad Aljideaa, deputy Defense Minister in the Syrian government in exile, which states that "in Russia there are four centers for military training, where are trained fanatics who then ranks the Army of the IS. Among those trained are Chechens."<sup>24</sup>

The US post 9/11 strategy aimed at countering the influence of Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, and the destruction of AQ and its franchise organizations. Regarding the Iranian problem, the alliance with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Gulf monarchies worked perfectly, while in case of AQ things have been complicated by the intervention of Wahhabi fighters and Russia. The Saud Dynasty, faced with growing criticism about its appetite for luxury and moral decadence, sought to overcome internal dissatisfaction through draconian internal repression and by funding Wahhabi missionaries. The US plan was to replace AQ islamism with a form of islamism practiced by the "Muslim Brotherhood" and other Islamist groups from Saudi Arabia, despite their Hanbali radical roots. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan have become US allies in the Gulf, and had a common plan that pursued mitigation of tensions in the Palestinian Territories, a plan heavily criticized by Israel. They also support Sunni and Kurdish factions in Iraq, an effort designed to undermining the Iran - Syria - Russia

efforts in nearby Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. For this purpose diverse forces were empowered by the Americans ranging from Druze and Christian militias in Lebanon, to the “Muslim Brotherhood” or other Islamist movements affiliated with AQ. In the article “The Redirection”<sup>25</sup>, Hezbollah leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, is quoted as criticizing US Middle East strategy that would redraw the regional map, and cause the fragmentation of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon along ethnic and confessional lines. This reconfiguration would eliminate two of the most powerful enemies of Israel, Syria and Iraq, and would create around the Jewish state “small and quiet” states. In Nasrallah’s opinion, Saudi Arabia and North African countries would eventually share the same fate, into small states divided along denominational lines. Hard to imagine how such a vast territory could be controlled, reduced to small states with several hundred thousand people each so that Israel, with only 3.5 million inhabitants, would become the largest and most powerful state in the Levantine and North Africa. True, this scenario would serve Israel’s security interests although, in reality, smaller states bring the risk of even greater instability, swaying coalitions and finally returning to the initial antagonistic situation. Also, it is extremely difficult to imagine how the US could benefit from a general religious and ethnic fragmentation of the Middle East and North Africa, in the context of hydrocarbon pipelines that will have to cross many state entities with their myriad competing interests. Additionally, the idea of perpetual US military occupation of the region, which alone could guarantee stability, is hardly imaginable and acceptable to American taxpayers who are constantly divided between isolationism and interventionism.

### **Syria's civil war and the emergence of the Islamic State**

In January 28, 2011, the Islamist “Muslim Brotherhood” accused the Alawite Assad family and single Ba’ath party of dictatorship, and sparked a series of anti-government protests in Damascus. On March 20, 2011 Syrian security forces opened fire on demonstrators in Daraa. The 15th to 21st of March, 2011 is considered “point zero” of the Syrian civil war. The Syrian civil war is now a proxy war. While the Assad regime has the support of Russia, Iran and more recently China, Syrian rebels were trained by the CIA at bases in Jordan, and have been logistically supported and provided intelligence by the US and Saudi Arabia<sup>26</sup>. At the beginning of 2013, the battle seemed lost by the Assad regime. In March 27, 2013, Bashar al-Assad called for BRICS political and military support<sup>27</sup>. A few days after Assad’s call, on 8 April 2013, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) fighters appeared in the Syrian theater of operations. The ISIL organization

resulting from the merger of two Islamist organizations affiliated to AQ: Jabhat al- Nusra (JN) and The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The merger was challenged both by Abu Mohammad al- Julani, JN leader and Ayman al- Zawahiri, AQ supreme leader<sup>28</sup> but part of JN militants remained loyal to the merger. The then recently created ISIL terrorist organization launched a series of extremely bloody attacks on Syrian opposition forces swearing to crush the rebel forces<sup>29</sup>. In June 29, 2014, ISIL stepped beyond the battlefield and proclaimed itself the global caliphate, Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi became caliph, and the territory controlled by the organization became known as the Islamic State (IS) organized into provinces<sup>30</sup>. By capturing of the city of Palmyra in May 2015, IS has come to control more than half of Syrian territory, through which run two Qatar - Turkey and "Islamic" pipeline routes. Soon islamist organizations and groups from Libya, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria declared their affiliation to SI. In November 13, 2014, al- Baghdadi announced IS expansion toward the "infidel" states Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Algeria, declaring them "IS operational provinces". He also declared any other Islamist movements unaffiliated to be illegitimate, and ordered them to choose between affiliation or a collision with IS forces<sup>31</sup>. The emergence of IS thwarted US efforts to take control of Syria. Moreover, we are witnessing today a more active Russian military presence in Syria, where the Tartus and Latakia<sup>32</sup> ports represent bridgeheads of an offensive that aims to recapture Syria and to force out both SI and rebel forces. Russia controls the Bassel al-Assad airport, the second largest in the country, and has transformed it into a permanent military base through agreement with the government in Damascus. According to Iranian sources, currently there are over 20.000 Russian troops and civilian experts stationed on Syrian territory<sup>33</sup>.

All this time, Turkey acted according to geopolitical expediencies. In the first stage of the conflict, until the emergence of ISIL, Turkey supported the US and its allies in supporting Syrian rebels. Starting with 2013, Turkey went to the other side, making its borders permeable for IS fighters and blocking aid to Kurdish forces surrounded in Kobane. Ankara also refused US forces permission to overfly Turkish airspace in order to bomb IS positions.

## **Conclusions**

The Middle East is evolving into two geopolitical blocks comprising Russia and its allies (Iran, Syria and Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip), against the US and its allies (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar). Other states in the area play more independent roles, such as Israel, Turkey,

Greece and Cyprus, even though the later three are NATO members and Israel has a special partnership with the US.

**American interests** are: containing the Russian imperial project, preventing Russia's transformation into a Eurasian hegemon; liberation of Europe from Russian energy domination; control of oil fields in the Persian Gulf and Levantine basin of the Mediterranean; ensuring the security of Israel, long time American bastion in the region; and balancing power between Shi'a/ Sunni Islam/Ba'ath.

**Russian interests** are: full control of its own security space including the Baltic and Black Sea Basin, the Caucasus, Iran and Central Asia, removal of the US from Eurasia's geopolitical "inner ring"; maintaining energy dominance over Europe and subsequent, cleavage of European cohesion and hindering Europe from building a network of alternative gas supply from Asia, Middle East and Africa; fracturing NATO cohesion and creating special partnerships with "independent" countries such as Turkey, Greece and Cyprus; undermining US-Israel cohesion by using the Jewish community of Russian origin and Israel right wing parties; support for pro-Russian regimes and movements in Syria, Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq.

"The key to the game" in the Middle East is **Iran**, pivot state in the Russian Federation security space and leader of the global Shi'a movement. Iran is included by Russia in three geostrategic axis: Moscow - Tehran - Damascus, Moscow - Tehran - Ankara and Moscow - Yerevan - Teheran, each of which facilitates Moscow control of the Black Sea Basin, the Caucasus, Caspian and Central Asia and the Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean regions, a truly huge region. As one of the largest oil producing states, Iran has an important role in oil and gas pricing. The Shi'a militia, Hezbollah, and the others are proxy tools acting for the benefit of Iran and its allies.

**Syria** represents the "hinge" state that tips the balance of power in the region and facilitates geopolitical inter - pivot communication. **Lebanon** was considered a "second Syrian state" due to ethnic and historical links between the two countries. Syria acts directly in Lebanon and in **Gaza**, through Hamas. The worsening crisis in Syria is a result of the Leviathan gas discoveries which threaten Russia's energy leverage in European affairs. Secondly, Assad's rejection of the Qatar-Turkey pipeline has further exacerbated the situation. Control of the resources of this region have transformed geopolitical competition into military confrontation.

From 1966 KGB and later, the FSB "Tri-continental" Division created and supported terrorist organizations and movements in the Middle East. To counter the USSR, the CIA trained Afghan Mujahidin. But, after



1990, the Mujahidin turned their weapons against the Americans and created AQ. In 2001 AQ attacked the US. After the death of AQ leader, Osama bin Laden, AQ leadership was taken over by Ayman al Zawahiri. According to the statements of former FSB Colonel and defector Alexander Litvinenko, al Zawahiri is a FSB agent and AQ activity is coordinated by the Kremlin. This information should be read in conjunction with first, the "defection" to the IS of the Tajik Colonel Gulmurod Halimov; secondly, the information released by Americans, according to which there were clear operational links of cooperation between AQ and Iran; and the statements of the former Estonian chief of Espionage Eerik Kross Nüles, the current Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin and the current deputy Defense Minister in the Syrian government in exile, Brigadier General Ahmad Aljjdeaa, charging Kremlin involvement in the development of the IS. The precursor of the IS, ISIL was founded in April 2013 by the merger of two AQ franchise organizations, JN and ISI. Since then, the balance of power has changed in Syria, Turkey has "played" squarely in the IS camp having its own interest in destorying the Kurds, Iraqi military forces have „gifted" their northern oil fields without a fight to the IS and Israel has become very critical of the Obama administration. SI has thwarted American efforts to take control in Syria and Saudi Arabia itself became the target of the IS. In addition, based on a Assad government invitation, Russia is strengthening its military presence in Syria, at Tartus and Latakia, in order to start offensive action against the pro-US rebels and IS. All these events and information, the documented connection between AQ - Iran and the often alleged connection between AQ – Russia and the Russia – Syria - Iran geo-strategic axis, all point to involvement by Russia in supporting AQ. The fact that IS is rooted in AQ, and its actions clearly served Russia's geopolitical interests in Syria, indicate also a potential involvement of Russia in the development of this organization. The Obama administration has made two important strategic moves in this context: the reopening of the diplomatic relations with Cuba and the signing of the nuclear nonproliferation agreement with Iran, which have to be considered in connection with the economic sanctions imposed to Russia and the oil barrel prices around 40 USD that undermines the Russian state budget. Russia's budget is predicated on per barrel prices of 100-117USD.

Therefore, the answers to the initial questions regarding the future of the two terrorist organizations can be found in the results of the geopolitical confrontation between the two blocks, the US vs. Russia. Both AQ and the IS have the same Hanbali ideological roots, and the merger of the two movements could develop naturally and simply. The current state of competition between the two terrorist organizations, which is more verbal than real, may be a hedging strategy of a joint central command or, indeed,

may indicate that there are different commands. Will the IS be able to assimilate AQ and become the leader of the global jihadist movements? More than likely, no. Most likely, in short time, the IS will be shattered as a battlefield force. Will AQ disappear? Probably not completely, but for sure it will not have the same strength as before. That is already a trend. So then, what will happen? Are we going to face a fourth wave of terrorism, that of the “lone wolves”? It is highly possible that the immediate future will belong to this new wave of jihadism. Let's not forget that IS uses a most barbaric form of neo-medievalism that satisfied internal drives of those with psychological problems, so it is highly possible IS will promote this tactic worldwide. Is Moderate Islam going to win? It is possible we will witness the revival of moderate Sunni legal schools, the only ones able to ideologically counter Hanbalism. If the efforts to reform Islam include stopping Hanbali Islam, weakening the intervention of Russia, reforming the despotic Gulf States, and ensuring effective local governance, then perhaps moderate Islam will be able to replace this toxic, extremist and ultra-conservative Islam.

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# NETWORK-BASED SECURITY MODEL. CASE STUDY: UKRAINE AND SEPARATIST REGIONS

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## Abstract

*Nowadays, because of the progressive breaking down of the distinction between military and civilian sector, it is difficult to find a clear border between battle space and non-battle space. Most of infrastructures, civilian and military, institutions and peoples are linked through various relations. These relations assure the functionality of the state. Therefore, an issue in one security sector can quickly escalate and produce effects everywhere, because, the modern state became a complex system of interconnected nodes. This system has some properties of complex network, thus, the aim of this paper is to study if the state system can be studied using the network analysis. Also, if national security is a network, it has its own topology and structure that changes if some relations broke up. As study case, I selected Ukraine, as an extreme example of break-up and war that damaged old relations and created new ones. Results that I received after an analysis through UCINET provided trends in Ukrainian security system.*

**Keywords:** national security, complex networks, graph theory, network analysis.

## Introduction

The famous war theorist Clausewitz argued that “the war is the continuation of politics with other means” or it is “an act of force to compel the enemy to do your will”<sup>1</sup>. The aim of the war is “to make your opponent powerless”<sup>2</sup> thus, to make possible to impose a favorable peace treaty and to accomplish a political goal. For a long time, the army and security apparatus has been perceived as ultimate ways to assure the national security. However, the end of the Cold War was a proof that a strong military is not enough to assure the security of a state. URSS fell under

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internal economic and societal problems, a phenomenon that strengthens opinions that security was, at that time, an underdeveloped concept. The most well known alternative to realist military security was the Copenhagen School, which argued that military security was only one of five security sectors: political, military, societal, economic and environmental.<sup>3</sup> Yet, because of the complexity of cross-sector relations, it becomes more and more difficult to study the security and predict possible threats.

The aim of this paper was to provide a network-based approach to study national security. National security is a system of systems - a network with multiple ties between political, societal, economic, military sectors. Through interaction of nodes, the system, becomes functional. This idea, based on graph theory, is largely used to study energy, transport and logistics. In sociology it is used to study relations within a group of people. In US military, it is used to assess the readiness of ground combat systems as well as to assess the operational environment before military campaigns. Finally, colonel John A. Warden III used this idea to study the enemy as a system.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the idea that the security or defense could be studied or designed using network theory is not new and is already used in various sectors. In this paper, I treated national security as a complex network, rather than a system of overlapping Copenhagen-style security sectors. In first section, I argued that the national security has the properties of a complex network that consists of nodes and relations. Therefore, I studied if it is possible to apply these properties in security studies. In the second section I argued that, even if the security has the properties of a network, it is, in fact, a multi-dimension hierarchical network, where some nodes have precise role for the functionality of the whole. Obviously, this kind of structure has its own topology which is difficult to study without advanced computing capabilities, because, for precise results, every node should be taken into account. Although, for the purpose of this paper, I used Warden's 5 circles model of defense to select relevant nodes and relations, in order to ease my analysis. Warden's model identifies five basic systems of a state defense and was a perfect framework to identify most important nodes to be analyzed by UCINET software. Finally, in the last part, I applied this method to study Ukraine and its separatist territories. Drawing a security network of pre-war Ukraine and applying network analysis tools, I identified most central systems of Ukrainian national security. The war and the annexation of Crimea broke some ties in this network, thus, important cascade effects spread in the whole system. Finally, broken ties enhanced the centrality of other nodes, creating new dependencies and threats, but, equally, new realities for Ukrainian national security.

### **Section One: security as network**

One way to study security is to consider it as a social construct. According Buzan and Waever, security is about survival. When an issue is presented as existential threat to a given reference object, the special nature of the threat justifies exceptional measures to deal with it.<sup>5</sup> Copenhagen School model considers state's security a system of five overlapping sectors that cover all aspects of social life: military, political, societal, economic and environmental. However, according to Buzan, security is an inter-subjective reality, because, it is the society that decides what is and what is not a security issue and legitimize the political class to take measures to solve it. Thus, security could be considered as a construct of a particular type of discourse and particular interiorized perceptions about the internal and external security environment. Another way to see security is to apply a realist framework, which is most used in realist security studies and in strategic studies. Thus, the military, the leadership and the security apparatus, as well as some vital infrastructures, are, by default, prioritized over social realities. Strategic sectors, political institutions, army, special services and strategic infrastructures are subjects of a special treatment, because state's survival depends on their functionality. Therefore, the government will try to secure them by all means. Here, we cannot speak about inter-subjective perceptions of security, because some state systems are extremely important to assure defense and combat capabilities in the case of war.

The problem is that, because states become more and more complex system, nowadays, it is more and more difficult to make a clear distinction between military and civil sectors, between defense and security, and, finally, between battle-space and non-battle space. New technologies, new contact and non-contact methods to influence society, economy, and new philosophies to do wars vanish the limit between war and peace. Actually, trade wars, information wars, currency wars are clear examples that some non-military tools could be more efficient and could bring more damage than military ones. The interconnectedness of technology, economy, military, and society means that boundaries between war and non-war could be totally destroyed in the near future and the actual battle space of future "unrestricted wars" could be everywhere.<sup>6</sup> Finally, the boundaries between security sectors also will be destroyed, because, being interconnected, a disruption in one sector will bring cascade effects in the whole system. In fact, because of this complexity, state security system is extremely vulnerable because small variations in its dynamics could trigger the "butterfly effect" that could affect everything. Therefore, national security could be considered as a complex network where

nodes and relations assure the operability of the whole and where risks are spread everywhere.

If the national security is a complex network, obviously, it should have some basic properties. Thus, a network, also called a graph, consists of nodes and edges - relations between them.<sup>7</sup> It is the basic condition for a network system and it could be fully applied to a security system. The national security consists of some reference objects: institutions, infrastructures, people, territory, etc. and of relations between these nodes: financial flows, loyalties, resources flows, command and control relations, etc. Nodes and their relations assure the operability and the survival of the state. Being isolated, a node is not a part of the system, it cannot be threatened or protected; it cannot spread risks or resources so, it is merely irrelevant for the functionality of the whole. Relations between various persons and infrastructures create various dependencies: psychological, social, political, military or resources. So, both nodes and relations are important for national security, and, as I said, it is a basic feature of a network system.

The second property of a network is the small world effect. It means that most pairs of vertices in the most networks are connected by a short path through the network.<sup>8</sup> This effect was described by Stanley Milgram who proved that two individuals could reach one another using a maximum of 6 intermediaries. The path is usually called geodesic distance. The more nodes the network contains, the longer it the average geodesic distance between nodes, however, the short path always exists and could be identified mathematically. No matter how large the network is, a node or a relation could affect everything because there is a short path between every two elements of the network. For security studies this phenomenon is relevant for one important reason. All risks, effects, resources and information spread through the system, generating first, second and third waves of cascade effects. Of course, the magnitude of influence is different for each node, however, in a complex system, even small variations could produce important and unexpected effects. The third property of a network is the clustering effect.<sup>9</sup> It means that some nodes have more mathematical chances to be in some type of relations, because the geodesic distance between them is smaller. So, the network consists of group of nodes that have high interconnectness, which forms some topological regions. This phenomenon could be easily observed in state systems. Economic regions, cities are clear example that some nodes are highly interconnected, and that makes them more likely to be in relationships and to influence each other. Even the state could be considered a cluster, because state institutions, the legal framework, national economy and the culture make territories and



individuals to be in contact, to depend and to influence each other with higher intensity, compared to same type of relations with the abroad. So, this clustering effect is extremely relevant for security because all relations between two given nodes will affect the whole cluster directly and more intensely than the other part of the system. A third property of a network, that makes sense for security studies is the network resilience. Each network has a particular resilience capability, and because of that, the removal of some nodes or edges, the network will modify its structure.<sup>10</sup> That means that, removing some elements of the network, we will modify its topology and geodesic distances between nodes. Again, for security studies it is a very relevant feature, because, the state system also is dependent on some elements and relations that are important for the functionality of the whole. For example, US Air force colonel J.Warden affirmed that the state has a minimum of 500 vital nodes, most of them being infrastructures, that could be targeted to bring the whole defense down. That means that some nodes are more central to assure the resilience of the network, therefore, they are most valuable targets for attack. From the other side, a less central node cannot modify the topology of the network, because of low interconnectedness. Finally, a fourth property of the network is the fact that each node will have a centrality. Actually, we can speak about a couple types of centralities: degree, betweenness and Bonachic power, closeness, etc. The degree of the node is the number of ties it has. The betweenness relates to the importance of the node as broker, an intermediary between other nodes. Finally, the Bonachic power is calculated according the centrality of the ego-network of a given node. The node who is linked to other nodes with high centrality will also have high centrality. For national security, this feature of the network is also very relevant. As I said, the state system has some vital nodes that assure the functionality of the whole and, obviously, they are usually the subject of a special treatment. These nodes, usually, have multiple relations with other nodes from the network, or they have solid relations with other central nodes. It means that they have high centrality, which is most relevant indicator to assess a node.

In conclusion of this section, the national security has the properties of a network. Thus, a network based approach on security could be useful to understand what nodes have critical importance. Also, this approach could identify critical vulnerabilities: every short-path that could be used to break up the system. This approach will take into account interactions between various nodes that structure the network. Using centrality measures that could be computed by network analysis soft, we could draw a picture of most central nodes in security system, this information being useful to

identify targets for military or non-military actions. Finally, this approach is very flexible - almost all physical and social relations could be expressed as nodes and ties. Of course, it says little about how security is build and perceived, but it will provide data about possible targets and vulnerabilities of security system.

### **Section two: hierarchical network and methodology**

In the previous section I discussed if security has the properties of a network and the answer was yes. We can apply the graph theory in security studies; however, it has its limits. First of all, networks are supposed to consist of same type of nodes and edges. It is valid to study social, biological, technological computer networks, if we study them separately. It is also valid to study nodes from the same security sector, because we can easily find a common denominator to quantify the intensity of interaction. Although, to study inter-sector ties a common denominator is not enough and sometimes it is impossible to identify. Identity relations are difficult to link with energy deliveries and equally, political loyalties are difficult to link with economic flows. Also, in contrast to simple networks, which can survive without some nodes, the modern state will be dysfunctional if the government, public administration or army fall from the network. In a state system some nodes have vital functions that cannot be taken by other nodes without modifying the whole topology of the security network. So, by default, these nodes should be placed into particular dimensions. Taking into account these facts, the security of the state should not be considered as simple network. It is a multi-dimensional structure with different type of edges and vital nodes that assure the functionality of the whole. It has a very complex topology and that makes it difficult to compute and to understand. Obviously, studying networks, a precise analysis should include full information about every node and interaction. However, in large systems, it is almost impossible to collect all data about nodes and relations. It will take time, resources, computing capabilities and will provide both relevant and irrelevant information for the analysis. Therefore, it is necessary to identify a framework that will help to collect what is really important.

For the purpose of this paper, I used the model of 5 circles, developed by USAF colonel John A. Warden III to identify relevant nodes and relations to be analyzed by network analysis soft. His idea is that all systems consist of command and political sub-systems, organic essentials, infrastructure, population and military.<sup>11</sup> Each enemy has its unique combination of these sub-systems and has a unique combination of “gravity

centers” that are vital to defense. It is an old concept, developed by Clausewitz, and means the most important part of enemy’s defense.<sup>12</sup> Actually, Warden argues that if the centers of gravity is a subject of parallel attack, the enemy falls into a strategic paralysis, because he cannot organize further resistance.

The main target for attack is the political leadership, however, it is difficult to hit, thus, other centers of gravity should be also considered for this type of action.

It is a hierarchical system, that could be seen as a set of concentric circles. Warden’s model was developed by US army and is used to design so called effect based operations. The US army Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint operations identifies five basic systems of enemy’s defense: political leadership, army, population, and information.<sup>13</sup> The whole operation area is considered a network of systems: allied and hostile. However, this approach is used to visualize some paths to analyze the operational area, not to calculate and assess the security system.

I used Warden’s model to select nodes and relations to be computed by network analysis software UCINET. This model helps us understand security as a five-dimensional network: political sub-system, organic essentials, infrastructure and production, society and military. These levels communicate through flows of information, finance, raw materials and energy. On the top, it is the political sector which is linked almost with all other nodes from the system, because it is the political system that assures the functionality of the state. Next, there are organic essentials, which assure the functionality of economy, society and of the defense system. Third, it is the infrastructure and production which assures financial flows for political leadership, society and generates GDP. Fourth, it is the society, at aggregated level, that assures the legitimacy of the state and the functionality of the economy. Finally, it is the army and security apparatus, structures that absorb resources and assure the security of the whole. These levels are linked together and influence each other in different ways by different magnitudes. None of these systems could survive without other systems. In addition, the network could not survive without one of these five systems because each of them has its own function. All of these systems should survive, because the state cannot survive without them.

To simplify my analysis, I did not calculate the intensity of these interactions. I selected most vital relations: political loyalties, finance flows, physical interactions, military control and energy. These interactions are vital for a state machine. In addition, Warden’s model provided a framework to select relevant nodes, because, obviously, there are a lot of

possible combinations of networks that could be studied in a state system. So, analyzing a state security network, I focused on interactions between the selected nodes. This data was computed through UCINET analyze software. However, to compensate some weak points of this kind of approach, a qualitative analysis was used as well.

### **Section three: the Break-up of Donbas and Crimea**

To apply this model, I selected Ukraine and its separatist regions: Donbas and Crimea. This choice has a couple of advantages. First, it is an extreme case when the “Center” loses all ties with its periphery. Broken ties, as I said before, modify the topology of the security network, so, it is a perfect example to study its resilience. The second advantage is the special relation between Ukraine and Crimea. The peninsula, virtually, was fully dependent on continental Ukraine resources, as water, fuel, transport, currency. The fact that quickly it broke some ties with Ukraine makes Crimea a brilliant case to study dependencies. In addition, Ukraine is a case of divided state, with regions that are linked only through the same political system. Finally, the break-up of two territories, modified not only the structure of state, but also the topology of Ukrainian security network. Therefore, some nodes became less central and some of them more central.

To simplify the model, the whole Ukraine was sought like a sum of interacting sub-systems: Crimea, Donbas and Central and Western Ukraine. In this model was also introduced Russia with its own systems. Therefore, selected systems form a so called security complex. Each of selected sub-system had its own Warden's circles and nodes related to these circles. Therefore, each region had its own political leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure and production, population and security apparatus. I selected relevant systems of nodes, for example energy, finance, industry, etc. The final matrix was analyzed by UCINET and I reached values of betweenness, closeness and Bonachic power for each node. Next, I excluded from the matrix ties that broke during the secession. The result was a model of Ukrainian security before and after the secession of Donbas and Crimea. Also, as I said in the previous part, this mathematical analysis was complemented with a qualitative analysis, because UCINET treat all data as being of the same type.

First, it was the political leadership circle. In Ukraine, due to weak government and strong oligarchic clans, the central government was not the only political authority. The Party of Regions, and so called Donetsk group, based in Donetsk and Eastern Regions, in fact, controlled the government

and the whole state machine. So, even if Donbas was, *de jure*, a part of Ukraine, due to large political importance of Donetsk elite, it could be considered an independent center of political decisions. Crimea, from its part, with large political autonomy, had its own political leadership. The relation that maintained these three nodes together was the Party of Regions that was the party of government and the representative of Donbas. In addition, through Donetsk group, the central government, Crimea and Donbas were linked to Russia.

Second, it was the organic essentials circle. I selected finance, energy and territory as most relevant organic essentials for my analysis. The territory is the most important infrastructure, and all other nodes have a precise geographic location, so they are linked to territory. Central and Western Ukraine has land border with Russia, Donbas and Crimea; Donbas has land border with Russia, and finally, Crimea has land border only with Ukraine. Second, the energy is another organic essential because, without energy, all other human activities are not possible. In this sector, obviously, we should take into account gas, coal, electricity and nuclear fuel. So, Central and Western Ukraine were dependent on Russian gas deliveries, but, as well, on Russian nuclear fuel. Also, its electric plants are dependent on coal deliveries from Donbas. From the other side, all gas pipelines to Crimea and Donbas were controlled by the Ukrainian government, which is an important feature of the network. Third, it is the finance. Ukrainian government controlled the emission of Ukrainian currency and, in addition, all main Ukrainian banks were located in Kiev. Therefore, Donbas and Crimea had no financial and bank system, because it was provided by Kiev government.

Third, it was the production and infrastructure. Here, I assumed that the economy of Crimea, Donbas and Central and Western Ukraine were connected through common flows of goods and services. Also, these economies were connected to Russia and the EU, as the largest trade partners of Ukraine. Finally, these “economies” were connected to local energy systems and financial system, because without these resources, economic activities were not possible. Also, I introduced some links between the economy and political leadership circle, who assured a legislative framework for the business.

Fourth, it was the population. Again, Ukrainian, Crimean and Donbas population were naturally linked to Russian population and political leadership, due to political loyalties, large cultural and family ties. Also, this population was working in the local industry and used common financial framework. In addition, the population of Central and Western

Ukraine had its own cultural and political ties with Russia. Last but not least, it is the army. Ukrainian political leadership controlled its regions through the security apparatus, present in all regions and being under the direct command of Kiev. From its side, Russia had military presence on its own territory, as well as in Crimea.

This data was introduced in UCINET matrix to identify main centrality indicators for selected nodes. This matrix was the base to draw a second one - the security network of post-war Ukraine. Relations between the government and regional political systems were deleted, as well as production and financial ones. Also people to people relations between Ukrainians and population of Russia, Crimea and Donbas were also deleted. Finally, the relation between Ukrainian army and separatist regions disappeared, because the central government lost military control over these regions. In contrast, a new relation between Russian army and Donbas was created, as well as between Russian financial system and Crimea. The second matrix was also processed through UCINET to identify relevant centrality indicators. These results were introduced in Table 1.

Analyzing Table 1, we could observe that in pre-war Ukraine, nodes related to Russia had high Bonachic Power value and that means they had highly central position in the network and had close relationship with other nodes with high centrality: population, energy system, production. Other nodes with high value of Bonachic Power were Ukrainian and Donbas population, as well as Ukrainian financial system, which connected the Ukrainian economy. All nodes from society circle, as well as Ukrainian financial system had low value of closeness. This fact means that these nodes were situated more close to other nodes; therefore, their capacity to influence all the rest of the network was higher. Russian political leadership and Ukrainian economy also had low value of closeness and, in consequence, a higher capability to influence the whole network. Finally, high values of betweenness could be observed for Ukrainian financial system, Russian political leadership, as well as for economy and society of all of three Ukrainian regions. High betweenness means these nodes were valuable brokers and assured the contact between other nodes.

The picture of post-war Ukraine is slightly different. Analyzing table 1, we can identify that the value of Bonachic power rose for all nodes that belong to Russia and dramatically decreased for all nodes that belong to Central and Western Ukraine. Actually, because of the war and the separation of Crimea, all nodes related to production and finance became less central. It is quite obvious, because financial and commercial relations were almost disrupted, at least, in Donbas.

	BonPw	Closene	betwee	Bon2	Clo2	Betw2	dBon	dClos	dBetw
armRus	600,6	56	1,485	820,03	57	3,555	219,43	1	2,07
armUk	674,05	53	2,39	334,67	67	0	-339,4	14	-2,39
eCrim	894,82	51	2,934	993,31	54	4,719	98,496	3	1,785
eCWUk	1328,6	46	11,941	1256,1	49	16,315	-72,6	3	4,374
eDonb	918,54	51	2,676	788,87	55	4,921	-129,7	4	2,245
eRus	1528,5	45	8,832	1635,4	48	12,938	106,92	3	4,106
finCrim	434,04	59	0	443,63	68	0	9,593	9	0
finCWuk	1889,4	41	36,064	1167,4	51	26,915	-721,9	10	-9,149
finDon	437,16	60	0	256,25	69	0	-180,9	9	0
finRus	1211,6	52	1,06	1306,4	54	1,493	94,74	2	0,433
pCrim	1165,4	48	4,849	0	125	0	-1165	77	-4,849
pCWUk	1510,3	43	14,702	1015,3	52	9,018	-495	9	-5,684
pDonb	1189,1	48	5,064	907,71	53	6,807	-281,4	5	1,743
poCrim	1874,1	41	17,119	1480	49	10,885	-394,1	8	-6,234
poCWUk	2054,6	41	10,963	1602,1	47	14,496	-452,5	6	3,533
poDon	1895,4	41	16,387	1606,7	47	18,34	-288,7	6	1,953
poRus	1828,3	45	5,511	1920	48	7,754	91,716	3	2,243
prCrim	1446	45	19,069	1136,5	55	9,562	-309,6	10	-9,507
prCWuk	1858,6	42	17,431	1381,9	48	16,531	-476,7	6	-0,9
prDon	1470,1	46	17,349	608,66	58	7,955	-861,4	12	-9,394
prRus	1930,2	43	11,812	1948,6	49	21,741	18,486	6	9,929
pRus	2169,8	42	28,147	2205	45	33,838	35,237	3	5,691
tCrim	1055,3	49	14,901	826,45	56	8,361	-228,8	7	-6,54
tCWUk	1437,9	44	14,045	1308,6	47	30	-129,3	3	15,955
tDon	1169,4	48	11,995	1096,8	50	18,403	-72,59	2	6,408
tRus	1388,4	46	11,274	1572,3	47	14,453	183,86	1	3,179

Table 1 : Centrality measures for pre and post-war Ukraine. <sup>14</sup>

Also, if we analyze the closeness indicator, we could observe that Russian political leadership became more close to other nodes, even if its value of closeness increased. Ukrainian financial system, political leadership of Crimea, Donbas economy and Ukrainian political leadership became less integrated in the network, because their value of closeness

considerably increased. It is a consequence of disrupted political and economic relations between Ukraine and its regions. Finally, Russian political leadership, the territory of Central and Western Ukraine, as well as Ukrainian financial system have high values of betweenness. It is quite different from the previous situation, because the importance of the territory controlled by Ukrainian government, actually, increased. It is also a consequence of disrupted nodes: the direct contact between the territories of separatist regions and territories controlled by Ukrainian government is one of the few relations that were not disrupted. Therefore, the energy and the territory are the only functional relations between these regions.

The topology of this security complex also changed. Nodes became less integrated in the network and the average distance between them increased. As a consequence, Russian systems increased their importance as brokers between Ukrainian state and its separatist regions. Finally, because Russian systems became more central, all nodes that are connected to Russian systems became more “powerful”, even if some of their relations with other nodes in the network were disrupted. Therefore, we can speak about one part of the network, controlled by the Ukrainian Government, that became less important, and the other part, controlled or influenced by Russian Government, that became more important. It means that Ukrainian security became more dependent on Russia and separatist regions, loyal to Russian government.

### **Conclusions**

The aim of this paper was to find and explain some security evolutions through graph theory. As it was explained in the first section, security has some properties of a network. However, various types of nodes and various types of interactions make this network a multi-dimension structure with complex topology. In order to study and get accurate centrality measures for this type of multi-dimension network, a more developed mathematical model is necessary. Also, a more developed way to select relevant data is necessary, because, without a precise way to select what nodes and relations are important and what are not, the analysis will be a subjective process that depends on the profile of the analyst.

Also, in the third section, I tried to use the network analysis to “simulate” Ukrainian security system. Actually, we cannot say that it is a separate system, because there is a clear link between Ukrainian and Russian security. It is more proper to speak about a security complex Ukraine-Russia. Also, analyzing centrality indicators, Ukraine and Russia became closer after the war in Donbass and the secession of Crimea.



Russian importance as broker for various processes within this security complex and the relatively low geodesic distance to other nodes enhanced its influence in Ukraine. It means that, wherever happens in Russia, it will influence quickly and intensely everything in Ukraine, Crimea and Donbas. In fact, Russia became a strong actor in Ukrainian security and, according Bonachic power indicators, it became the most influent one.

My approach to study Ukrainian security is a model and each model has its own deficiencies. First, it is only one part of the reality that was described using mathematical models. Obviously, this approach depends on the framework of analysis and subjective perception of “what is important and what is not”. Secondly, because of limited computing capabilities, I considered all relations: financial, political loyalties, energy flows, as being of the same type. Also, I did not take into account their intensity. Therefore, my results were blurred, even if they identified the correct trend. Finally, the low number of nodes and relations, included in my matrix, means that my model is one of the possible pictures of Ukrainian security. I selected nodes according Warden’s 5 circles model, so, a different framework to select nodes could give a different result.

Growing computing capabilities and a more appropriate mathematical model to study networks, could increase the accuracy of security analyze based on graph theory. This model could be a real alternative for constructivist approaches that highlight the inter-subjective ways to study security. A more objective approach is possible only through a network analysis, that will take into account both nodes and relations and will mathematically identify main cores of security. Therefore, new technologies and new analysis software could ease security analysis and target selection for military purposes.

## References

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